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Abstract
This thesis wants to understand how alternative firms deal with the complexity of 
balancing different rationalities in their intraorganizational coordination, in the 
absence of formal hierarchies. In a comparative case study of three small, 
democratically governed collective firms, the relationship between coordination 
and morality is analyzed. The majority of research on collective firms focuses on 
democratic governance structures, which risks to underestimate the importance of 
coordination that is based on intimate knowledge and personal relations. This is 
especially important to understand collective firms, which are dependent on lateral 
accountability and cooperation between their members. Consequently, this work is 
informed by the work of Laurent Thévenot which allows to understand coordination
based on different levels of generalization. 
The results of this thesis contribute to three different areas of research:
First, contributions are made to the field of valuation studies, by further developing 
insights on the notion of the test. The thesis also points out the central role of 
legitimate principles of difference and equivalence for successful commensuration,
and the tension between particularity and generalization in standardizing 
evaluation devices.
Second, the study contributes insights for scholarship on coordination and morality
in organizations. It demonstrates that considering coordination based on different 
degrees of generality yields important insights on intraorganizational coordination.
Finally, this study contributes to scholarship on cooperatives and collectivist 
organizations. The often noted duality of collective firms is reframed as the need to
balance and mediate different modes of coordination. The study develops a 
heuristic concept, the composite relation, which explains how collectives are held 
together despite their central tension between particular and collective goods.
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Introduction 
Organization theory is a wide field with diverging views on the subject of interest, 
but in general organizations are viewed as as social entities with a formal 
structure, purposefully created and recreated by actors in order to achieve specific
goals (Scott, 2004) or with an emphasis on the possibility of conflicting interests, 
they are seen as “systems of coordinated action among individuals and groups 
whose preferences, information, interests, or knowledge differ“ (March and Simon, 
1993: 2). A crucial question for organization theory follows from this: How do 
organizations achieve the coordination of individuals with diverging information 
and interest in order to achieve specific goals? In organization studies, some 
variation of bureaucratic or formal hierarchy is usually assumed as the 
fundamental basis of governance and coordination (Ahrne and Brunsson, 2011). 
Bureaucracies are effective in supporting ongoing coordination because their 
hierarchical structures reduce the potential for open conflict between individuals, 
objectives or values. Formal hierarchies ensure, that ultimately a person, or a 
group of people “on the top” are able to define the common interest and 
delegitimize anything that can be deemed as particular, individual or egoistic from 
this point of view. 
While organizational scholarship in general can be characterized by a “relative 
neglect of 'actually existing‘ alternatives” (Reedy, 2014: 640), this study is 
interested in how alternative firms deal with the complexity of coordinating and 
balancing different people, as well as rationalities in the absence of formal 
hierarchies. How does an organization without formal hierarchies handle 
uncertainty in the face of new situations, where multiple different rationalities and 
evaluative logics could be applied? How does such an organization resolve 
conflicts between people and/or rationalities? This study analyses the relationship 
between coordination, evaluation and morality in three small, democratically 
governed collective firms. The cases were selected based on the firms using 
collective, democratic governance structures, not on the legal form of the 
10
Pohler - Collective firms between collective and company
cooperative. This understanding of collective firm mirrors Rothschild and Whitt’s 
definition of a collective or a cooperative as “any enterprise in which control rests 
ultimately and overwhelmingly with the member-employees-owners, regardless of 
the particular legal framework through which this is achieved” (1989: 2). 
The fundamental basis of governance and coordination in alternative organizations
is always some form of organizational democracy. The literature on democratic 
organizations is still influenced by the ‘iron fist of oligarchy‘ (Michels, 1957), the 
idea, that every complex organization will over time unavoidably develop into an 
oligarchy. This is assumed to happen, because complex organizations need a 
division of labour, and thus specialization. From specialization follows the 
development of hierarchies and ultimately, an elite of experts emerge. Another 
related specter that still haunts scholarship on democratic organizations is the 
‘degeneration thesis’ (Cornforth, 1995), which specifically targets democratic 
worker cooperatives. The degeneration thesis posits that worker cooperatives, 
over time, will degenerate from a collective which uses direct democracy to a 
conventional managerial hierarchy. It is argued this is happening, because in order
to fulfill their role as an economic enterprise, cooperatives will start to use more 
and more formalization. The ‘degeneration thesis’ has its origin in Marxist and 
socialist critiques of worker cooperatives. Here, the cause for ‘degeneration’ are 
external forces, the capitalist relations of production. The need to survive in a 
competitive market forces worker cooperatives to seek profit, and, over time, they 
lose their radical ideas and start to adopt the same structures as every other 
capitalist firm. The ‘degeneration thesis’ also has non-Marxist proponents, which, 
referring to Michels, locate the reason for the failure to maintain democratic 
structures in problems of intraorganizational coordination (Cornforth, 1995: 489 – 
492).
A “preoccupation with failure“ (Stryjan, 1994: 62) has contributed to a lot of 
research on collective firms that directly aims to refute the degeneration thesis 
(Cornforth, 1995; Langmead, 2016; Storey et al., 2014). While scholars seem to 
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agree, that governance based on direct democracy is unrealistic in larger 
organizations, they highlight that not every form of formal hierarchy means that an 
organization is governed by an elite of oligarchs, as there are many possible forms
of democratic governance (Putterman, 1984; Cornforth, 1995; Meira, 2014). 
Michel’s idea that division of labour is incompatible with sustaining equality and 
democracy in a collective heavily influenced 1960s and 1970s counter culture and 
their alternative organizations (Freeman, 1972; Levine, 1975; Neumann, 2008; 
Rothschild-Whitt, 1976; Rothschild and Whitt 1989). Consequently, job rotation is 
often used as an anti-dote to degeneration (Kokkinidis, 2015; Rothschild-Whitt, 
1976; Sobering, 2019). However, research has shown that specialization and 
division of labour is not necessarily undermining democracy (Hunt 1992; Cornforth
1995).1
There is ample theoretical and empirical work on collective firms that lays out 
conditions, possibilities and facilitating factors that make democracy in economic 
organizations possible (Bernstein, 1976; Chakrabarti and Varman, 2004; Cheney 
et al., 2014; Cornforth, 1995; Johnson, 2006; Kokkinidis, 2015; Reedy, 2014; 
Rothschild, 2016; Rothschild-Whitt, 1976; Sauser, 2009; Spear, 2004; Stryjan 
1994). Jaumier (2017: 219) summarizes factors the literature describes as 
facilitating ongoing democracy and equality as (1) relating to environment and size
– for instance small-size and niche-markets, and (2) rules and procedures that 
support democratic practices – among the most common democratic decision-
making. 
This thesis is interested in intraorganizational coordination, which is, however, not 
limited to rules and procedures. The majority of research on collective firms 
focuses on the design and maintenance of democratic governance structures, to 
1 Division of labour and specialization has never been an issue for the collective firms I‘ve 
analyzed in this study. Like all firms, they may at times face coordinative problems due to a 
division of labour, but specialized knowledge and skills of members is not seen as a danger to 
their collective governance per se. Division of labour is specifically discussed in Pohler 2020b.
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the detriment of an analysis of everyday experiences and practices and how 
relationship dynamics on the ground contribute towards organizational dynamics 
(Jaumier, 2017; Langmead, 2016; Resch and Steyaert, 2020; Stryjan, 1994). 
According to Stryjan, a democratic firm is “run and shaped by what its members do
in the course of their daily interactions with their organization as much as by what 
they say at formal assemblies” (Stryjan, 1994: 66). A focus on the formal 
characteristics of organizational democracy risks to underestimate the importance 
of coordination between people and their social-material environment that is not 
based on formal rules, but on intimate knowledge and personal relations. 
Consequently, this work uses central ideas from the economy of conventions 
(Eymard-Duvernay et al., 2005; Diaz-Bone, 2011), a theoretical approach that 
allows to understand coordination based on different levels of generalization. 
The economy of conventions furthermore allows to reconsider the prevalent notion
of collective firms as characterized by a duality of being a social and an economic 
organization (Ashforth and Reingen, 2014; Meira, 2014; Langmead, 2016; Styjan, 
1994). This duality is usually understood in two main ways: On one hand, echoing 
the degeneration thesis, it is seen as one between idealism and pragmatism 
(Ashforth and Reingen, 2014), whereby “pragmatism” refers to an economic 
rationale. In another variant, this duality is described as one between formal, 
impersonal structures, and informal, personal relations. For instance, Meira (2014)
describes “Omega”, a worker-coop, as an organization that exists in a tension 
“between structure and anti-structure”, since “the coercive mechanisms implied in 
institutions and technology will meet the brotherhood of cooperators in an ongoing 
challenging contradictory process.” (Meira, 2014: 726). 
While collective firms certainly comprise informal, as well as formal structures and 
they “conceive(s) social and economic goals as interdependent” (Langmead, 
2016:80), thinking in these dualities risks to overlook the actual complexity that is 
at play. According to Boltanski and Thévenot’s “On Justification” (2006), one of the 
central works following the economy of conventions perspective, “the social” as 
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well as “the economy” always already comprise compositions of different values 
and related rationalities.
The main research interest of this thesis is what it means to be a collective and a 
company at the same time and which coordinative tensions ensue from this. The 
starting point of the analysis is, however, not to look at tensions between formal 
and informal structures, or social and economic values. An economy of 
conventions perspective posits ‘complexity’ (Eymard-Duvernay et al., 2005), an 
intermingling of multiple values, where others often conceive ‘duality’. Taking 
guidance from the economy of conventions and French pragmatic sociology, this 
thesis starts with the problem of coordination in the presence of multiple and at 
times conflicting rationalities. According to Thévenot, coordination is not just a 
“lawlike process mainly determined by forces, constraints, rules, dispositions, 
habitus, and all the rest”, instead, coordination has “undetermined, dynamic and 
creative aspects” which arise “from the operations of evaluation, which actors 
depend on for the conduct of their action and their selective access to reality” 
(2002: 57). From this perspective, coordination is always seen as related to 
evaluation and thus, ultimately, morality.
The existing literature on collective firms is mainly focused on the achievement of 
democratic governance and often relies on conceptions of a foundational ‘duality’. 
This study contributes to this literature by broadening the perspective on the 
relationship between coordination and normative ideas. The research wants to 
understand which coordinative and evaluative tensions exist inside collective firms 
and how they are mediated or resolved. This interest is informed by the theoretical
work of the economy of conventions in general and in particular, by the work of 
Laurent Thévenot (Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006; Thévenot, 1984; Thévenot, 
2001b). 
The theoretical concepts this study uses are explained in detail in the articles of 
this thesis. However, in the following I will give a short overview of the central 
14
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concepts, since this is necessary to understand how the research aims and design
have been developed. Therefore, I will shortly introduce the economy of 
conventions, Boltanski and Thévenot‘s pragmatic sociology of critique and 
Thévenot‘s sociology of engagements. Next, two different research perspectives 
on organizations that these frameworks afford are distinguished. Based on this, I 
will discuss the current state of research in the academic literature. Subsequently 
the research aims and questions, as well as the research design and methodology
will be introduced.
The Economy of Conventions
The economy of conventions (henceforth EC) is an interdisciplinary research 
programme in the social sciences, that emerged in France in the 1980ies 
(Desrosieres, 2011). With the aim of developing a counter-paradigm towards 
standard economic theory, the programme incorporates three issues that are 
usually separated in economic thinking: “the characterization of the agent and his/
her reasons for acting; the modalities of the coordination of actions; and the role of
values and common goods" (Eymard-Duvernay et al.,2005: paragraph 1). A 
leading questions is how uncertainty in coordination can be resolved by actors that
are capable of not just a calculative, but an interpretative rationality: “In the centre 
of interest, (...), we find the situation in its temporality, the individual’s uncertainty 
about the identification of the situation and the interpretative effort that is required 
to determine, together with others, the situation as a shared and common one.” 
(Wagner, 1994: 274). For the EC the achievement of coordination is not something
that can be taken for granted, but has to be explained, since: “In its ordinary 
singularity, any coordination is uncertain in so far as it brings into play 
heterogeneous actors, takes place over time, and focuses on a product (or 
service) that is never entirely predefined.” (Eymard-Duvernay et al., 2005: 
paragraph 18). This uncertainty can be resolved by using conventions. 
Conventions are cognitive or interpretative frames which help to coordinate as well
as evaluate practices: “Conventions channel uncertainty on the basis of a common
15
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form of evaluation that qualifies objects for coordination.” (Eymard-Duvernay et al.,
2005: paragraph 20). Each mode of coordination is based on and determined by 
conventions, that is, specific cognitive and evaluative forms. The central idea of 
the EC is that coordination is accomplished through the use of evaluation 
principles. “Evaluation is at the centre of coordination; it is not an argument, 
among others, of the individual function of utility, an invisible bedrock sub-
contracted for analysis to other disciplines of the individual function of utility, or a 
value added to rationality to complete or correct it.” (Eymard-Duvernay et al., 
2005: paragraph 22).
The EC assumes a plurality of available cognitive and evaluative formats - or 
conventions - that can be used for coordination. One of the central works coming 
from this perspective is Boltanski and Thévenot’s “On Justification” (2006, 
henceforth OJ), in which they develop a model of the structure of the most 
legitimate conventions, based on different ideas of a common good. 
On Justification and the Economies of Worth Framework
In OJ, Boltanski and Thévenot describe the most legitimate conventions in 
contemporary societies, which set up just ‘orders of worth’ since they allow to 
combine a principle of a common humanity with meritocracy. People can acquire 
different states of worth according to their contribution to a common good. These 
orders of worth are repertoires of justification based on a central principle of 
equivalence, that people with critical capacities can mobilize in different situations 
for critique or justification. The moral economy of the orders of worth is extended 
towards 'common worlds', which house specific objects and subjects that have 
meaning and worth. This extension towards ‘worlds’ is necessary to understand 
how critique and justification is pragmatically enacted.
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OJ distinguishes six different worlds2: The world of the market, in which a 
competitive market is valued, and which is populated by merchants, customers 
and market goods. In the industrial world technical efficiency is valued, and 
important people and objects are engineers, experts, methods and infrastructures. 
The civic world values collective interest, and therefore citizens and unions, rules, 
rights and welfare policies. In the world of fame, celebrities have the highest state 
of worth and acquire this through media. The domestic world relates worth to 
reputation, a relational order of people is based on heritage and history. In the 
inspired world, the worthiest people are artists and inspired people, which are 
characterized by grace, nonconformity and creativity. All of these worlds can be the
basis of coordination. If the market world is of high importance in an organization, 
than coordination and decision will tend to rationalize in regards to market 
expansion and good salesmen will have a high status. If the industrial world is of 
high importance, coordination and decision will tend to optimize product quality 
and consequently, technical expertise will have a high status. 
The theoretical framework in OJ has been developed to support a pragmatic 
sociology of critique, which is able explain how people deal with a multiplicity of 
legitimate common goods in situations, in which there is a controversy over the 
worth of the involved people and objects. Based on the common worlds, Boltanski 
and Thévenot distinguish two kinds of critique: The first kind is an internal or 
reformative critique, when an arrangement or a situation is criticized because its 
supposed order is faulty. There are three possibilities of internal critique. First, it 
can be criticized that an object which is necessary for a correct test in a world is 
missing, or that an object that is important is not functioning properly. For instance,
someone argues that a competition between two runners is not fair, because one 
of the runners has inferior running-shoes. A second critique can claim that 
someone has been unjustly overvalued due to aspects or characteristics that are 
2 The six worlds have been extended by Thévenot, Moody, and Lafaye (2000) with the green 
world and Boltanski and Chiapello (2005) with the project world. Since these worlds did not 
appear empirically relevant in my case studies, I won‘t discuss them here.
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not relevant. Someone might criticize a job interview (industrial world) in which the 
interviewer takes into consideration aspects of the applicant that are not “of 
relevance”, i.e. attributes that have no worth in the industrial world, like expensive 
clothes, family background etc. Boltanski and Thévenot (2006: 220) call this a 
“transport of worth” from one world to another. A third possibility is a “transport of 
deficiency” from one world to another, for instance, if an applicant is not accepted 
because one of the interviewer’s friends does not like her.
The second kind of critique that is distinguished in OJ is the external, or radical 
critique. It criticizes one order of worth from the standpoint of another order of 
worth. Boltanski and Thévenot call the resulting situation a 'clash of worlds' (2006: 
223) “if a customer waiting in the line at the post office were to claim the right to go
straight to the window because he is wealthy, he would be denouncing the validity 
of justice on which public service relies” (2006: 224).
A critique can lead to a critical moment, in which people, who are doing things 
together and have to coordinate their actions, realize that “that something is going 
wrong; that they cannot get along any more; that something has to 
change.”(Boltanski and Thévenot, 1999: 359). According to Boltanski and 
Thévenot, “One can make a link between very different stories if one accepts the 
idea that justified disputes are always grounded on the disagreement whose object
is the relative size or worth of the different beings present in the situation.“ (1999: 
363). 
In order to solve a disagreement, a test can be set up, in which actors are trying to
come to a justified evaluation of worth of subjects and objects involved in a 
situation. Such a test can only be set up if actors agree on a higher evaluation 
principle on which the test is based on. The test then has to be conducted in a 
way, that it is “cleaned” of elements from other worlds, a “pure” test only takes into 
consideration elements from one world (2006: 138). These tests are conditioned 
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and supported by the involved people making use of objects in the situation that 
help to legitimize their arguments. 
If participants are unable to settle on one world, they can work out a compromise, 
resulting in a composite arrangement. Composite arrangements are situated 
between orders of worth: “We use the term ‘compromise’ in a specific way to 
designate the kind of composition between orders of worth (and not only between 
particular interests) which suspends controversy, without having resolved it by 
recourse to a test in a single order of worth” (Thévenot, 2001a: 411). In composite 
arrangements, people are able to establish a compromise between different 
conceptions of justice and therefore avoid a clash. These compromises are made 
more stable by the creation of objects composed of elements stemming from 
different worlds which are endowed with their own identity “in such a way that their 
form will no longer be recognizable if one of the disparate elements of which they 
are formed is removed” (Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006: 278). An example is that of
worker's rights, which associate : “[…] an object from the civic world (rights) with 
beings from the industrial world (workers). This grouping is inherent in the union 
movement, and more broadly in all arrangements with which the term 'labor' can 
be associated […]” (2006: 278). 
There is a third possibility to solve a conflict, a private agreement. Private here 
refers to “something that ignores the common good, implies benefits only to the 
parties involved, and does not aim at justification” (2006: 337). A private 
arrangement, then is “a contingent agreement between two parties that refers to 
their mutual satisfaction rather than to a general good” (2006: 336).
Organizations as Compromise Devices
According to Laurent Thévenot, organizations are “devised to generalize, both in 
terms of temporal and spatial validity certain forms of relations between human 
beings and their environment“ (Thévenot, 2001a: 407).  Organizations enable 
coordination by creating certainty in regards to the socio-material environment, this
19
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certainty is based on the assurance, that relations to the environment will remain 
stable over time. Stability is achieved by generalization, which means, that 
situations are handled according to general rules, if the situation at hand can be 
subsumed under a general rule. If, for instance, there is a general rule on how to 
take decisions, this rule will be applied whenever a decision has to be taken. 
Generalization is achieved by 'investing in forms' (Thévenot, 1984). An investment 
in a form is “a costly operation to establish a stable relation with a certain lifespan” 
(Thévenot, 1984: 9). Invested forms, like a manual on how to take decisions, 
sustain specific modes of coordination by qualifying persons or objects, they 
objectify and standardize and therefore enable coordination over time and space. 
Investing in forms involves more than just the usual notion of investment, as 
sacrificing financial liquidity, it involves sacrificing “particularization or 
characterizations of entities which could sustain other forms of equivalence and 
possible coordination” (Thévenot, 2011: 41). Examples for invested forms range 
from personalized equipment, like a personalized window manager for computer 
workers which has only limited reach, to organization-wide forms like procedures 
for decision making or hiring people, to public forms which have a wide spatial 
validity, like international time. Once investments have been made and forms have
been established, coordination rests on them and it is costly to change to a 
different form of coordination, since for this, the underlying form-investments have 
to change.
With multiple orders of worth and the composite arrangement as conceptual 
background, it becomes possible to view organizations as social spaces in which 
multiple different rationalities are used for coordination. For Laurent Thévenot, 
organizations are “compromising devices between several modes of coordination 
which engage different repertoires of evaluation” (2001a: 405) because they use 
different form investments to connect and compromise different modes of 
coordination. Form-investments can take up the form of compromise 
arrangements, these sustain a form of coordination which is based on a 
compromise between different evaluation principles or orders of worth.
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In summary, for Thévenot, organizations are able to deal with of two different 
obstacles to coordination: (1) Contingency and uncertainty, as well as (2) the 
presence of multiple and conflicting legitimate principles of evaluation. They can 
deal with these obstacles to coordination because, first, they establish certainty 
over time and space by the generalization of relations. Second, they establish 
relatively stable compromises between multiple, conflicting values by designing 
form investments as composite arrangements. 
The Regimes of Engagement
Most English language papers that utilize the economies of worth framework 
solely focus on Boltanski and Thévenot’s pragmatic sociology of critique as laid out
in OJ. This work, however, also incorporates the work Laurent Thévenot 
developed after OJ, in order to deal with coordination and evaluation below the 
level of public justification. 
The Economy of conventions differentiates between a 'horizontal' level and a 
'vertical' level on which pluralism and complexity in coordination can be 
differentiated (Eymard-Duvernay et al. 2005). This addresses the problem of social
theories that either focus on local modes of coordination – like routines or 
contracts -, or more public modes of coordination – like institutions or citizenship. 
Theories that focus either on local or public coordination, “cannot account for the 
movements required to shift from one to the other when a rule or law is applied 
with careful attention paid to the specificity of the case, when a public policy 
‘moves closer' to people, or when the functional object or plan is adapted for a 
particular use” (Eymard-Duvernay et al., 2005: paragraph 20). On the horizontal 
level of complexity in coordination, different forms of the common good, which 
serve as the base for generalization are distinguished. This is the level where the 
orders of worth are located. The 'vertical level' of coordination distinguishes 
between different degrees of generality that coordination is based on. The plurality 
on the vertical level concerns the difference between very public forms of 
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coordination, related to public forms of legitimation, and more local forms of 
coordination which rely on local ideas of legitimacy (Eymard-Duvernay et al. 
2005). With the private arrangement, Boltanski and Thévenot already introduced a
form of coordination that is not based on a generalizable common good in OJ. 
With the sociology of engagements Laurent Thévenot has developed a model that 
incorporates the plurality of coordination on the vertical level, it describes how 
agency and coordination can be supported by formats with varying degrees of 
generality.
Thévenot differentiates four main ways people can be engaged with their socio-
material environment: The regime of public justification, in which people coordinate
their actions according to a common good, the regime of planned action, in which 
people coordinate their actions in order to achieve a plan; the regime of 
engagement in familiarity, in which people protect personal and local convenience;
and the regime of engaging in exploration in which excitement and novelty is 
pursued (2001b, 2011, 2014, 2019).3 Social coordination in OJ is restricted to 
situations in which there is a need for public justification, so that critique and 
justification of action have to refer to some conception of a common good. In 
contrast, with the regime of engagements Thévenot has developed a model that 
incorporates different modes of agency which allow for different modes of 
coordination and related modes of establishing commonality. These concepts 
3 Thévenot’s sociology of engagements, in addition to the regimes of engagement, comprises 
also different ways of composing commonality and differences, the ‘grammars of commonality’, 
which refer to the regimes of familiarity, the plan and public justification (2015, 2019). The 
grammars are not discussed in this thesis as they have not been used. The grammars of 
commonality already provide typologies of communicating and differing in commonality, 
whereas this thesis starts from the question of how different modes of coordination influence 
the composition of commonality. From this perspective, the regimes are on a scale more 
adequate to the research interests. Furthermore, regimes and related modes of coordination do
not necessarily match grammars of commonality in the context of organizations, in contrast to a
political context . For instance, engaging in a plan inside an organization might be related to 
interests of the organization, and not the interests of individuals (see related Eranti, 2017: 297).
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enable us to draw a meaningful distinction between “agency of the most personal 
or intimate kind and agency that is collective, public or institutional” (Thévenot, 
2001b: 57).
Figure 1: Horizontal and Vertical Complexity in Coordination
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Regime of 
Engagement
Familiarity Planned Action Public justification
Invested power The easiness coming 
from personal 
habituation
The autonomy of the 
self projected in the 
future
Worth qualifying the 
common good
Engaged good ease Self-projection through
individual plans or 
projects
Participation in the 
common good
Engaged Reality Personally 
accommodated
Functionally grasped Qualified for the common 
good






given confidence in 
one’s project
Preparing for the trial of 
public qualification
Table 1: Regimes of Engagement, adapted from Thévenot 2019
Combining the Economies of Worth Framework and the Regimes of
Engagement to Analyze Collective Firms
This thesis views organizations as social spaces in which different actors with 
differing orientations have to coordinate their actions. To understand the continued 
existence of an organization, it is therefore necessary to understand how different 
orientations and goals are mediated and balanced. This is especially crucial to 
understand organizations that are not based on formal authority and control, but 
lateral accountability and cooperation between their members. To some extend, all
collective firms have a prefigurative function for their members (Maeckelbergh, 
2011), insofar as they try to create the kind of economic and social relations that 
they would like to see in the world. In collective firms, which strive for good 
working conditions and solidarity between their members, the organization is not 
just a means, but an end itself. An analysis of collective firms therefore has to 
entail a consideration of how normative values function as both resources and 
constraints for the organization. The economies of worth framework allows to 
analyze the moral complexity that organizations have to deal with and how moral 
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orientations are utilized and balanced in organizational structures. Collective firms 
in this perspective can be regarded as compromises between at least the market, 
the industrial, and the civic world. 
However, it makes sense to assume, that the interrelation between morality and 
coordination in collective firms can not sufficiently be captured by the economies of
worth framework. This is for two main reasons:
First, a central principle of Boltanski and Thévenot’s orders of worth is that of a 
‘just meritocracy’. The orders of worth allow to order people and objects according 
to their relative contribution to a common good. Meritocracy is an idea that is in 
tension with the ideal of the equal worth of all members in a collective. Therefore, 
one can expect that in collective firms, wherever a “ranking” of members is 
attempted, there will be critique or resistance which is not necessarily based on a 
different order of worth, but on an ideal of equality. Therefore, an analysis of 
collective firms needs to be able to consider coordination that does not rely on the 
construction of equivalences and subsequent ordering.
Second, collective firms are organizations in which personal relations between 
members are important. An analysis of them therefore needs to include personal 
attachments and relations and the meanings and goods that are embedded in 
them.
Thévenot’s regimes of engagement allow to consider coordination below the level 
of public justification and specifically, to understand the caring relations that an 
engagement in familiarity values.
Two Analytical Perspectives 
In a review article on the use of the economies of worth framework in organization 
studies, Jagd (2011) makes a useful distinction between two perspectives on 
organizations that this framework allows, a synchronic and a diachronic 
perspective on organizations. “Studies applying the synchronic perspective focus 
mainly on describing co-existing orders of worth in particular organizations. 
Studies applying a diachronic perspective focus on analyzing ‘justification work’ in 
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organizations, studying processes of critique, justifications, testing or 
compromising performed by actors.” (Jagd, 2011 :348). 
While Jagd is focusing on studies that use the economies of worth framework, this 
study widens the view of coordination and justification work in organizations by 
including Thévenot’s regimes of engagements. Jagd's distinction between 
synchronic and diachronic perspective is therefore modified into these two 
perspectives:4  
(1) A justification work perspective that tries to understand how different 
public goods related to orders of worth, as well as more local goods, related
to the regime of planned and familiar engagement, are utilized in 
justification and critique and particularly, in attempts to create tests or 
compromises.
(2) An composite organization perspective that tries to understand the the 
relationship between coordination and morality in an organization, by 
looking at coordinating forms which establish the co-existence or 
compromise between different orders of worth (on the horizontal level of 
complexity), as well as between different regimes of engagement (on the 
vertical level of complexity).
I will now shortly discuss these two perspectives and which analytical challenges 
and questions they entail.
Justification Work Perspective
Jagd concludes his article with the observation that, while existing research using 
the framework shows its usefulness in revealing different competing or conflicting 
rationalities in organizations, relatively few studies explicitly focus on the 
processes involved in justification, critique and attempts to produce compromises 
4 Note that this distinction does not necessarily mean that there are no studies that combine both
perspectives.
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in organizations, the processes Jagd terms ‘justification work’ (2011: 355). While in
2020, there are many more studies than in 2011 that utilize the economies of 
worth in organization studies5,  there are still relatively few studies that analyze the
unfolding of critical moments into tests in detail. This might be, because “[…] 
despite its apparent centrality to Boltanski and Thévenot’s (2006) original oeuvre, 
the notion of “test” is less fully developed by these authors and less widely 
adopted than the repertoire of worlds of worth.“ (Dionne et al., 2019: 21). The “less
fully developed“ state of the notion of the test is one of three analytical challenges 
that a justification work perspective might encounter. These challenges will now be
introduced shortly.
Tests, measures and instruments
In OJ, the description of tests takes up around seven pages only (Boltanski and 
Thévenot, 2006: 133-138). These pages describe how contentions over states of 
worth - what Dansou and Langley (2012) call ‘test of state of worth’ - might emerge
through different kinds of internal critique. Boltanski and Thévenot point out that in 
order to be successful, a test needs to “presuppose situations that have been 
purged of any ambiguities that might allow alternative worths to emerge. The 
situation achieves purity only if measures have been taken and arrangements set 
up to establish it in a common world.“ (2006: 138). Boltanski and Thévenot 
however do not explain in detail how people deal with the challenge of developing 
appropriate measures and instruments for tests. This is a topic which, as the 
existence of the field of valuation studies (Helgesson and Muniesa, 2013; 
Doganova et al., 2018) shows, is so complex and immense, it could fill at least 
another 389 pages book. An analysis of concrete social processes in which the 
evaluation of an object or a person is attempted will encounter actors dealing with 
problems that go beyond the question of legitimate principles of equivalence, 
towards question of different instantiations of orders of worth (Jaumier et al. 2017) 
5 See in particular the Special Issue of Research in the Sociology of Organizations, “Justification,
Evaluation and Critique in the Study of Organizations”, Cloutier et al. 2017.
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and into challenges of commensuration (Espeland and Stevens, 1998) and 
calculation (Callon and Muniesa, 2005).
Conflict or Uncertainty
Another analytical challenge from a justification work perspective concerns the 
difference between uncertainty and conflict. Due to the focus on critique and 
justification in OJ, the critical situations that Boltanski and Thévenot describe are 
always the consequence of a critique. However, as we know from the EC‘s interest
in uncertainty (see also Thévenot, 2002), coordination can be be endangered by 
cognitive as well as evaluative uncertainty, even in the absence of conflict. If actors
are faced with uncertainty, either because they find themselves in unknown 
situations, or because situations are open to a variety of interpretations, can the 
process of coming to shared understandings or evaluations be analyzed with the 
notions of test and compromise?
Combining the economies of worth framework with the regimes of engagement
Finally, if a consideration of the horizontal level of complexity in coordination is 
combined with the vertical level of complexity, if the analysis considers both orders
of worth and regimes of engagement, how does this change the analysis and the 
modeling of justification work? 
Composite Organization Perspective
A composite organization perspective assumes that the co-existence of regimes of
engagement, which includes the co-existence of orders of worth, both enables and
constrains coordination. It is thus a perspective that extends Thévenot’s composite
organization view with his regimes of engagements. To be more concrete, such a 
perspective makes use of concepts of the regimes, including orders of worth as 
well as central concepts of Boltanski and Thévenot’s pragmatic sociology of 
critique. The main analytical challenges of a composite organization perspective 
are on one hand, to recognize when different regimes of engagement are in play 
and on the other, to understand their use in coordination, as well as the tensions 
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they create. A related question is how tensions between regimes of engagement 
are mediated, balanced and compromised through practices and investments in 
forms.
Current State of Research – Literature Review
In the following, I will review academic work that is relevant for the research aims 
and questions of this study. For this literature review, I’ve conducted a systematic 
review of journal articles within the field of organization and management studies 
that use either the economies of worth or the regimes of engagement framework. 
Since there are not many articles in organization studies that use the regimes of 
engagement, I’ve broadened the search for literature to include all peer-reviewed 
journal articles that use the regimes of engagement. A detailed description of the 
methodology used for this literature review and a list of the reviewed articles can 
be found in appendix 1. The whole corpus of reviewed literature entailed 74 
articles. I‘ve read all of the articles in order to find those that are relevant either to 
a justification work, or a composite organization perspective. However, a result of 
this reading was that many of the articles use the six worlds to describe facets of 
their empirical cases, but are not interested in coordination, tests, compromises or 
coordination. Furthermore, many articles that use the notion of the compromise or 
test use it in a rather superficial way that does not contribute to an enhanced 
understanding of these concepts. In addition, there are not many papers that are 
interested in intraorganizational coordination. In the following I will discuss the 21 
articles that provided insights that are relevant for the aims of this study. 
Justification Work Perspective
Literature that is relevant for this perspective analyses either the unfolding of 
controversies and conflicts, or how people manage to deal with uncertainly in 
processes in which characteristics of people or objects have to be ranked or 
evaluated. The central concepts here are the different kinds of critiques, the test 
and the compromise. Additionally, ‘regime change’ (Knoll 2013), that is changing 
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between publicly justifiable and private forms of coming to agreements would, in 
principle, be a valuable component of understanding justification work. However, 
only one of the reviewed studies which fall under a ‘justification work perspective’ 
uses the regime of engagements.
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Authors Title Year Source title
Annisette M., Vesty G.,
Amslem T.
Accounting values, controversies, and
compromises in tests of worth




The role of criticism in the dynamics of
performance evaluation systems
2005 Critical Perspectives on 
Accounting
Centemeri L. Reframing problems of 
incommensurability in environmental 
conflicts through pragmatic sociology: 
From value pluralism to the plurality of










A market for weather risk? Conflicting 
metrics, attempts at compromise, and 
limits to commensuration
2011 Organization Studies
Munzer M. Justifying the logic of regulatory post-
crisis decision-making – The case of 
the French structural banking reform
2019 Critical Perspectives on 
Accounting
Patriotta G., Gond J.-
P., Schultz F.
Maintaining legitimacy: Controversies,
orders of worth, and public 
justifications
2011 Journal of Management 
Studies
Reinecke J. Beyond a subjective theory of value 
and towards a 'fair price': An 
organizational perspective on 
Fairtrade minimum price setting
2010 Organization
Reinecke J., Van 
Bommel K., Spicer A.
When orders of worth clash: 
Negotiating legitimacy in situations of 
moral multiplexity
2017 Research in the Sociology 
of Organizations
Taupin, B. The more things change... Institutional
maintenance as justification work in 
the credit rating industry
2012 Management (France)
Whelan G., Gond J.-P. Meat Your Enemy: Animal Rights, 2017 Journal of Management 
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Alignment, and Radical Change Inquiry
Table 2: Literature justification work  
Controversies
In studies that analyze controversies the usage of the notion of the test varies 
significantly.  Some papers merely use the word test in the very general sense of a
situation in which people have different opinions or a stable order is endangered, 
thus more in the sense that Boltanski and Thévenot give to a ‘critical moment’. For 
instance, Patriotta et al. (2011) write that “Unsettling events like the Forsmark 
accident constitute legitimacy tests in the sense that they pose a challenge to the 
legitimacy of nuclear power as a source of energy.” (Patriotta et al., 2011: 1829). 
Taupin (2012) writes that “In practice, the test takes the form of a justification or a 
public critique.“ (Taupin, 2012: 531). Some papers are more influenced by 
Boltanski’s further development of the notion of the test (Boltanski, 2011). For 
instance, Taupin (2012) and Munzer (2019) refer to Boltanski’s distinction between
‘truth tests’ – a simple confirmation of what is there, and ‘reality tests’ – which 
compare what exists with what should exist. Papers that analyze controversies 
which include a clash between orders of worth almost exclusively describe 
maneuvers that are neither pure ‘tests of state of worth’ nor compromises in the 
exact sense that OJ gives them. 
Patriotta et al. (2011) analyze a controversy which was started by a nuclear 
accident in a Vattenfall reactor. They trace how the enfolding controversy, which 
takes place in German media, is shaped by the use of different orders of worth. 
The paper argues that “If agents in a conflict invoke different orders of worth, 
however, then a ‘test of worth’ cannot be used, so that compromise may be 
necessary to resolve disputes.” (Patriotta et al., 2011: 1809). The paper describes 
different clashes between worlds that shaped the debate. Over the controversy, 
Vattenfall “diversified” its justification work, which was originally primarily based on 
the industrial world, to include arguments from other worlds. The same 
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diversification strategy is found in the work of pro-nuclear power stakeholders. The
controversy is eventually cooled down by the creation of  “a ‘good enough’ 
compromise containing elements from different orders of worth that enabled a ‘buy
in’ from enough crucial stakeholder groups (or at least defused their active 
resistance)” (Patriotta et al., 2011: 1830).
Taupin (2012) analyzes the comments sent to the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission  (SEC) for  four public consultations, comparing how credit rating 
agencies were legitimized in these comments before and after the subprime crisis. 
Taupin‘s central finding is the 'circular figure of the compromise‘: There is an 
established view of credit rating agencies as a compromise, which allows 
stakeholders to use one of the arguments for the compromise, whenever critique 
points to another. This argumentative tactic is a kind of sophisticated 
'whataboutism‘. It is also an interesting explanation of the stability of compromises:
Since several values are inside a compromise, if one is criticized, one of the other 
values can still be used to legitimize the compromise. This is in some regards the 
opposite of how Boltanski and Thévenot describe the mechanisms of a 
compromise: To them, a compromise is more fragile, because there are several 
values involved, which means, it is logically inconsistent. In Taupin's study, this 
inconsistency of the compromise it what makes its stability possible, even in a 
situation where it should have no legitimacy at all. What is obvious when 
comparing Taupin and Boltanski and Thévenot on the compromise is, however, 
that they are assuming very different situations: The assumption in OJ is always a 
situation in which there is a need for public justification. In such a situation people 
who can‘t strictly use their power, have to make their criteria for evaluation 
transparent, which means that they need to provide a coherent account of why 
something is good or bad. The situation that Taupin analyses is far from these 
constraints: A public consultations where comments can be sent in is a “one way” -
communication, there is no possibility  to react to  hypocritical comments, which in 
turn would force people to clarify their evaluative criteria. 
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Munzer (2019) also analyzes justification work in the post-crisis financial sector. In 
order to explain why new banking regulations did not actually target structural 
problems, Munzer elaborates the figure of ‘symbolization’, which happens when 
arrangements superficially form compromises between different orders of worth, 
while only symbolically referencing one of these orders – the civic in her case.
Whelan and Gond’s study (2017), which analyses the public justification work of 
animal rights organizations,  also discusses a substitute for compromises: 
‘Alignment’ between worlds, which emerges when “different common worlds 
agree, or are ‘provoked’ (…) to agree by those with the requisite ‘competences’ 
(…), that a given set of empirical developments is desirable in their own, 
unambiguous terms“ (Whelan and Gond, 2017: 123). An example of Alignment is a
movie that is both a commercial and artistic success, such a film “brings the 
market and inspired common worlds into alignment“ (Whelan and Gond, 2017: 
123). 
Reinecke et al.‘s conceptual paper (2017) discusses two substitutes for 
compromises, i.e. alternative forms that make the co-existence of multiple values 
possible and thus avoid a clash. They introduce ‘Transcendence’ in which a new 
moral reference point is created that “aligns two or more existing schemes under a
new, higher-level point of reference“ (Reinecke et al., 2017: 54). Examples are the 
emergence of new worlds, like a green or projective order of worth (Thévenot et 
al., 2000; Boltanksi and Chiapello, 2007). The second is ‘Antagonism’, which 
allows to strongly side with one moral scheme, this allows to “strengthen the 
commitment to a common order of worth amongst a narrower audience. This may 
overcome conflict between different schemes of worth by putting them into 
contrast with a third, commonly opposed scheme of worth such as targeting a 
'common enemy‘” (Reinecke et al., 2017: 55).
An exception among the papers that study controversies is Dionne et al. (2018) 
insofar as this is the only article in the reviewed literature that systematically 
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explores the notion of the test as developed in OJ. The paper studies a public 
controversy in Quebec that followed a governmental proposal for a major increase 
in higher education tuition fees. Similar to Patriotta et al. (2011), the paper 
analyses the media coverage of this controversy and the discourses of the major 
actors involved. From their analysis, they distill six types of evaluative moves that 
actors use in situations of controversy and how they influence a ‘test of worth’.  
The six evaluative moves are ‘qualifying an object’ in which an object for a test is 
defined through its word in one world, ‘reformulating an object’ in which other 
qualities of the object are pointed to re-order the evaluation in the same world, 
‘requalifying an object of a test’ in which new criteria that point to evaluation in 
another world are pointed out, ‘materializing a new object’ which becomes the 
basis for a new test of worth, ‘selfcasting’ when actors discursively reorder their 
own worth and ‘altercasting’ when actors denote or promote other actors to re-
evaluate their worth (Dionne et al., 2018:  17). All of this evaluative moves center 
around the object of the test. The key observation of their study is that during 
controversies, new test objects are created, which transforms the process of the 
controversy. They argue that “evaluation processes during a controversy are 
punctuated by a series of tests of worth built around the qualification of different 
objects of test (..), each of which (except the first) is materialized  within the 
process itself as a response to an emerging configuration of qualifications and 
orderings generated through previous tests” (Dionne et al., 2018: 18).  
Uncertainty and Commensuration
Some of the most interesting papers dealing with justification work are not 
interested in a controversy that is spurred by critique, but rather in processes of 
evaluation and commensuration. Situations that are more characterized by 
evaluative uncertainty than conflict. These studies seem to be ideal to further 
develop analytical descriptions of processes of calculation or commensuration, 
and the instrumentation and measurements that are needed for a test of worth. 
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Interestingly, all of these studies encounter compromises, or ‘test of worths in 
compromise’ (Anisette et al.,  2017).
Bourguignon and Chiapello (2012) in their exploration of performance evaluation 
systems as ‘institutionalized trials’ base their notion of the test/trial explicitly on the 
concept that has been developed in Boltanski and Chiapello (2007). Bourguignon 
and Chiapello’s paper is especially interesting to this thesis, as they analyze an 
intra-organizational evaluation process from a perspective of organizational 
justice. They are interested in the (power ladden) dynamic that emerges out of 
reformative critique directed towards organizational evaluation processes and how
the management systems over time change in response to this criticism. They 
develop a “trial-inspired” model of performance assessment that consists of three 
steps: (1) Instrumentation, which includes qualification and categorization of the 
performance that is to be assessed. (2) Evaluation, in which a value judgment is 
created. And (3) consequences, among them, the distribution of social goods. 
Their first step ‘instrumentation’ points to the complex and meticulous work that 
has to be done in order to set up a test of worth. In Bourguignon and Chiapello's 
case, however, instrumentation is rather unproblematic, since the performance 
evaluation systems they analyze are ‘institutionalized trials’ and to a large part rely 
on already well established criteria like operating income or sales of new goods. 
Bourguignon and Chiapello’s study looks at ‘internal critique’, that is critique that is
aimed at a “tightening of the trial”. Therefore, the uncertainty displayed in this 
study is rather constrained, since it does not open up to questions of radical 
critique, respectively, the complexity of considering a multiplicity of conflicting 
higher order evaluation criteria.
Huault and Rainelli-Weiss (2011) analyze the failed attempt of  creating a market 
for weather derivatives in Europe. They interpret the failure to create commonly 
accepted calculations for derivatives as the failure to find a compromise. The 
compromise is framed as commensuration between different orders of worth. Their
study highlights that a main obstacle to creating a compromise is a missing 
common interest among the involved parties: “the necessary condition for an 
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agreement to arise […] is the social construction of a problem whose solution 
could be seen as serving a common interest, despite conflicting worldviews” 
(Huault and Rainelli-Weiss, 2011: 1412).
Reinecke (2010) describes the determination of Fairtrade minimum prices for 
coffee as the establishment of a compromise between different orders of worth. In 
the beginning, when Fairtrade products where not marketed to a mainstream 
audience and significantly smaller, fair prices were established in face-to-face 
negotiations between producers and independent fair trading organizations, which 
created personal, long-term relationships based on trust and mutual recognition. 
This personal negotiations were later substituted with a formalized price 
determination based on the Cost of Sustainable Production methodology (CoSP), 
which calculates the cost of production. The resulting compromise for calculating 
minimum prices for coffee combines the CoSP methodology with democratic 
decision making of all stakeholders. Reinecke interprets the result as a 
compromise between the industrial world, in which productivity and efficiency 
measured by standardized criteria are valued, and the civic world, where the 
collective interest expressed through formal and democratic procedures is valued. 
In contrast to Reinecke’s interpretation, the final result could be interpreted as a 
compromise between public goods and leaving space for the negotiation of 
particularities. Such a view, however, rests on ideas of morality that go beyond, 
respectively, below, the kind of morality that is considered in the economies of 
worth framework.
Annisette et al. (2017) illustrate ways in which accounting can be conceptualized 
within the economies of worth framework. They draw on two cases from ongoing 
fieldwork to illustrate this. They discuss ‘accounting objects’ like a triple bottom line
report or a balanced scorecard as the outcomes of compromise situations in which
multiple orders of worth are present. These compromise objects are developed 
through cycles of testing and retesting to clarify the common good, what Boltanski 
and Thévenot call the work of explication (2006: 283). While accounting is to them,
on one hand often a tool to find and stabilize compromises, it can also be used to 
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secure the dominance of one single order of worth. In their second case, they 
describe the development of an evaluation device for large-scale capital 
investment projects of a water utility in Western Australia as a ‘test of worths in 
compromise’ that calculates the financial, social and environmental impact of a 
project. One of the critiques of the device targets the fact, that Aboriginal cultural 
and heritage issues were not included in the valuation. In response to this critique, 
the developers of the evaluation device argue that certain types of values “are not 
appropriate values to be monetized” (Annisette et al., 2017: 231). 
For Anisette et al. this device is a compromise in the sense of OJ, “a single test to 
incorporate at once the multiple value orientations of economy, society and 
environment“, the critique of incommensurability does not lead to a “tightening of 
the test“, the involved developers “appear to have accepted the limitation of the 
model“ (Annisette et al., 2017: 234). While they stop here, I would argue, that it 
makes sense to see this instance as a compromise between what can be 
measured and what can’t.
Among the literature that applies the regimes of engagement, there is one article 
that deals with problems of commensuration. Centemeri’s article (2015) is 
interested in problems of incommensurability that emerge in relation to the 
evaluation of nature, due to the idea that the environment is a value that can not 
be monetized. The article thus mirrors arguments for incommensurability in 
Anisette et al.’s article. Centemeri applies the regimes of engagement to 
understand environmental valuation. She argues that “the approach of plural 
modes (or “regimes”) of engagement provides a sociological understanding of the 
unequal power of conflicting “languages of valuation”” (Centemeri, 2015: 299). In 
contrast to justifiable action in the regime of public justification, planned and 
familiar engagement are related to modes of coordination and valuation which can 
not be easily extended towards public justification. Tests which actors might use in 
these modes of engagement are less dependent on general standard assessing 
functions and more embedded in knowledge produced and shared through 
personalized practices. Centemeri distinguishes two types of incommensurability: 
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‘Order incommensurability’, which emerges when there are conflicting ideas on 
which criteria should be used for commensuration. A solution to this kind of 
incommensurability are the compromises Boltanski and Thévenot describe. 
‘Radical incommensurability’ on the other hand, has to do with an evaluation of 
something, in her example the environment, as something that is part of familiar 
engagement. She illustrates this with the example of Native Alaskans who value 
the environment as a place of dwelling. This in turn makes it impossible to 
commensurate the value of the environment into a financial amount that could be 
paid as compensation for destroying the environment.
Summary Findings Justification Work
The literature review of articles that engage a justification work perspective to 
study the unfolding of controversies or commensuration processes provides the 
following four insights that are relevant for this thesis:
(1) The social context in which a controversy or commensuration is 
happening has to be taken into account in the analysis. For instance, 
Taupin and Munster both describe “false” compromises to protect the 
financial sector. They are “false”, in the sense that they are almost 
transparently not in the interest of a common good and could never hold a 
severe critique. But both are emerging in settings in which, even though 
public justification is relevant, external critique is powerless or absent. 
Huault and Rainelli-Weiss (2011) analyze a context in which 
commensuration fails because the involved stakeholders don’t have a 
common interest, while both Reinecke (2010) and Annisette et al. (2017) 
study how different actors that share common interests create evaluative 
compromises. 
(2) In both studies of controversies as well as evaluation processes, the 
main solutions for a clash between worlds are compromises, and not 
clarifications according to one world.
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(3) Studies of controversies usually don’t seem to go into details of 
assessing and measuring worth, probably, because in many controversies 
this is not required to suspend a conflict. On the other hand, studies that 
deal with evaluative uncertainty and commensuration centrally focus on the 
possibilities of evaluating and measuring worth.
(4) In Annisette et al‘s as well as in Reinecke‘s study of commensuration 
processes, the evaluative tension that is surfacing is not just a problem of 
incommensurability due to conflicting orders of worth, but a more 
fundamental problem of incommensurability, where people refuse the 
adequacy of measurement and calculation per se. Centemeri‘s (2015) 
article, in which such a tensions is discussed, conceptualizes this as a 
tension between public and familiar engagement.
Composite Organization Perspective
Literature that is relevant for this perspective is interested in intraorganizational 
coordination and uses either the economies of worth framework, or the regimes of 
engagement, or both, to explain tensions and compromises between different 
modes of coordination. Although both the economies of worth framework and the 
regimes of engagement seem to be quite useful to study coordination inside 
organizations, there is only a limited number of studies that use it for this purpose. 
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Authors Title Year Source title
Banoun A., Dufour 
L., Andiappan M.
Evolution of a service ecosystem: 
Longitudinal evidence from multiple
shared services centers based on 
the economies of worth framework
2016 Journal of Business Research
Bérubé J., Demers 
C.
Creative organizations: when 
management fosters creative work
2019 Creative Industries Journal
Besio, C., Meyer, U. Kompromisse in 
Forschungsorganisationen
2014 Organisationen und 
Konventionen
Bullinger B. Family affairs: Drawing on family 
logic and familiar regime of 
engagement to contrast "close-up" 
views of individuals in 
conventionalist and institutionalist 
reasoning
2014 Journal of Management Inquiry
Mailhot C., Gagnon 
S., Langley A., 
Binette L.-F.
Distributing leadership across 




Carlsen H.B., Blok 
A.
Methods of engagement: On civic 
participation formats as 
composition devices in urban 
planning
2018 European Journal of Cultural 
and Political Sociology
Meriluoto T. Neutral experts or passionate 
participants? Renegotiating 
expertise and the right to act in 
Finnish participatory social policy




The Competent Actor: Bridging 
Institutional Logics and French 
Pragmatist Sociology
2014 Journal of Management Inquiry
Raviola E. Meetings between frames: 
Negotiating worth between 
journalism and management
2017 European Management Journal
Suckert, L. Organisierter Kompromiss 2014 Organisationen und 
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Konventionen
Table 2: Literature composite organization
Most studies utilizing the compromise to understand coordination inside 
organizations do not refer to Thévenot’s (2001a) article on organizations as 
compromise devices, nor his article on form investments (1984). This might be, 
because these articles have been published in journals outside of organization 
studies, in the European Journal of Social Theory, respectively Social Science 
Information. There are two exceptions, both from the German edited volume on 
“Organisationen und Konventionen“ (Knoll, 2014): Suckert (2014) discusses how 
‘ecopreneur-firms’, firms that try to integrate economic and ecological goals, use 
discursive compromises such as 'market success because of environment 
protections‘, as well as form-investments-as-compromise-forms such as CO2 
offsetting for flights. Besio and Meyer (2014) describe how research organization 
use compromise forms to mediate between different rationalities, for instance 
research projects are compatible with a scientific rationality, but they also allow 
rationalities which are external to the scientific community, particularly the interests
of funding bodies.
Mailhot et al. (2016) studies the Remote Networked Schools Initiative in Quebec, 
which was started to connect pupils located in rural areas with other schools 
through optical fiber networks and subsequently, to study educational experiments 
based on remote collaboration. The article is interested in how leadership in this 
collaborative research project,  in which several logics co-exist, is possible. They 
describe how leadership is distributed across people and objects in ‘actor-object 
couplings’, which in turn facilitates the coordination of action across different 
orders of worth. An example for a leader-object coupling is that of the project 
leader Renée and the steering committee. The steering committee is on one hand 
a space for democratic deliberation, and at the same time transmits demands to 
researchers and to the field. Renée became a spokesperson of this committee and
sometimes used this in settings, in which her own authority was insufficient to spur
42
Pohler - Collective firms between collective and company
action. While the steering committee is described as a mediating object between 
the civic and the industrial worth, the coupling with Renée establishes distributed 
leadership.
The main coordinative tension that Bérubé and Demers (2019) describe is 
between “creativity and business“. They study how managers of small advertising 
agencies establish compromises between these two orientations. They suggest 
four creative management work profiles which describe how creative work is 
divided and coordinated in advertising agencies.  For instance in the “Versatile“ 
profile, all creative workers manage their own projects, they are not only in charge 
of the conceptual work, but also are in frequent touch with customers. In this 
profile, in the beginning of a project all creative workers in the agency are involved 
in the conception. Which Bérubé and Demers interpret as relieving the tension 
between inspired and market world by including the civic world. “For example, if a 
creative worker was to neglect the inspired world in favor of the market world –  to 
meet the demands of a customer for example –  the other creative workers, who 
are responsible of judging the creative aspect, would intervene so that the final 
product creates a balance among the market world and the inspired world.“ 
( Bérubé and Demers, 2019: 331)
Banoun et al. (2016) analyze the tensions that follow the attempts to introduce 
new processes of standardization through the introduction of shared service 
centers (SSC)  in five different large organizations. An SSC is business unit that 
mutualizes several support functions and operates as internal suppliers of support 
services. The article develops a process model which explains the conflicting, but 
eventual successful inclusion of the SSCs in their client organizations. The phases
go from a tensions between industrial and domestic worth, clarification in the 
industrial worth, a local arrangement and eventually a compromise which included 
the civic worth: “The SSCs, with a civic perspective, tried to take into account the 
expertise of each internal client so that each contributed to improving the SSC. [...]
SSCs that had previously focused on standardizing processes became innovative 
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service providers. The distinction between client and supplier became more and 
more irrelevant, as the internal clients co-created the offers and contributed to 
developing the SSCs' strategy (adapted co-creation value)” (Banoun et al., 2016: 
2996).
The article describes the initial tension that arise between the SSCs and their 
internal clients as one between the industrial world (the SSC) and the domestic 
world (internal clients). According to Banoun et al. the internal clients protect the 
domestic world because the introduction of the SSC “caused substantial changes 
in the work habits of the internal clients and destroyed their previous relationships 
with their local support function that had been based on personal relations and 
trust, the SSCs tended to impose upon their internal clients an industrial approach 
by standardizing services and new processes“ (Banoun et al., 2016: 2994). 
Reading this study, it seems to be an ideal-type example of what can go wrong if 
scholars approach empirical reality with the purely deductive strategy of looking for
conflicts between orders of worth. They look for conflicts between orders of worth, 
and this is indeed what they subsequently find. However, according to the 
description of the initial conflict, the conflicting ideas of which is “good“ at stake 
here, could also be understood as a tension between the regime of planned and 
familiar engagement. When people in an organization criticize that outsiders 
impose new work patterns on them that destroy their relationships and familiar 
working habits, they are not necessarily criticizing a version of a just social order 
from the perspective of another social order, they might actually criticize the 
endangerment of familiarity for the sake of standardization.
The main coordinative tension that Raviola (2017) is interested in is between 
journalistic and management frames inside an organization that operates an online
journalism platform. Raviola describes the tension between journalism and 
management, as a tension between the equivalence principles of “truth and 
novelty“ and “efficiency and control“. Using ideas from both Callon (1998) and OJ, 
Raviola describes how in contrast to formal meetings in which heated discussions 
take place, in everyday practice “small tests“ help to “cool down“ situations: “In 
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everyday work, for instance, the tension between journalism and management 
seems not to be openly conflictual and is resolved by everyday mundane “small 
tests”(…) These are almost invisible and come to become a “natural” part of 
everyday work and routines. Controversies on worth of actions, decisions, and 
tools in everyday work, thus, seem to be constantly cooled down, as news needs 
to be produced constantly and discussions on overflows cannot paralyze the 
ongoing work.“ (Raviola, 2017: 7). While Raviola does not use the regimes of 
engagement in her theoretical framework, what she aptly describes here is a 
change from the regime of public justification to planned engagement, where 
people evaluate the situation at hand according to shared plans that have to go 
on, instead of considerations of higher goods.
Two conceptual papers discuss the implication of different regimes of engagement
for coordination in organizations: Bullinger (2014) in a paper that discusses how 
convention theory can contribute to research on institutional logics (IL), contrasting
institutional logic’s ‘family logic’ with Thévenot’s familiar engagement when dealing
with the work of HR managers. She argues, that “in private situations, long-
standing relationships and so on, coordination does not depend on referring to 
higher order principles” (Bullinger, 2014: 330). Therefore an IL perspective would 
benefit from incorporating the regimes of engagement approach, to understand 
situations in which HR managers engage with close colleagues in everyday 
coordination. Pernkopf-Kornhäuser (2014) in a similar vein, discusses how the 
notion of the actor can be made more ‘competent’ by stressing people’s reflexivity 
in dealing with multiple logics in their practices.
In an empirical study of initiatives in the sector of Finnish participatory social policy,
Meriluoto (2018) analyses how different definitions of expertise render different 
modes of participation more preferable or justifiable. For instance, if in an initiative 
participation is legitimate due to it allowing the rehabilitation of citizens, 
participation is quite limited, since expertise is primarily seen as a therapeutic tool 
that helps to make people feel more confident in themselves and their capabilities. 
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In this initiatives the preferred mode of engagement is a composition of “familiar in 
a plan”. In contrast, initiatives that value participation because it contributes to co-
creation through different kinds of expertise, the preferred mode of engagement is 
planned engagement. 
While not strictly a paper on the coordination of practices inside an organization, 
Meilvang et al.‘s paper (2018) on civic participation formats as composition 
devices in urban planning is the only research paper I could find that uses 
Thévenot‘s sociology of engagements and the orders of worth framework 
simultaneously to explain coordination. The paper analyses civic participation 
formats in urban planning in Denmark, where the traditional participation format, 
the municipal hearing process is highly formalized and legally mandatory. The 
paper describes the hearing process as a compromise between the civic and the 
industrial order of worth. This compromise, however is criticized as being too 
bureaucratic, abstract and expert-driven. They argue that “participation has shifted
from a main concern with involving citizens in discussing the justification of 
planning, to a situation in which involving citizens co-exists with quite different 
attempts to involve users and stakeholders into negotiations over urban interests 
and opinions.“ (Meilvang et al., 2018: 20)  Newly emerging participatory formats – 
the dialogue meeting and the workshop  - are institutionalized responses to this 
critiques which construct compromises between civic and market work (hearing 
dialogue), as well as between civic and project worth (workshop).  But at the same
time, these formats are composition devices for urban planning, configured so as 
to transform familiar engagements into an engagement with a plan.
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Summary Findings Composite Organizations
There are three findings from the literature review on composite organizations that 
are important for this study. 
(1) First, considering the high number of articles in the field of organization 
and management studies that employ the economies of worth framework, 
only a relatively small amount – which has been discussed here – analyses 
intraorganizational coordination. This might be, because such an analysis 
necessitates the observation of organizational practices.
(2) The analysis of intraorganizational coordination and related tensions has
to be aware of the fact, that not all controversies develop in a setting in 
which public justification is important. Since firms have to do things and 
follow plans, often a controversy will be ‘relativized’ by changing from an 
engagement in public justification towards planned engagement (Raviola, 
2017). Furthermore, firms are social spaces in which familiar engagements 
develop which might come into tension with planned engagement or 
engagement in public justification (Banoun et al., 2017). Scholars who use 
the economies of worth framework, without considering the nature of the 
situations they analyze, risk to misinterpret their empirical findings.
(3) There are already studies that demonstrate that regimes of engagement
can be compromised (Meriluoto, 2018) as well as composed (Meilvang et 
al., 2018)
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Research Aims and Research Questions
From a theoretical perspective, the problem of coordination in the presence of 
multiple, at times conflicting rationalities is not limited to collective firms, as all 
organizations have to mediate between “several modes of coordination which 
engage different repertoires of evaluation” (Thévenot, 2001a: 405). While all 
organizations from this perspective are compromises, it seems obvious that there 
is something specific, and specifically interesting, about the compromises that 
collective firms, in the absence of formal hierarchies, have to create in order to 
deal with complexity in coordination. 
Furthermore, from a perspective that is interested in the concrete processes of 
‘justification work’, collective firms are especially interesting, since their democratic
governance structures create a setting in which there is ample opportunity for 
competing moral considerations and values to emerge. Negotiation processes in 
this context are ‘hot situations’ in which everything can become controversial 
(Callon, 1998). 
This thesis has two research aims which have been developed as a consequence 
of the analytical challenges related to the justification work and the composite 
organization perspective, as well as the empirical interest in collective firms.
The first aim of the study is to combine the frameworks of the economies of worth 
and the regimes of engagement to explain the relationship between coordination 
and evaluation in organizations.
To address this aim, the study poses the following research questions:
(1) How can the pragmatic processes which aim at the resolution of 
evaluative uncertainty or conflict be analyzed using the notions of test, 
compromise and regimes of engagement?
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(2) How do organizations deal with the co-existence of not only different 
orders of worth, but different regimes of engagements in intraorganizational 
coordination?
The second aim of this study is to use the combination of these frameworks to 
understand how collective firms achieve a balance between being a company and 
a collective.
To address these aims, the study poses the following research questions:
(1) What are the main normative and coordinative tensions in collective 
firms and how are they related to different regimes of engagement?
(2) What are the practices and compromises collective firms employ to 
balance these tensions?
Research Design
The study analyzes three different collective firms. All of these three are similar in 
the sense that they strive for working conditions that promote solidarity between 
colleagues, they collectively govern their organization and use collective consent-
finding for decision-making. While they have similar aspirations and governance 
structures, these collective firms differ in the kind of work they are doing. 
Democratic, collective governance is only one source of coordinative and 
evaluative tensions inside a collective firm, another factor possibly contributing to 
tensions are the goods or services produced, which are related to different 
possibilities and constraints in regards to structuring the process and the division 
of labour inside a firm. Therefore, the study included the case of a firm that sells 
goods (radical cola collective), a firm that sells services (call a bike) and a firm that
works project-based (good tech collective). This sampling strategy has been 
chosen to explore the interrelationship between justification work and the kind of 
structuring that particular logics of work processes prescribe.
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Figure 3: Call a Bike
Figure 2: The Radical Cola Collective
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Figure 4: The Good Tech Collective
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To be able to understand the interrelationship between modes of coordination, 
relational practices and normative ideas, as well as how uncertainty and conflict 
are dealt with in critical moments, this study used a multiple-case study approach. 
A case study approach allows to use multiple sources of evidence and benefits 
from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and 
analysis (Yin, 2002: 14). 
Data were gathered in three main ways: Semi-structured interviews were 
conducted in all of the collective firms, as well as observation of their meetings and
daily work practices. In addition the study draws on the analysis of internal 
documents that were available online. While the radical cola collective (RCC) 
conducts all of their collective communication online, both call a bike (CAB) and 
the good tech collective (GTC) have extensive internal wikis, which include, 
among others, the minutes of meetings. 
The main methodological strategy for the analysis of all three cases was threefold:
(1) To look for critical moments, that is moments of uncertainty, as well as to
look for tests, that is moments of evaluation. Subsequently, to try to 
understand how people use justification work to come to shared 
understandings of a situation or an evaluation.
(2) To look for central form investments that stabilize relations and create 
order(ing).
(3) To look for central compromises between different values and hmodes of
coordination.
The firms themselves, as well as methods for data collection and analysis are 
described in detail in the articles of this thesis.
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2 annual “offline meetings”  - 
which included presentations and
discussions of research in 
progress. Both over a weekend, 
with shared accommodation and 
collective cooking. 
2 workshops on democratic 
organizing held by a member of 
the RCC in a public setting.
3 More than 300 e-Mails out of 
all e-Mails on the mailinglist 
between 2003 and 2014. 
More than 200 posts on the 
online board out of all posts 
between 2014 and 2016.
Call a Bike 6 working days in the office.
4 general assemblies.
1 annual one-day-long plenary.
All over the duration of 20 
months.
7 46 - minutes of meetings and 
entries in the internal wiki.
Good Tech 
Collective
Flexible ethnography over 3 
months, including social activities,
as well as a two-day networking 
meeting with other tech-
cooperatives on the countryside
13 42 - minutes of meetings and 
entries in the internal wiki.
Table 3: Data sources of the case studies.
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Findings
This chapter provides an overview of the articles that are part of this thesis, as well
as their main findings.
ID Author(s) Title Year Source title
Pohler 2019 Pohler, N. Commensuration, 
compromises and critical 
capacities: Wage 
determination in collective 
firms





Pohler, N. Evaluation and the tension 




allowance in a collective 
firm













Pohler, N. and 
van Elk, S.
Duality, uncertainty and 
management consultancy 
as practice: navigating 
conflicting regimes of 
engagement
2020
Table 4: Articles of this thesis.
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Pohler, Nina. "Commensuration, compromises and critical capacities: Wage 
determination in collective firms." Social Science Information 58.2 (2019): 261-281.
This article analyses pay determination in two collective firms, the radical cola 
collective (RCC) and the good tech collective (GTC). Pay determination is 
conceptualized as a process of commensuration in which a compromise between 
different principles of equivalence has to be created. The article highlights the 
multidimensionality of wage determination and the challenge of commensurability 
between these dimensions. The article develops a process-oriented approach to 
understand commensuration which is based on Callon and Muniesa‘s (2005) 
understanding of calculation. To introduce the question of legitimacy in the 
evaluation process, this approach is supplemented with concepts from Botlanski 
and Thévenot‘s work on critical capacities. The article argues that understanding 
commensuration has to entail an analysis of the situated justification work that 
produces commensurable and incommensurable entities. Based on Boltanski and 
Thévenot‘s work the article develops a framework that can explain which kinds of 
critiques can hinder commensuration on the three stages of calculation of Callon 
and Muniesa‘s model. The analysis identifies four factors that make the 
achievement of a stable compromise for pay determination unlikely: First, 
incommensurability can be the result of a radical refusal of setting up differences 
or equivalencies. Second, it can be the result of a disagreement over possible 
legitimate principles of equivalence, or their relative worth. Third, a disagreement 
over the limits of meritocracy, i.e. relative importance of merit-based measures vis-
a-vis needs-based measures further complicates commensuration. Fourth, certain 
characteristics are by nature hard to measure, or need an established 
infrastructure to be measured. By using Callon and Muniesa‘s model to determine 
the stages that are necessary to evaluate a person or an object, this article shows 
how Boltanski and Thévenot’s concepts of critique and test can be complemented 
with a framework that considers the stages of separation, association, 
manipulation and transformation that are involved in evaluation. In particular, the 
article shows the importance of legitimate principles of difference and equivalence 
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for processes that can lead to evaluation. In this regard, it explores the specific 
problem that the formal equality of members poses to the question of evaluating 
differences. The paper furthermore extends extant literature on commensuration 
and compromises by taking into account obstacles to compromise that go beyond 
the need for a common interest (Huault & Rainelli-Weiss, 2011).
Pohler, Nina. "Evaluation and the tension between generalization and particularity: 
The negotiation of supplementary child allowance in a collective firm" ephemera. 
Theory & politics in organization.  Forthcoming (2020).
This article follows the justification work during a process of commensuration, the 
negotiations for a model to calculate supplementary child allowance in the radical 
cola collective (RCC). The model that the RCC is looking for is conceptualized as 
an evaluation device: A device that standardizes how people and things are 
evaluated. Boltanski and Thévenot‘s test is used as a heuristic framework to follow
the justification work of the involved actors. The evaluation process in case, 
however, is more a discovery process than a conflict between  established ideas 
or values; it is more exploration than exploitation. The paper illustrates that in 
order to mobilize the test for empirical studies and to make use of the potential of 
the conceptual apparatus of Boltanski and Thévenot’s pragmatic sociology of 
critique, tests should not be seen as linear endpoints, but rather as ‘temporary 
truces’ with varying degrees of stability (Reinecke et al., 2017). While, in a first 
phase, the RCC agrees on an evaluation device for calculating supplementary 
child allowance, this is criticized and subsequently replaced in the second phase. 
During the discussion, the objects of the test are not always clear, and indeed, at 
several points the relevant beings of the test have to be re-defined. Supplementary
child allowance can be seen as a test for a good, social employer, therefore, 
considerations oscillate between considerations of what the responsibilities of a 
just employer are, and considerations about how to calculate the costs of raising 
children in a standardized form. In addition, supplementary child allowance is 
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something that is paid to parents, and throughout the discussion, it needs to be 
clarified, that this involves people who live with their partner‘s children as well. This
case shows that successful evaluation is related to established and available 
measures. It also shows, that there can be different interpretations of the same 
common good, which can lead to different, conflicting test arrangements. In the 
end the collective fails to develop an evaluation device that would allow to 
standardize the evaluation of the amount of costs of raising children that a “good” 
employer has to pay. The collective settles on a device that signifies worth but 
refrains from evaluation. One of the main findings of this article is, that the main 
obstacle in this process is a tension between general and particular, or what can 
be legitimately commensurated and what not. The solution the collective 
eventually settles on is a compromise between the need for a general solution and
the hesitation to use a standardized format to evaluate the financial needs of 
different parents and their children. The analysis furthermore shows, that even in a
situation that is characterized by an imperative to justification, people might settle 
for solutions that are good enough, or ‘satisficing’. 
Pohler, Nina. “Composite Relations: Organizations between collective and 
company”. 
Based on findings from call a bike (CAB) and the good tech collective (GTC), this 
paper shows how their relationships are configured in such a way that they allow 
to balance and mediate different modes of coordination. The paper distinguishes 
two different kinds of logics that firms use to coordinate work: First, coordination 
based on generalization, that is, the use of standards, roles and rules. Second, 
coordination based on familiarity, which rests on intimacy and detailed, often tacit 
knowledge and understanding. Both coordination logics have a moral dimension: 
Generalization is justified by, and justifies common goods, while coordination 
based on familiarity protects particular goods and needs. Based on Zelizer’s work 
on differentiated ties (2005) and Thévenot’s composite organizations as 
compromising devices (2011a), as well as his regimes of engagements (2001b, 
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2011b), this paper develops the heuristic concept of the composite relation. The 
composite relation is a conceptual tool that helps to uncover how organizations 
mediate between coordination based on generalization and coordination based on 
familiarity. The composite relation thus contributes to literature on coordination in 
organizations and particularly extends Thévenot’s work on organizations as 
compromise devices, by adding the consideration of coordination based on 
familiarity. The case studies in this paper illustrate that small organizations with 
democratic governance develop composite relations that are more open to the 
particular, since they rely on coordination based on engagement in familiarity, 
which fosters shared understandings and trust. For both CAB and GTC 
coordination based on generalization and coordination based on familiarity are 
equally important. By creating composite relations these collective firms are able 
to reconcile and balance different coordination logics as well as related moral 
considerations. Through this composition they achieve to be neither 'just‘ a 
collective, nor 'just‘ a company. 
Pohler, Nina and van Elk, Sam. “Duality, uncertainty and management consultancy
as practice: navigating conflicting regimes of engagement“. 
This article analyses the practices of consultants in two very different 
organizations, the good tech collective (GTC) and a large hospital in the UK. The 
article describes a  comparative case study of consultants’ practices in both sites. 
The study is based on observational, interview and documentary data from both 
sites. The material for the study was coded by both authors separately for their 
cases. After an initial state of coding, the authors compared their codes and 
subsequently developed a common code scheme to capture consultant‘s practices
in their respective sites. The article is motivated by an attempt to explain a duality 
in consultant‘s practices which is often noted in the literature on management 
consultants. Consultants’ practices are theorized using Thévenot‘s regimes of 
engagement, in particular the tension between coordination based on familiar 
engagement and coordination based on planned engagement. This tension is 
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linked to a historical change in ideas of good governance, rationality and efficiency.
Within new management, a Fordist-Taylorist ideal had been replaced by a new 
ideal of flexible and lean organizations. The rise of flexibility and personal, 
subjective factors in management and organizational governance now coexists 
with attempts to standardize and control even creative and knowledge-based 
work. The article relates the contrast between traditional bureaucratic norms of 
order and new ideals of innovative organizations, between standards-based and 
“flexible” coordination, to tensions between coordination based on familiar 
engagement and coordination based on planned engagement. Through 
Thévenot’s framework, the article is able to relate consultants’ qualities to the 
organizations’ uncertainties between planning and familiarity. The article models 
the practices that consultants use to balance and mediate tensions between these 
two modes of coordination, as well as the resistance these practices face. While 
consultants were hired to deal with an uncertainty between familiarity and 
planning, this uncertainty was articulated differently in both organizations.  The 
GTC wanted to increase the role of planning to protect its familiar core and faced 
uncertainty over how to do so. The Hospital’s uncertainty sprang instead from the 
tension between central plans and divisional particularity. These differing 
uncertainties implied different orientations between planning and familiarity: at the 
GTC, coordination based on planned engagement aimed to protect, while at the 
hospital it aimed to contain, familiar coordination.
Discussion and Conclusion
Economies of Worth and the Regimes of Engagement Combined
The first aim of this study is to combine the frameworks of the economies of worth 
and the regimes of engagement to explain the relationship between coordination 
and evaluation in organizations. The thesis demonstrates, that such an analysis is 
not only possible, but also yields important insights on intraorganizational 
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coordination. This is shown through the analysis of two different kinds of ‘critical 
moments’ in which tensions between different goods surface, on one hand, 
evaluation processes (Pohler, 2019, 2020a), on the other, tensions resulting from 
the co-existence of different modes of coordination, based on different regimes of 
engagement (Pohler, 2020b; Pohler and van Elk, 2020).
Evaluation Processes 
Pohler 2019 and Pohler 2020a analyze processes in which collective firms try to 
develop evaluation devices. These two articles therefore address the research 
question “How can the pragmatic processes which aim at the resolution of 
evaluative uncertainty or conflict be analyzed using the notions of test, 
compromise and regimes of engagement?”.
To understand the unfolding of evaluation processes, it is necessary to not only 
understand the dynamics of critique and justification, but also the pragmatic steps 
that lead from the attribution of worth to the calculation and measurement of worth.
In this regard, Bourguignon and Chiapello (2012) in their study of performance 
evaluation systems developed a three step model that leads from instrumentation, 
to evaluation, and finally, consequences. Pohler 2019 aims to clarify the steps in 
evaluation processes as well, but in contrast to Bourguignon and Chiapello’s case,
in my cases, the question of instrumentation is radically uncertain and contested. 
Consequently, the article develops a framework to understand how instruments, 
respectively, evaluation devices are developed from the start. To do this, the 
articles utilizes Callon and Muniesa‘s calculation framework (2005), which has 
three stages as well, but starts with a more fundamental operation, the sorting out 
of relevant entities for calculation. With ‘sorting out of relevant entities’, ‘creation of
relations between entities’ and ‘extraction of calculation’, Callon and Muniesa’s 
model provides a useful description of the stages that are necessary to establish a
test arrangement. These stages are not theorized in Boltanski and Thévenot’s 
model of the test. The article thus provides a theoretical extension of the notion of 
the test in OJ. While Callon and Muniesa’s framework is used to refine an analysis 
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that follows Boltanski and Thévenot’s ideas of evaluation, this article also offers a 
refinement of the calculation model. This in turn allows to understand how different
critiques on the three different stages of calculation can endanger 
commensuration. The systematic approach that is thus developed highlights the 
importance of legitimate principles of difference and equivalence. Boltanski and 
Thévenot discuss the importance of a principle of difference for their polity model 
in OJ (2006: 74ff), but it does not play a role in their elaboration of critical 
capacities. Considering the need for legitimate principles of difference provides an 
enhanced understanding of incommensuration, which complements existing 
understandings of the relationship between incommensuration and engagement in
familiarity. Centemeri (2015) in her discussion of environmental evaluation shows 
that the regime of public justification does not exhaust the possible moral 
orientations of people and relates ‘radical incommensurability’ to an engagement 
in familiarity. She explains radical incommensurability as the consequence of 
human-environment relations that can be termed as ‘dwelling’. “When dwelling, the
human-environment relation is both that of a biological space to which human vital 
functions are connected and that of a ‘milieu’ – a material and social place of 
proximity – in which the person and some of her capacities are ‘distributed’” 
(Centemeri, 2015: 4). A consideration of legitimate principles of difference can 
contribute to this analysis: If people consider their relationship to their environment
as “dwelling” rooted in familiarity, there is no legitimate principle of difference that 
would allow to separate people from their environment, a separation that is 
necessary for the kind of instrumental relationship that allows to calculate the 
worth of the environment. 
Pohler 2020a also contributes to studies utilizing the notion of the test. The critical 
moment that is studied in this paper is characterized by profound uncertainty, 
which can not be solved by selecting an order of worth and putting it to a test. 
Instead, a collective discovery process ensues. What is at stake in this process is 
not only who should be evaluated and how, but also it if it is possible to develop a 
fair model for all situations in the first place. The analysis shows, that successful 
evaluation is related to established and available measures. It also shows, that 
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there can be different interpretations of the same common good, which can lead to
different, conflicting test arrangements. The analysis of the negotiations 
surrounding supplementary child allowance furthermore highlights the tension 
between general and particular in evaluation processes. Particularity in some 
sense includes familiarity, but it is broader, since in the discussion of 
supplementary child allowance particularity includes the planned engagement of 
particular parents and their children. Pohler 2020a furthermore extends Dionne et 
al.’s (2018) observation, that “valuation processes during a controversy are 
punctuated by a series of tests of worth built around the qualification of different 
objects of test “ (Dionne et al., 2018: 18), since in the RCC case, the relevant 
beings that should be tested change, as well as their definitions.
Both Pohler 2019 and Pohler 2020a describe evaluation processes which entail 
meanings and moral orientations that can not be captured if the idea of morality is 
restricted to the level of public justification. The analysis of evaluation processes in
this thesis therefore demonstrates the analytical advantage of using a framework 
that is able to acknowledge and describe the valuation of particular goods. 
Co-Existence of Different Modes of Coordination in Organizations
Pohler 2020b and Pohler and van Elk 2020 address the research question “How 
do organizations deal with the co-existence of not only different orders of worth, 
but different regimes of engagements in intraorganizational coordination?”.Though
Raviola (2017) does not use the distinction between different modes of 
coordination, her study she shows, that the regime of planned engagement is so 
important in organizations, that in daily-practice controversies are regularly cooled 
down or set aside. This allows that the work that is necessary for the continued 
existence of a firm, for their “projection into the future“ (Thévenot, 2011), can 
continue. The analysis of the negotiations of fair payment (Pohler, 2019), as well 
as the 'satisficing‘ solution for supplementary child allowance (Pohler, 2020a) point
to this conclusion as well: An analysis of the relationship between coordination and
evaluation in organizations has to consider the regime of planned engagement, in 
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which evaluation is based on the good of the achievement of a plan. Existing 
studies that utilize the regimes of engagement to explain coordination show that, 
while familiar engagement can lead to tensions with other regimes, these tensions 
can be resolved through compromises (Merilutoto, 2018) and compositions 
(Meilvang et al., 2018). Pohler and van Elk (2020) and Pohler (2020b) further 
contribute to this. These articles discuss the tension that results from the co-
existence of coordination based on different regimes, and demonstrate how 
different practices (Pohler and van Elk, 2020) and composite relations (Pohler, 
2020b) can balance and mediate between them. While this thesis focuses on 
collective firms, Pohler and van Elk uses a comparative case study design that 
includes a hospital and a collective firm, thus showing that both the tension 
between regimes, as well as practices to reduce this tension are phenomena that 
are relevant for organizations in general. 
Both Pohler 2020b and Pohler and van Elk 2020 demonstrate, that a perspective 
that does not limit the analysis of intraorganizational coordination to the question 
of different orders of worth, yields important insights on the role coordination at 
different levels of generalization, as well as related tensions and compromises. 
Collective Firms and the Balance between Company and Collective
The second aim of this study is to use the combination of the economies of worth 
framework and the regimes of engagement to understand how collective firms 
achieve a balance between being a company and a collective.
The thesis demonstrates, that this combination can clarify specific characteristics 
of collective firms which become apparent in the way evaluation processes unfold 
(Pohler, 2019, 2020a), as well as in their coordinative tensions and related 
compromises (Pohler, 2020b; Pohler and van Elk, 2020).
All of the articles of this thesis address the research questions “What are the main 
normative and coordinative tensions in collective firms and how are they related to 
different regimes of engagement?” and “What are the practices and compromises 
collective firms employ to balance these tensions?”.
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Evaluation Processes in Collective Firms
Pohler 2019 and 2020a analyze evaluation processes in collective firms. Pohler 
2019 describes how fair payment is negotiated at the RCC and the GTC. Both 
collective firms acknowledge differences in needs, as well as “competence” 
between members. But whereas the GTC has a differentiated pay system, as well 
as a formula that can be used to calculate differentiated pay, members do not 
regard their solution as fair. At the RCC, there is an equal pay system which is 
seen as problematic and consequently, there is a failed attempt to shift towards a 
“fair pay formula”. Both firms are not entirely content with their respective 
solutions, but fail to develop a satisfying one. The analysis shows, that the 
incommensurability of members, their needs and their worth is strongly related to 
their ideas of what it means to be a collective, which implies acknowledging that 
members are both different and equal. For instance, one RCC members argues 
that a collective has to value all its members equally, and therefore there should 
be equal pay for everyone. For another member, valuing members means 
acknowledging their differences, and therefore, pay should be differentiated. At the
GTC, the tension between difference and equality has a different starting point, as 
there is differentiated pay already. Two of the members think they would deserve 
more pay in principle, but hesitate to ask for a raise. One of the reasons for this is 
that they would prefer to implement a general solution for everyone, as they don’t 
feel certain that they are the only (special, different) ones who should be singled 
out for re-evaluation. The tension between difference and equality here can be 
seen as one between particularity – do I deserve my own, particular solution? – 
and generalization – should we not have a general solution?.
The formal equality of members thus influences the perception of legitimate 
differences and, in consequence, the normative framing of pay. In addition, the 
formal equality of members creates situations in which it is very likely that a critical
moment emerges. It is thus a context that is more open for radical critique and the 
potential presence of multiple principles of equivalence. This in turn means, that 
incommensurability is more likely to emerge in collective firms than in conventional
ones. 
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Pohler 2020a discusses the negotiation of supplementary child allowance at the 
RCC. In this process, there is a new variation of the dynamic between difference 
and equality. The question of equal pay is re-visited not due to the 
acknowledgment of differences in worth, but between needs in members. But 
while members try to develop a common understanding of how supplementary 
child allowance should be calculated, the eventually unmet challenge they face is 
to find a general solution for different parents and their children. This again points 
to the tension between particularity and generalization. Pohler 2020a also 
demonstrates the relationship between the unfolding of an evaluation process and 
the specific “value-measure-environment” (Brighenti, 2018) in which it takes place. 
The complexity of the task of developing an evaluation device for supplementary 
child allowance, in combination with the radical openness of the situation, leads to 
a process in which values and their appropriate translation into measures are 
simultaneously discovered and created. During this, together with the prevalent 
ideas of justice, the aims, subjects and objects of the test change.
Pohler 2019 and Pohler 2020a demonstrate the specificity of collective firms as 
context for evaluation processes. On one hand, they are a context in which more 
voices have an equal right to be heard, which means that radical critique is more 
likely to be voiced than in conventional firms. On the other hand, the formal 
equality of all members in combination with the importance of familiar engagement
provides a context in which tensions between particular and general goods arise.
Co-Existence of Different Modes of Coordination in Collective Firms
Pohler and van Elk 2020 argues that the central goal of a collective firm, the GTC, 
is to protect its familiar coordination, while also allowing for the kind of certainty in 
planning that planned coordination and standardization allow. Balancing these two 
modes of coordination is such a big challenge, that a consultant is engaged to 
facilitate this. The paper shows how the consultant addresses this tension by 
65
Pohler - Collective firms between collective and company
implementing practices that balance regimes or narrow their distances, supported 
by mediating objects. The paper also shows that mediating forms could become 
the focus of resistance to these practices, when members of the GTC felt that the 
standardizing efforts had gone ‘too far’. 
Pohler 2020b argues that the main coordinative and evaluative tension that CAB 
and the GTC are facing is between coordination based on familiarity and 
coordination based on generalization. The distinction between these two modes of
coordination is based on Thévenot’s regimes of engagement, in which he 
differentiates modes of coordination based on degrees of generality. The article 
focuses on the differentiation between familiarity and coordination that is based on
conventions, collapsing the regimes of plan and public justification. This is 
because the combined analysis of all the three collectives in this study resulted in 
the conclusion, that tensions between orders of worth were less important in the 
achievement of ongoing coordination, whereas conflicts mainly emerged between 
the particular and the general, respectively coordination based on familiarity and 
coordination based on generalization. The composite relation in this sense is a 
main contribution of the thesis, in that it explains how collective firms manage to 
compose relations that are able to mediate between familiarity and generalization. 
The analysis in Pohler 2020b distinguishes three levels on which GTC and CAB 
mediate between the particular and the general. 
(1) In their governance structures, which use formalized rules and 
procedures, but leave space for particularity.
(2) In the way they include people who work for them as formal “non-
members” in the organization, which allows “non-members” participation in 
the governance structures as well as the same rights in regards to pay.
(3) Finally, while both collectives use a division of labor and related, 
temporally constrained formal hierarchy, they consider their member’s 
particular needs and use relational work to balance conflicts between 
particular and collective needs.
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While Pohler 2020b suggests, that all organizations have to manage the tension 
between particular and general, it also suggests, that this tension is central for 
intraorganizational coordination in collective firms. This is related to the importance
of both formal equality, as well as personal relations in collective firms. By 
declaring everyone equal, it becomes problematic to acknowledge differences. At 
the same time, if one acknowledges and values differences, it becomes 
problematic to use coordination that is based on generalization. Being a collective 
and a cooperative at the same time thus means to acknowledge that members are
“equal, not different”, as well as “different, not equal”. It means to acknowledge the
particular, situated needs of people, as well as collective, general needs. 
Collective firms have to balance this tension, they have to make sure that they 
never ‘go too far’, by either threatening particular goods for the sake of the 
collective, or threatening the collective for the sake of particular people. 
From a perspective of pure logic, this means that collective firms are impossible. 
We can immediately come up with the boundary cases that will either lead to the 
dissolution of the collective, or else, its degeneration into an oligarchy. Fortunately,
in reality, collective firms are able to develop a pragmatic moral sense, so that in 
consequence members try to never ‘go too far’. This balance allows collective 
firms to combine the advantages of flexibility and trust that are related to familiar 
engagement and the advantage of efficient planning that is related to coordination 
based on generalization. 
In this study, the often noted duality of collective firms is reframed as the need to 
balance and mediate different modes of coordination. The thesis furthermore 
argues, that in small collective firms with direct democratic governance, the central
tension coordinative and evaluative tension is between coordination based on 
familiar engagement and coordination based on generalization. With this, the 
thesis does not aim to replace “social” with “familiar” and “economic” with “general”
in the analysis of collective firms, but it proposes a different perspective on their 
central duality. We already know from OJ that neither the social, nor the economic 
are pure entities, as they already contain compositions that achieve compromises 
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between different orders of worth. The are always economic reasons to value the 
social, and social reasons to value the economic. With shifting the emphasis from 
social/economic to particular/general, the thesis does not propose that economic 
reasoning is not central to coordination in collective firms, but that tensions 
between particular and general arise within, as well as across what is usually 
considered economic reasoning. The challenges in finding calculations for fair pay 
result from the uneasiness and uncertainty members of the collectives feel in 
regards to making things general at the cost of devaluing the particular. This is not 
a conflict between pay for performance and payment according to needs, it is not a
tension between economic and social. Related, a collective firm that has a division
of labor but refrains from treating their members as “only workers” does not simply 
attempt a compromise between social and economic. Both frames could be, and 
indeed have been, used to argue for either side. A division of labor furthers the 
collective good, but this also means giving in to market pressures. Considering 
people in their particular needs strengthens social relations, but it also enhances 
motivation and productivity, etc. This study proposes that the social as well as the 
economic can be located on different levels of generalization, and they can be 
composed of different compromises between the general and the particular. This 
clarification is necessary, since the main challenges in evaluation processes and 
intraorganizational coordination that I encountered in my research can not be 
adequately captured with the duality of social and economic. These challenges 
can also not be adequately described as tensions between different orders of 
worth. But they can be captured by looking at the ‘vertical level of complexity in 
coordination’, the tension between particular and general in coordination.
Limits and Implications of this Study
The results of this thesis contribute to, and open new directions for research, in 
three different areas:
First, this thesis contributes to the field of valuation studies. The thesis illustrates 
that in order to mobilize the test for empirical studies of valuation, tests should not 
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exclusively be seen as linear endpoints, since often they will be intermediary 
states with varying degrees of stability. Furthermore, the thesis shows that the 
uncertainty in critical moments might lead to a process that resembles more a 
collective discovery process than a contention. Further contributions to the field of 
valuation studies are made by pointing out the central role of legitimate principles 
of difference and equivalence for successful commensuration, as well as the moral
tension between particularity and generalization in standardizing evaluation 
devices. The findings of this study result from an analysis of collective firms, which 
due to their democratic governance-structures and values are a specific context 
for evaluation processes. It would be interesting to understand the influence of 
different governance-structures on the unfolding of evaluation processes and in 
particular, how this influences the legitimacy of principles of difference and 
equivalence. 
Second, the study contributes insights for scholarship on the relationship between 
coordination and morality in organizations, especially research that is inspired by 
Boltanski and Thévenot’s On Justification. The thesis shows, that an 
understanding of different degrees of generality in coordination, as articulated in 
Thévenot's sociology of engagements, yields important and also more appropriate 
insights on intraorganizational coordination than an analysis that only looks at the 
co-existence of different orders of worth. The study introduces the composite 
relation, a heuristic concept that allows to understand how different modes of 
coordination can be mediated by defining and distinguishing different ways of 
relating to an organization. In addition, the study extends Thévenot’s conception of
the relationship between coordination and implied goods. The notion of ‘going too 
far’ describes a moral orientation that corresponds with composite relations. In 
their relationship to other people and their environment, people might feel the wish
to pursue both general, as well as particular goods. They are then not contempt to 
settle with “either/or”, but are striving for “as well as”. 
Finally, this study contributes to scholarship on cooperatives, collectivist 
organizations and collectives. The main contribution this study can offer to the 
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existing research is a different perspective on what it means to be a collective firm,
by looking at how intraorganizational coordination is achieved in practice. The 
theoretical perspective this study employs allows to understand coordination as 
something that includes, but goes beyond, formal governance structures. It is 
furthermore, able to address the role and meaning of moral orientations at different
levels of generality. This allows to reframe the often noted duality of collective firms
as the need to balance different modes of coordination with differing modes of 
evaluation. The thesis proposes that the main intraorganizational tension in small 
collective firms with with direct democratic governance is between coordination 
based on familiarity and coordination based on generalization. With the composite 
relation the study helps to understand the practices through which collective firms, 
despite their central tension between particular and collective goods, are held 
together. 
Existing scholarship on worker cooperatives and collective firms has explored in 
detail external and internal factors that make it possible to maintain democratic 
governance in business organizations. Not all of these factors are related to 
intraorganizational coordination. One of the most important factors in this regard is
the challenge of raising enough capital that allows surviving and growing during 
the first formative years, as well as to deal with unforeseen circumstances in the 
years thereafter. Cooperatives do not have access to equity capital like stock 
corporations do, and due to their unconventional character might have harder 
times getting loans from banks (Dow and Putterman, 2000; Davies, 2009; Whyte 
and Whyte, 1991). All three collective firms in this study started with a small 
number of people and grew very slowly, with considerate rates of self-exploitation. 
Struggling to survive through early years of low wages and self-exploitation seems
to be a common feature of the history of many alternative firms (Cornforth, 1995; 
Neumann, 2008). By highlighting the centrality of the tension between particular 
and general, this study does not want to understate other considerate problems 
collective firms may face. Nevertheless, in regards to intraorganizational 
coordination, the study suggests, that the central tension in most phases of a 
collective firm is indeed between particular and general. This proposal is, however,
70
Pohler - Collective firms between collective and company
limited to small firms that use collective, democratic governance. Further research 
could explore the relative importance of the tension between particular and 
general in larger worker-cooperatives, like the Mondragon subsidiaries (Whyte and
Whyte, 1991), where governance structures contain different levels of hierarchy.
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Appendix I: Literature Review Methodology
The main source that was used to construct the corpus for the literature review 
was Scopus Preview, the largest abstract and citation database for peer-reviewed 
literature. All search requests were limited by a publication date up to 2019, since 
this was the year in which the search took place.
Articles using the economies of worth framework in the field of management and 
organization studies where searched for by combining two different searches: 1) 
Since Scopus does not allow to search for articles that cite books, hence, does not
allow to search for journal articles that cite On Justification, a first search request 
was for articles in the category “Business, Management and Accounting“ that cite 
Boltanski and Thévenot‘s 1999 article on “The sociology of critical capacity“. This 
strategy was used because this article summarizes the framework developed in 
OJ. This search resulted in 92 results. Book chapters were eliminated from the list.
To ensure that the corpus only includes articles that actually use the framework, 
articles that did not include either the terms “convention theory“, “orders of worth“, 
“economies of worth“, or “justification“ in their abstract where eliminated. Articles 
by Boltanski or Thévenot were eliminated as well. This resulted in a list of 39 
articles. Three additional search request were conducted for journal articles in the 
category “Business, Management and Accounting“ that use “On Justification“, 
“Economies of Worth“, “Boltanski and Thévenot“ or “French Pragmatist Sociology“ 
in their title, abstract or keywords. These search requests resulted in many 
articles, that were already in the initial list, while others were eliminated because 
reading their abstract revealed that On Justification was not central to them. In 
total, the combined searches added up to a list of 61 journal articles. The list was 
further complemented with two book chapters that discuss compromises in 
organizations, both from the German edited volume “Organisationen und 
Konventionen. Die Soziologie der Konventionen in der Organisationsforschung“ 
(Knoll, 2014). This resulted in a list 63 articles. 
Articles using the regimes of engagement were searched with the search term 
“regimes of engagement“ or “sociology of engagements“ in title, abstract or 
keywords. Again, only journal articles were considered. Since there are much less 
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articles that reference the regimes of engagement than articles that reference “On 
Justification”, this search was not limited to articles in the category “Business, 
Management and Accounting“. The combined searches resulted in 20 articles, of 
which articles by Laurent Thévenot were excluded. Furthermore, articles were 
eliminated from this list if their abstract did not give the impression that the article 
was dealing with either questions relevant to the justification work or the composite
organization perspective. In total, this contributed to a number of 11 articles.
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Economies of worth framework: Corpus of reviewed literature 
Table 5: Economies of worth framework: Corpus of reviewed literature
Authors Title Year Source title
Annisette M., 
Richardson A.J.
Justification and accounting: Applying 
sociology of worth to accounting 
research
2011 Accounting, Auditing and 
Accountability Journal
Annisette M., Trivedi 
V.U.
Globalization, paradox and the 
(un)making of identities: Immigrant 





Annisette M., Vesty 
G., Amslem T.
Accounting values, controversies, and 
compromises in tests of worth
2017 Research in the 
Sociology of 
Organizations
Banoun A., Dufour L., 
Andiappan M.
Evolution of a service ecosystem: 
Longitudinal evidence from multiple 
shared services centers based on the 
economies of worth framework
2016 Journal of Business 
Research
Barbe A.-S., Hussler 
C.
“The war of the worlds won't occur”: 
Decentralized evaluation systems and 
orders of worth in market organizations 
of the sharing economy
2019 Technological 
Forecasting and Social 
Change
Barès, F., Cova, B., 
Farde, G., Salle, R.
Caught in the crossfire of orders of 
worth: a failed attempt by a small 
business to reconfigure a French public 
sector
2019 Journal of Small 
Business and 
Entrepreneurship
Barondeau R., Hobbs 
B.
A pragmatic sociological examination of 
projectification
2019 International Journal of 
Managing Projects in 
Business
Barros M., Michaud V. Worlds, words, and spaces of 
resistance: Democracy and social 
media in consumer co-ops
2019 Organization
Barthod-Prothade M., 
Muller C., Cristini H.
How can a wine grower articulate the 
different types of time: The time of the 
weather, the economic time, and the 
human time?






The destructive side of branding: A 
heuristic model for analyzing the value 
of branding practice
2018 Organization
Bérubé J., Demers C. Creative organizations: when 
management fosters creative work
2019 Creative Industries 
Journal
Besio, C., Meyer, U. Kompromisse in 
Forschungsorganisationen
2015 Organisationen und 
Konventionen
Boesen M., Sundbo 
D., Sundbo J.
Local food and tourism: an 
entrepreneurial network approach





Measuring the persuasive power of 
consumerist activism: An experimental 
study on the polity model applied to food
imitating products





The role of criticism in the dynamics of 
performance evaluation systems
2005 Critical Perspectives on 
Accounting
Boxenbaum E. Toward a situated stance in 
organizational institutionalism: 
Contributions from French Pragmatist 
Sociology theory
2014 Journal of Management 
Inquiry
Brandl J., Schneider 
A.
Headquarters-subsidiary relationships 
from a convention theory perspective: 
Plural orders of worth, arrangements 
and form-giving activities





M., O'Doherty Jensen 
K.
Framework for understanding 
misleading information in daily shopping
2012 Qualitative Market 
Research: An 
International Journal
Cloutier C., Gond J.-
P., Leca B.
Justification, evaluation and critique in 
the study of organizations: An 
introduction to the volume
2017 Research in the 
Sociology of 
Organizations
Cloutier C., Langley A. The Logic of Institutional Logics: 
Insights From French Pragmatist 
Sociology
2013 Journal of Management 
Inquiry
Cloutier C., Langley A. Negotiating the Moral Aspects of 
Purpose in Single and Cross-Sectoral 
Collaborations
2017 Journal of Business 
Ethics
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Dansou K., Langley A. Institutional work and the notion of test 2012 Management (France)
Dansou K., Langley A. What’s in an App? Investigating the 
Moral Struggles Behind a Sharing 
Economy Device
2019 Journal of Business 
Ethics
De Graaf, F.J. Competing logics: financialisation and a 
Dutch cooperative bank
2018 Journal of Management 
History
Dionne, K.-E., 
Mailhot, C., Langley, 
A.
Modeling the Evaluation Process in a 
Public Controversy
2019 Organization Studies
Friedland R., Arjaliès 
D.-L.
The passion of Luc Boltanski: The 
destiny of love, violence, and institution
2017 Research in the 
Sociology of 
Organizations
Gálvez A., Tirado F., 
Alcaraz J.M.
“Oh! Teleworking!” Regimes of 
engagement and the lived experience of
female Spanish teleworkers
2019 Business Ethics
Gherardi S., Perrotta 
M.
Daughters taking over the family 
business: Their justification work within 
a dual regime of engagement
2016 International Journal of 
Gender and 
Entrepreneurship
Gkeredakis E. The Constitutive Role of Conventions in 
Accomplishing Coordination: Insights 
from a Complex Contract Award Project
2014 Organization Studies
Gond J.-P., Barin Cruz
L., Raufflet E., 
Charron M.
To Frack or Not to Frack? The 
Interaction of Justification and Power in 
a Sustainability Controversy
2016 Journal of Management 
Studies
Guile, D., Wilde, R.J. ‘Articulating value’ for clients in a global 
engineering consulting firm: ‘immaterial’ 
activity and its implications for post-
knowledge economy expertise




A market for weather risk? Conflicting 




Daudigeos T., De 
Lautour V.J.
Co-operatives, compromises, and 
critiques: What do French co-operators 
tell us about individual responses to 
pluralism?






The Obligation to Volunteer as Fair 
Reciprocity? Welfare Recipients’ 




Tourism strategies and climate change: 
Rhetoric at both strategic and 
grassroots levels about growth and 
sustainable development in Finland
2013 Journal of Sustainable 
Tourism
Kleppe B. Managing Autonomy: Analyzing Arts 
Management and Artistic Autonomy 
through the Theory of Justification
2018 Journal of Arts 
Management Law and 
Society
Leemann R.J., Da Rin
S., Imdorf C.
Training networks: A new form of 
apprenticeship in Switzerland [Les 
réseaux d'entreprises formatrices : une 
nouvelle forme d'apprentissage en 
Suisse]
2016 Formation Emploi
Lendaro A., Imdorf C. The use of ethnicity in recruiting 
domestic labour: A case study of French
placement agencies in the care sector
2012 Employee Relations
Lindberg F., Fitchett 
J., Martin D.
Investigating sustainable tourism 
heterogeneity: competing orders of 
worth among stakeholders of a Nordic 
destination




Competing orders of worth in 
extraordinary consumption community
2019 Consumption Markets 
and Culture
Mailhot C., Gagnon 
S., Langley A., Binette
L.-F.
Distributing leadership across people 
and objects in a collaborative research 
project
2016 Leadership
Munzer M. Justifying the logic of regulatory post-
crisis decision-making – The case of the
French structural banking reform
2019 Critical Perspectives on 
Accounting
Nadai E., Canonica A. The moralization of labor: Establishing 
the social responsibility of employers for
disabled workers




Oldenhof L., Postma 
J., Putters K.
On Justification Work: How 
Compromising Enables Public 
Managers to Deal with Conflicting 
Values
2014 Public Administration 
Review
Patriotta G., Gond J.-
P., Schultz F.
Maintaining legitimacy: Controversies, 
orders of worth, and public justifications




The Competent Actor: Bridging 
Institutional Logics and French 
Pragmatist Sociology




Variations in evaluative repertoires: 
Comparing employee perspectives on 
training and development in Germany 
and Russia
2011 Personnel Review
Ramirez C. 'We are being pilloried for something, 
we did not even know we had done 
wrong!' quality control and orders of 
worth in the british audit profession
2013 Journal of Management 
Studies
Raviola E. Meetings between frames: Negotiating 
worth between journalism and 
management
2017 European Management 
Journal
Reinecke J. Beyond a subjective theory of value and
towards a 'fair price': An organizational 
perspective on Fairtrade minimum price 
setting
2010 Organization
Reinecke J., Van 
Bommel K., Spicer A.
When orders of worth clash: Negotiating
legitimacy in situations of moral 
multiplexity




Zellweger T., Gond J.-
P.
Maintaining Moral Legitimacy through 
Worlds and Words: An Explanation of 
Firms' Investment in Sustainability 
Certification
2017 Journal of Management 
Studies
Rolandsson B. Partnerships with the police – logics and
strategies of justification







Vagabonds at the Margins: 
Acculturation, Subalterns, and 
Competing Worth
2019 Journal of 
Macromarketing
Stamer N.B. Moral conventions in food consumption 
and their relationship to consumers’ 
social background
2018 Journal of Consumer 
Culture
Stark D. For what it's worth 2017 Research in the 
Sociology of 
Organizations
Strauß, A. Value-creation processes in artistic 
interventions and beyond: Engaging 
conflicting orders of worth
2018 Journal of Business 
Research
Suckert, L. Organisierter Kompromiss 2015 Organisationen und 
Konventionen
Susen S. Remarks on the nature of justification: A 
socio-pragmatic perspective
2017 Research in the 
Sociology of 
Organizations
Taupin, B. The more things change... Institutional 
maintenance as justification work in the 
credit rating industry
2012 Management (France)
van Bommel K. Towards a legitimate compromise?: An 
exploration of integrated reporting in the
Netherlands
2014 Accounting, Auditing and 
Accountability Journal
Vesty G.M., Ren C., Ji
S.
Integrated reporting as a test of worth: A
conversation with the chairman of an 
integrated reporting pilot organisation
2018 Accounting, Auditing and 
Accountability Journal
Whelan G., Gond J.-P. Meat Your Enemy: Animal Rights, 
Alignment, and Radical Change
2017 Journal of Management 
Inquiry
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Table 5: Regimes of engagement: Corpus of reviewed literature
Authors Title Year Source title
Conley J., Jensen, O. “Parks not parkways”: contesting 
automobility in a small Canadian city
2016 Canadian Journal of 
Sociology
Eranti V. Re-visiting NIMBY: From conflicting 
interests to conflicting valuations
2017 The Sociological 
Review
Eranti V. Engagements, grammars, and the 
public: From the liberal grammar to 
individual interests
2018 European Journal of 
Cultural and Political 
Sociology
Meriluoto T. Neutral experts or passionate 
participants? Renegotiating expertise
and the right to act in Finnish 
participatory social policy
2018 European Journal of 




Methods of engagement: On civic 
participation formats as composition 
devices in urban planning
2018 European Journal of 
Cultural and Political 
Sociology
Gherardi S., Perrotta 
M.
Daughters taking over the family 
business: Their justification work 
within a dual regime of engagement
2016 International Journal 
of Gender and 
Entrepreneurship
Centemeri L. Reframing problems of 
incommensurability in environmental 
conflicts through pragmatic sociology:
From value pluralism to the plurality 
of modes of engagement with the 
environment
2015 Environmental Values
Blok A., Meilvang M.L. Picturing Urban Green Attachments: 
Civic Activists Moving between 
Familiar and Public Engagements in 
the City
2015 Sociology
Bullinger B. Family affairs: Drawing on family 
logic and familiar regime of 
engagement to contrast "close-up" 
views of individuals in conventionalist
and institutionalist reasoning
2014 Journal of 
Management Inquiry
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Knoll L. Coping with economic uncertainty. on
the pragmatism of the French 
Convention School [Die Bewältigung 
wirtschaftlicher unsicherheit. zum 
pragmatismus der soziologie der 
konventionen]
2013 Berliner Journal fur 
Soziologie
Gálvez A., Tirado F. Telework and regimens of 
engagement: Women and their 
critique of face work [Teletrabajo y 
regímenes de compromiso: Mujeres 




Appendix II: Commensuration, compromises and critical 




This paper analyses pay determination as a process of commensuration as well as
a process in which commensuration can fail. The analysis is based on an empirical
study of two collective firms in Germany and the United Kingdom and their 
attempts to self-determine fair pay. Due to the formal equality of members and 
their democratic decision-making processes, these cases are a specifically 
interesting context for studying the determination of pay. Through the analysis of a 
failed attempt at finding a formula for fair pay, as well as a fragile compromise 
formula, a contribution is made to the literature on commensuration and the 
construction of compromises. This paper also extends this literature, by explaining 
the obstacles to the creation of a compromise that would go beyond the need for a
common interest. Callon and Muniesa’s work on calculation is used to clarify the 
steps that are necessary to move from questions of worth to the assessment of 
worth and its expression in measures. To introduce the question of legitimacy in 
evaluation processes, Callon and Muniesa’s framework is supplemented with 
Boltanski and Thévenot’s work on critical capacities. 
Keywords




Cet article analyse la détermination des salaires comme un processus de 
commensurabilité, mais également comme un processus au cours duquel la 
commensurabilité pourrait échouer. Cette analyse s’appuie sur une étude 
empirique réalisée au sein de deux entreprises collectives, en Allemagne et au 
Royaume-Uni, et sur les tentatives que ces dernières ont faites pour déterminer 
par elles-mêmes une rémunération juste. En raison de l’égalité formelle entre leurs
membres et des processus de décision démocratiques qui définissent leur 
fonctionnement, ces cas constituent un contexte particulièrement intéressant pour 
étudier la détermination des salaires. À partir de l’analyse d’une tentative 
infructueuse de trouver une formule permettant de déterminer une rémunération 
juste, et de l’analyse d’un compromis fragile, cet article vient contribuer à la 
littérature sur la commensurabilité et la construction du compromis. Il enrichit 
également cette littérature en éclaircissant les obstacles à la création d’un 
compromis qui dépasserait la recherche d’un intérêt commun. Le travail de Callon 
et Muniesa sur le calcul y est utilisé afin de clarifier les étapes nécessaires pour 
passer des questionnements autour de la valeur à son évaluation et à son 
expression en unités de mesure. Pour introduire la question de la légitimité dans 
les processus d’évaluation, le cadre théorique établi par Callon et Muniesa est 
complété par le travail de Boltanski et Thévenot sur les capacités critiques.
Mots clés 
Commensurabilité, compromis, calcul, capacités critiques, évaluation, salaires, 
estimation 
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‘Determining pay, I don’t know where that comes from. I feel like in all 
organizations, it‘s just about a finger in the air, in like, crappy organizations, it is 
very much about, what can we get away with, what is the least amount of money 
that we can pay this person, and they will continue to be motivated and produce 
good work? So, that’s not the culture we have and I don’t want it to become that.’ 
 (A member of the Good Tech Collective, one of the companies discussed in this article.) 
Wages are the result of a process of commensuration, attempts to measure 
characteristics of people and their performance according to a common metric 
(Espeland & Stevens, 1998: 315). If wages are objects of disputes and thus have 
to be justified, they have to make their underlying calculations transparent in a 
formula. These formulas usually have to consider that wages are not only a 
remuneration of performance (merit), but also have to secure the reproduction of 
labour (need) (Schmierl, 2010). Wage determination thus entails the consideration 
of multiple dimensions and related values. Merit is an ambiguous idea, and in the 
context of labour, it can be based on characteristics of people (talent, qualification, 
experience), on the effort people put in their work (effort, time), or based on 
performance outcomes (quality, sales, profit) (Voswinkel & Kocyba, 2008). Pay 
determination is interrelated and contingent on a specific labour contract, that 
specifies the base of remuneration: piece wage and time wage, for instance, 
suggest very different concepts and measures of merit.6 Wage determination thus 
entails the consideration of multiple dimensions and related values. By analysing 
the determination of fair pay in two collective firms, this paper shows the inherent 
multidimensionality of wage determination and the challenge of commensurability 
between these dimensions.
In their classic paper on commensuration as a social process, Espeland and 
Stevens (1998) highlight that commensuration is fundamentally relative, since it 
creates relationships that allow comparison and thereby changes our relations to 
what we value and alter how we invest in things and people (1998: 319). Pay is 
never just compensation, it is grounded in shared understandings of social 
6 Although the labour contract that defines the legal relationship between the givers and 
receivers of labour is clearly a central element of understanding the relationship between pay 
and related ideas of worth, this paper brackets the related questions and focuses on the wage 
level issue.
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relations, which it defines and marks (Zelizer, 1996). An important characteristic of 
pay is that it simultaneously reveals and creates organisational hierarchies. Wages
signal the relative worth of people and their work, and thereby also the core values
of their organisations. 
The pay determination this paper analyses is set in the context of two collective 
firms.  The cases were selected based on the priority given to democratic methods
of control, not on the legal form of the cooperative. The case selection mirrors 
Rothschild and Whitt’s definition of a collective or a cooperative as ‘any enterprise 
in which control rests ultimately and overwhelmingly with the member-employees-
owners, regardless of the particular legal framework through which this is 
achieved’ (1989: 2). Since in collective firms members are formally equal, wage 
determination and thus defining the relationship between the worth of different 
members is especially critical and problematic.
But it is not only at looking how people and things are commensurated that we can
learn about organisational values: it is also by understanding where the 
boundaries of commensuration are drawn and incommensurability is claimed, 
which characteristics of people are up for evaluation, and which ones are not. 
‘Incommensurables can be vital expressions of core values, signalling to people 
how they should act toward those things. Identities and crucial roles are often 
defined with incommensurable categories. Believing that something is 
incommensurable can qualify one for some kinds of relationships’ (1989: 327). 
As they derive from differently weighted metrics and the fact that they are based 
on social ideas of worth and needs, wages are a fascinating topic for valuation 
studies. Furthermore, pay determination and the conflicts and legitimations 
accompanying them are interesting cases to think about the entanglement of 
material possibilities and situated moral considerations in evaluation practices in 
organisations (Brighenti, 2018; Hutter & Stark, 2015). Pay determination is not 
often studied from the perspective of moral justification. An exception is Stark and 
Lukács’ study (2009) of an intra-enterprise partnership in the 1980s communist 
Hungary. They studied a group of 18 workers who were self-organised and were 
running the factory’s equipment on the ‘off-hours’, subcontracting to the parent 
enterprise and getting orders from outside firms. In their study, which is inspired by
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Botlanski and Thévenot’s work as well, they discuss how this collective of formally 
equal workers struggled to find a fair payment system.
Espeland and Stevens write that ‘commensuration as a practical task requires 
enormous organization and discipline that has become largely invisible to us’ 
(1998: 315). Successful commensuration requires that relevant entities have been 
identified and that there are appropriate calculation devices that allow an 
assessment of these entities. These calculation devices, furthermore, have to be 
able to maintain legitimacy in the face of critique. Commensuration thus entails a 
process that is ridden with prerequisites. To analytically distinguish between 
different phases and related prerequisites in the process of determining pay, this 
paper develops a structured, process-oriented approach, based on Callon and 
Muniesa’s understanding of calculation (2005). To introduce the question of 
legitimacy in evaluation processes, Callon and Muniesa’s work on calculation is 
furthermore supplemented with Boltanski and Thévenot’s work on critical 
capacities (1999; 2006).  
In the following, the paper will first discuss pay determination as the construction 
of a compromise, utilising the work of Boltanski and Thévenot. Second, the paper 
will introduce the analytical grid, based on Callon and Muniesa and Boltanksi and 
Thévenot, which will be used to understand the challenge of commensuration in 
the case studies. Subsequently, the two different case studies will be discussed. 
 
Pay determination as the construction of a compromise
Pay determination is a process of commensuration, since different dimensions and
related values have to be considered. Boltanski and Thévenot’s work (1999; 2006)
offers conceptual tools to understand the processes of commensuration insofar as 
the critical moments7 they are interested in are characterised by the potential 
threat of value incommensurability. Espeland and Stevens, referring to the work of 
7  According to Boltanski and Thévenot (1999), a critical moment is when there is a critique of a 
situation that leads to a deliberate reflection and (re)evaluation. 
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neo-institutionalists, hypothesise ‘that the most frequent and most durable claims 
about incommensurability occur at the borderlands between institutional spheres, 
where different modes of valuing overlap and conflict’(1998: 322). Boltanski and 
Thévenot argue that there is a limited number of most legitimate common goods 
and related modes of valuing in modern societies, but in contrast to neo-
institutionalists, they don’t localise these goods in different institutional spheres. In 
their model, different modes of (e)valuation are not related to different social 
spheres or groups, but to different situations (1999: 365). On Justification 
(Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006) develops a framework that describes six ‘worlds’, 
repertoires of justification based on the central principle of equivalence, that 
people with critical capacities can mobilise in different situations for critique or 
justification. Because these worlds are tied to situations, but people are capable of
mobilising different worlds, they ‘always have the possibility of denouncing a 
situation as unjust (even if criticism is unequally easy according to the current 
constraints they have to deal with)’ (2006: 373). In their book, Boltanski and 
Thévenot describe two possible outcomes of commensuration processes when 
there is a threat of value incommensurability and an imperative to public 
justification: the ‘test of worth in one world’ and the ‘compromise’. 
In a test of worth, people and objects are put in their appropriate order, according 
to a central principle of equivalence that is related to one world. This allows to 
suspend a dispute and establish a new agreement, based on a just order. A firm 
could for example decide that wages should reflect formal qualification (industrial 
worth), in-house experience (domestic worth) or contribution to sales (market 
worth). However, a dispute about wages will most likely not be settled by a test in 
one world, but by a compromise. 
A compromise suspends a dispute that involves more than one world without 
settling the dispute in only one of the worlds. The resulting setup is a composite 
arrangement that involves individuals and things that can be identified in different 
worlds. Boltanski and Thévenot discuss the example of workers’ rights as a 
compromise that relates an object from the civic world (rights) with beings from the
industrial world (workers). The compromise between the civic world and the 
industrial world is the foundation for all arrangements that concern labour law and 
labour movements, where civic and industrial common goods –collectivity and 
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solidarity, efficiency and productivity– are intermingled (2006: 277, 326). It is thus 
on a central compromise that the idea of wages is based. 
Since in a compromise entities are not unambiguously ordered according to one 
principle of equivalence, it is easy to point out inconsistencies in the evaluation. 
The compromise always already entails sources for its own critique. A compromise
is therefore a fragile, pragmatic solution to value incommensurability. It does not 
overcome the tensions between different worlds, but rather, allows to brush off 
these tensions. There are three factors that allow for a relative stability of 
compromises:
First, the compromise needs the involved participants to be ‘favourably disposed 
toward the notion of a common good’ while at the same time, they ‘do not attempt 
to clarify the principle of their agreement’ (2006). Huault and Rainelli-Weiss (2011) 
describe commensuration as the construction of a compromise between different 
orders of worth. They argue that such a compromise is only successful if it can 
provide a solution to a problem common to various parties: ‘the necessary 
condition for an agreement to arise […] is the social construction of a problem 
whose solution could be seen as serving a common interest, despite conflicting 
worldviews’ (2011: 1412). Second, a compromise can be made more stable by 
creating objects that are composed of elements from different worlds, and endow 
these objects with their own identity, so that removing one of the disparate 
elements would make them unrecognisable. For instance, the compromise of a 
‘competitive public service’ is stabilised by the identity of a ‘user’, which 
encompasses the contradiction between a ‘citizen’ and a ‘client’ (2006: 278ff.). 
Third, a compromise is easier to achieve and stabilise if the involved entities are 
ambiguous and can derive meaning from more than one world (Boltanski and 
Thévenot, 2006: 279). This allows, in the absence of criticism and the presence of 
good-will, to imply an equivalence which would otherwise be regarded as 
unacceptable. If people for instance agree that wages should be based on ‘merit’, 
this would still allow to commensurate the merit of people based on different ideas 
of merit. Boltanski and Thévenot’s pragmatic sociology helps to understand that 
commensuration and incommensurability are results of a social process, where 
judgments remain socially indeterminate and emerge only from disputes (Wagner, 
1999: 351). The notions of test and compromise highlight that neither 
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commensurability nor incommensurability can be sufficiently explained by tensions
or the absence of tensions between substantive values. Understanding 
commensuration has to entail an analysis of the situated justifications work 
represents (Jagd, 2011) that produces commensurable and incommensurables 
entities. 
This article analyses the justification work surrounding the determination of fair pay
in two collective firms. The question of justice is potentially more critical in these 
contexts than in conventional firms. Stark and Lukács emphasise that having a 
payment system that is considered just is especially important for a collective, 
since ‘failure to ‘do what’s fair’’ could lead to so much disharmony that it would 
threaten the very existence of the group’ (2009: 52). In his study on ideas of justice
and injustice at work Dubet (2008) emphasises that even though the problem of 
justice is often talked about in terms of equality and inequality, actually the crucial 
difference is between ‘just inequalities’ and ‘unjust inequalities’. In cooperatives 
and collective firms, in principle everyone is equal, which is formally specified by 
the ‘1 member 1 vote’ decision rule, or even consensus-decision rules. Starting 
from this, stating any principle of difference in order to distinguish between 
members is more problematic than in conventional firms. Therefore, the 
establishment of ‘just inequalities’ is more demanding in this context. 
However, in most cooperatives, there are differences between member-workers, 
even if they are all regarded as equally skilled. Different people fulfil different roles 
and furthermore, there are differences in the time people spend working for the 
cooperative, and therefore in the amount of workload and of the responsibilities 
taken over. There are then always some people who feel they give more of their 
time and energy to the cooperative than others. These felt differences can lead to 
critical tensions in light of the ideal of the equality of everyone. For instance, 
workers in Stark and Lukács intra-enterprise partnership initially paid all workers 
the same hourly wages. But over time they started to mistrust their peers, 
suspecting that others were over-reporting. To remedy these emerging tensions, 
the collective established a new payment system, based on estimates of the hours
for each task prior to undertaking a project. The new system, however, soon 
generated problems of its own. The payment system continued to be a source of 
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tension in the collective. The disparity between the need for a payment system 
and its unsatisfactory, quasi-provisional character when viewed from a perspective
of fairness is a feature of the two case studies discussed in this paper as well.
Calculation and the creation of commensurability and 
incommensurability
In this section, I will explain Callon and Muniesa’s understanding (2005) of 
calculation as a three-stage process to clarify the steps that are necessary for 
successful commensuration. I will simultaneously point out the moral requirements
for calculation on each stage that allow to draw differences between entities and 
evaluate them. Subsequently, I will suggest different kinds of  critique related to 
each of the three stages of calculation that create obstacles to commensuration. 
The three stages of calculation
According to Callon and Muniesa, calculation is a three-stage process: first, the 
relevant entities have to be sorted out, detached and moved in a single space. 
Second, the entities are associated with one another, manipulated and 
transformed. Third, a new entity is produced; this can be a sum or an ordered list 
that links the entities taken into account. The newly constructed entity can leave 
the calculative space and circulate elsewhere (2005: 1231). The first stage of 
calculation entails that entities have to be ‘sorted out’ and ‘detached’ in order to be 
able to move to a space of calculation. To understand the moral capacities of 
actors involved in evaluation processes, this first stage of calculation first needs to 
establish legitimate principles of differences8: in order to ‘sort out’ and ‘detach’ 
employees among all the people working for a firm, for instance, I have to 
differentiate between employees, freelancers and ‘external’ temporary workers. 
These differences are well established and thus I should not have any problems 
8 Boltanski and Thévenot discuss the importance of a ‘principle of differantiation’ for their polity 
model (2006: 74ff.), but it does not play a role in the further elaboration of critical capacities and
tests.
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when I attempt to evaluate and remunerate employees differently from freelancers 
or temporary workers. However, the differences that allow me to differentiate 
employees from freelancers or temporary workers in terms of remuneration are 
often contested by labour unions. In the second stage of calculation, entities are 
associated with one another, manipulated and transformed. Callon and Muniesa 
use the example of a supermarket as a ‘calculative space in which it [the good] 
can be connected and compared to a finite list of other products. [...] The good has
been placed in a frame with other goods. Relations have been established 
between them, leading to new classifications that allow forms of comparison: the 
good can finally be calculated’ (2005: 1235). The establishment of comparability 
always needs a legitimate principle of equivalence that determines how entities 
can be made equivalent. This allows to compare and subsequently rank them, 
according to an overarching principle of evaluation. In a supermarket, principles of 
equivalence are materialised in shelves that contain, for instance, products with 
similar functions –e.g., cleaning products, cooking products and their different 
prices. In a firm, employees are ordered by their different functions as well– e.g. 
cleaners, cooks. But the established categories are not necessarily legitimate 
principles to calculate wages. In the third stage of calculation, ‘a new entity must 
be produced (a sum, an ordered list, an evaluation, a binary choice, etc.) that 
corresponds precisely to the manipulations effected in the calculative space’ 
(2005: 1231). In Callon and Muniesa’s conception, what is usually regarded as 
calculation is just its third stage: it is only after entities have been singled out and 
rules on how there connections must be treated have been established that a new 
entity, an evaluation, can be produced. In this sense, calculation does not 
necessarily mean commensuration (‘the expression or measurement of 
characteristics normally represented by different units’, Espeland & Stevens, 1998:
315), but we could say that commensuration is always a process of calculation. 
Creating incommensurability at the three different stages of calculation
How do actors endowed with moral and critical capacities create obstacles to 
calculation and commensuration? Espeland and Stevens note that the creation of 
incommensurables is no less a work than that of commensurables (1998: 329). 
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Understanding how different kinds of critique can hinder commensuration helps to 
understand this work. By showing which kinds of critiques can be mobilised on the 
three stages of calculation, we can see that commensuration is always a testing 
movement that might fail. The first stage of calculation, where relevant entities 
have to be identified and singled out, relies on a legitimate principle of difference 
that states if and how differences between entities can be made. In fact, these 
differences are not always already established or legitimate. There was, for 
instance, a time where people found it legitimate to talk about ‘the working class’, 
not allowing any distinctions between workers. In a different context, second-wave 
feminism was centred around the needs of all women but the underlying idea of a 
homogenous community of women was later successfully broken up in third-wave 
feminism, which developed the idea of intersectionality. The direction of criticism is
not always towards breaking up collective wholes; indeed, feminism also gave us 
the idea that, when it comes to child care and parental leave policies, we have to 
consider ‘parents’ and it should not be legitimate to differentiate between mothers 
and fathers. Similarly, between 2003 and 2005, in Germany reforms of collective 
labour agreements in the metal industry and electrical industry dissolved traditional
differences in the remuneration between white and blue-collar workers (Kratzer & 
Nies, 2009). Whether a principle of difference is legitimate or not is contingent on a
specific situation and can change over time. If there is no legitimate principle of 
difference, commensuration fails already at the first stage of calculation, since it is 
not possible or appropriate to single out entities of a whole. 
The second stage of evaluation, where entities are associated with one another, 
relies on one (or several) principle(s) of equivalence. A principle of equivalence 
allows to abstract from the particularities of something, in order to regard only the 
differences that are relevant to the invoked principle (Eymard-Duvernay et al., 
2005). In the second stage of calculation, there are two different critiques that lead
to a failure of commensuration. First, commensuration can fail if people cannot 
agree on which principle of equivalence is appropriate in a given situation. 
Different kinds of evaluation can be either criticised or justified from the viewpoint 
of different value-worlds. The second critique is even more radical and concerns 
the possibility of establishing equivalence per se. This critique is not part of the 
framework presented in Boltanski and Thévenot’s work (2006), but it is implicit in 
the literature on commensuration. The inappropriateness of making equivalencies 
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is usually made on claims about substantive characteristics of people, objects or 
relationships that render them unique and incomparable. In the second stage of 
calculation, commensuration can thus fail if people refuse to acknowledge any 
principle of equivalence or if several radical critiques based on different worlds 
make deciding on one principle of equivalence impossible. 
In the third stage of calculation, two more critiques are possible. The first one 
denounces the final evaluation by pointing out that ‘external entities’ not relevant to
the test and the related world have been included. For instance, if during a job 
interview, a candidate is asked if she is planning to have children in the future and 
subsequently does not get hired. The second critique occurs ‘when flaws or faults 
are noticed and beings are re-qualified or discovered as relevant’ (Boltanski and 
Thévenot, 1999: 373). What is criticised here is the process of ordering and 
measurement that leads to a wrong outcome, for instance because measurement 
devices have been faulty. Table 1: Stages of calculation and related possible 
critiques.
 Stage of Calculation Critique
 1. Sorting out of relevant 
entities
1. Criticising the creation of differences.
2. Criticising the principle(s) of difference used to 
sort out relevant entities.
 2. Creation of relations 
between entities
1. Criticising the creation of equivalencies.
2. Criticising the principle(s) of equivalence used to 
create relations.
3. Criticising the relative worth of principles of 
equivalence.
 3. Extraction of a 
calculation
1. Criticising the execution of evaluation, because 
external entities have been considered.
2. Criticising the execution of evaluation, because 
measurement devices have been faulty.
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 Understanding commensuration for compromises in practice
The case studies discussed in this paper have been conducted for my PhD 
project, which aims to understand the interrelationship between coordination and 
evaluation in small collective firms that practice self-governance and consent-
based decision making. Of the two cases discussed in this paper, one firm is a 
cooperative in the legal sense, the other one is formally a network of business 
partners and independent contractors. The latter, however, gives decision-making 
rights for all decisions to every business partner, regardless of their specific status.
Due to the highly different characteristics of these collective firms and different 
contexts and time-spans in which discussions of fair pay took place, the methods 
of gathering data varied significantly. In the following section, in the discussion of 
each case study, I will explain the data and data gathering methods I relied on. All 
of the data were coded in MaxQDA. I initially used a coding scheme that included 
codes for three categories: (1) codes that were related to discursive movements 
and inspired by conversation analysis (e.g., explanatory introduction, apologising), 
(2) codes that were related to justification work (Jagd, 2011) (e.g., critique, 
industrial worth, compromise), and (3) codes that were related to content (e.g., 
payment, good collective member). For this paper, I looked at passages that were 
related to pay determination and critical moments (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1999). 
After a first phase of going through the respective material and comparing findings 
across the co-ops, I revised the coding scheme in order to be able to find different 
opportunities and constraints for commensuration during the three different stages 
of calculation. In light of the framework outlined above, it is now possible to 
examine how two different coop collectives have struggled with the tension 
between the ideal of equality and the actual differences of their members in the 
context of pay determination. In the first case, which we will call ‘Community Cola 
Collective’ (henceforth, CCC), there is a failed attempt to develop a formula for fair 
and differentiated pay. In the second case, which we will call ‘Good Tech 
Collective’ (henceforth, GTC), such a formula already exists. This formula, 
however, is a fragile compromise, since there is on one hand uncertainty regarding
the calculation of pay based on this formula, and on the other hand, a shared 
sense of discomfort regarding existing pay differentiation based on this formula. 
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The CCC Case
CCC is a virtual organisation that supervises the supply-chain for their signature 
product, a coke with less sugar and more caffeine than usual, as well as beer and 
lemonade. Members of the CCC are based in different cities in Germany, their 
products are distributed in Germany and in two neighbouring countries. The CCC 
was started by a German-wide network of people who were fans of a particular 
German brand of coke that was not produced anymore and who connected 
through a mailing list. In 2001, they got hold of the original recipe and the contact 
of one of the original bottlers. They started by ordering 1000 bottles of coke with 
the original recipe, and distributed them among their network. At the same time, 
one of the supporters started talking to two diners in the city he lived, who were 
interested in selling the coke. The network then realised that they could start 
producing coke on a regular basis. They have been very slowly but steadily 
growing from selling 1000 bottles to their members and friends in 2001, to selling 
more than one million bottles in 2015. 
Due to its history, the CCC has a very specific system of distribution that is based 
on so called ‘ambassadors’. They are people who want to be part of the CCC and 
act as semi-professional, semi-activist, local salesmen. In every city and every 
village, in which CCC products are being distributed, this is due to an ambassador 
who started talking to small retailers, restaurants and bars about the CCC project. 
These ambassadors get paid on an hourly base for their initial work, and after they
have established a network of retailers, they get a percentage of the price of every
bottle that has been sold in their respective city or town. Apart from the 
ambassadors, there are people working part-time in the ‘organisation team’ to 
ensure the day-to-day operations. During the time of fieldwork, there were five 
people in this organisation team, supported by 30 ambassadors.
Everyone working for the CCC does so on a self-employed basis. Legally, the 
CCC is not a cooperative but a network of freelancers, they don’t own their 
production sites or their distribution network. The founding member of the CCC, 
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whose official job description is that of the ‘central coordinator’, owns the 
trademark rights, which is the only thing that can be ‘owned’ about the CCC. They 
can be best described as the coordinators of a supply chain. Altogether, in 2016 
the CCC had 1600 business partners, most important among them the bottler and 
the manufacturer, as well as a huge number of wholesalers and retailers. Business
partners, ambassadors and members of the organisation team are all viewed as 
equal members of the CCC, with the right to take part in decision making 
processes. Members of the CCC believe that the economy is a collective 
endeavour and all affected people should be able to directly influence production. 
Therefore they organised themselves in large parts through a mailing list and later 
changed to an online board (in 2016, the online board had 180 registered users). 
All strategic decisions are discussed within this board, and all decisions are taken 
by consensus. Theoretically, everyone that feels affected by CCC can get access 
to the online board and take part in the decision-making processes. However, it is 
mostly ambassadors and people who are part of the organisation team that take 
part in these online discussions. 
In the beginning of the CCC, people were working for free, but gradually they 
could start paying wages to the people working in the organisation team and they 
also started paying ambassadors on a commission base. If there is surplus at the 
end of the year, it is regularly used to retroactively increase wages. From the 
beginning, the hourly wages for the people working on the administrative side, as 
well as the share of the bottle price for the ambassadors, were they same. 
However, in their 10th year, there was a confrontational discussion on the mailing 
list because not everyone agreed with the equal pay policy. To avoid amplified 
tensions over the question of fair pay, the central coordinator hired a social 
scientist to conduct a study in order to find a ‘formula for fair wages’. The following 
description is based on the research report of the social scientist and the e-mail 
discussion that accompanied the study, both before, during and after its 
completion. 
Finding a compromise formula for fair pay
A social scientist was hired to find a ‘formula for fair pay’, which should determine 
a base salary, and relevant characteristics of people and their work. The salary for 
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one person would then have been calculated by adding or subtracting 
appropriately weighted factors from the base salary. Such formula is a compromise
between multiple evaluation principles: On one hand, there is a base salary, which 
seems to be based on the idea of some minimum amount of money that everyone 
needs to secure one’s livelihood. The factors that were to be added are a 
combination of needs and merit-based factors. The formula was based on the idea
that there could be legitimate principles of difference distinguishing between 
people or their work that would justify to distance from equal pay. It is also based 
on the idea that these principles of differences are at the same time, or can be 
combined with, legitimate principles of equivalence that can be used to calculate 
the relative worth of these factors. By trying to develop this formula, the CCC tried 
to commensurate the needs as well as the worth of its different members in one 
single metric. The study identified possible factors for the differentiation of pay and
conducted a survey in which participants were asked to weigh these factors. 
Interestingly, the survey refrained from using an already established principle of 
difference, i.e. the existing division of labour.9 The survey was conducted among 
all members of the CCC –which included everyone on the mailing list, as well as 
people following the CCC’s Facebook account.10 46 people answered the survey, 
among them eight people directly working for the CCC, 9 business partners and 
32 end-consumers. The survey asked participants to weigh the importance of 
criteria that could be possibly relevant to calculate fair pay on a scale from one to 
four. These factors were differentiated between output-oriented factors (like 
number of hours worked or added value), input-oriented factors (like qualification 
or working experience) and needs-oriented factors (like rent costs or children). The
results of the survey revealed that there was neither an unanimous reference for a 
base pay, nor an agreement on the appropriate weighting of factors. The social 
scientist summarised the average values for aggregation to argue that the factors 
9 This was a fundamental problem of the study, since ambassadors are paid based on 
commission, while the organisation team is paid based on hours worked. Therefore, two very 
different kinds of work and systems of remuneration were negotiated and discussed at the 
same time.
10 Note here that for the CCC, everyone who is connected to their products, as a business partner
or a consumer, and takes part in the discussions within the mailing list is a member.
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that seemed most important to the collective were workload, flexibility and risk. Her
interpretation of the study was immediately criticised in the mailing list, as 
something that should not be used for determining fair pay at the CCC. The study 
was then discussed at the annual ‘offline-meeting’ where all members of the CCC 
meet for two days. During the meeting, the members did not succeed to come to 
an agreement on a fair pay formula. Instead, they decided on a resolution to keep 
a model of flat pay, with the exception of supplements for people with children or 
disabilities. While I do not have material on the discussion during the offline 
meeting, the study had been discussed within the internal mailing list, from before 
the start of the study until the end. The e-mail discussion concerned with the 
formula for fair pay developed over a time period of six months, with 28 
contributions from 11 individuals. The people who took part in the discussion were 
all part of the organisation team, ambassadors or business partners, therefore the 
arguments brought up in these discussions should be representative of the 
arguments deployed during the offline meeting.11 In the following I will use insights 
from the survey and describe the arguments brought forward in the e-mail 
discussions to recreate the critiques that led to the emergence of 
incommensurability. 
First stage of calculation: Critique of principles of difference and equivalence
The discussion concerning the fair pay formula had already started when the 
planned project for finding a fair pay formula was announced. Some members 
fundamentally criticised this plan, by dismissing any legitimate principles either of 
difference or equivalence that could be used to evaluate members. One of the 
discussants described in this way his discomfort with the idea of a formula like 
this12: 
‘I feel very uncomfortable with the idea of a formula for fair pay, [...] a 
collective should have equal pay for everyone.’
11  The author attended  the offline-meeting twice and could deduce from her experiences that the
majority of people attending offline-meetings are people who are not ‘just’ consumers, but have 
some business relationship to the CCC.
12 The following quotes are originally in German, translated by the author.
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While this member felt uncomfortable with setting up any differences in pay, 
another member had the complete opposite view: according to her, her pay was 
fundamentally individual, and therefore, there could be no general formula: 
‘The question of whether your personal remuneration is fair or not is 
yours to answer first, and then afterwards you should negotiate with the 
collective.’
For this member, it is not possible to decide on common principles of equivalence 
for the evaluation of pay.
 
Second stage of calculation: Limits to meritocracy and a plurality of principles of 
equivalence
The establishment of a space for calculation where people can be ranked 
according to a principle of equivalence is dependent on the legitimacy of 
meritocracy in general. In Boltanski and Thévenot’s work, a just order is one in 
which people are ranked according to their worth in one world. Inequalities are 
justified as long as the differences in people’s rank are related to their differences 
in contributing to the common good. However, pay is not only about the 
remuneration of worth, but also about securing the needs of workers. There has 
always been a needs component in the legitimation of wages –which is reflected in
contemporary discussions on living wages–, and therefore a limit to meritocracy. 
The quest for finding a ‘fair pay formula’ then entails not only the question which 
merit-based criteria are legitimate, but also what their relative weight in 
comparison with needs-based factors is and which needs-based criteria are 
relevant. While the majority of the discussants and survey participants seem to 
grant legitimacy to an attenuated meritocracy in pay, the appropriate ratio between
merit and needs-based considerations remained unclear. The legitimacy of both 
needs-based criteria and merit-based criteria suggests a possibility for a 
compromise between the civic, the industrial and the market world. Whereas 
Boltanski and Thévenot note that they could not find a compromise between the 
civic and the market world in their sources (2006: 325), this could be precisely a 
case for such a compromise. According to the results of the survey, none of the 
input-oriented factors (like qualification or working experience) can form a base for
a legitimate meritocracy and formal qualifications (education certificates are not 
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seen as relevant for instance). The only factors that could constitute a legitimate 
meritocracy are ‘output factors’ (performance, workload, risk). However, the factors
that have exactly the most legitimacy as principles of equivalence, i.e. output 
factors, are the ones that are the hardest to measure. 
Third stage of calculation: The limits to measurability
Commensurability is not only made unlikely because of a radical rejection of 
principles of difference or because of an incommensurability of values, but also 
due to practical problems of measurement. One problem of measurability that 
clashed with ideas of justice was that it seemed fair to most that the people who 
produce more market value for the collective should also be paid more. However, 
while many input factors, like education, qualification and experience, can be 
measured to a broad extent, this is not true of output factors like performance, 
workload or success. This is, on one hand, because these factors are hard to 
measure per se, and on the other hand, because the CCC does not have any 
control or measurement infrastructure set up to monitor its members. 
Another problem that most people agreed on was that it is not fair that 
ambassadors are paid on a commission base. Depending on their location, 
ambassadors face indeed very different conditions to do their work successfully. It 
is much easier to acquire and keep customers in a major city where there are 
many alternative bars, than to acquire and keep customers in a geographically 
wider area in the countryside, with less bars to start with. However, the CCC is a 
distributed, heterarchical (Stark, 2009) structure without any control, which makes 
an hourly-based pay for a large number of ambassadors difficult. No one at CCC 
would be able or wiling to control how many hours ambassadors are actually 
working. And since working conditions are so different across geographic 
locations, no one would even be able to determine if someone practices shirking 
or not. For that reason, they are more or less forced to make do with a 
commission-based pay. 
In the end, the CCC decided to continue to pay everyone equally, since it seemed 
impossible to argue for commonly accepted differences between factors and in 
addition between the value different people, or different jobs, were adding to the 
CCC. Even though they share a common desire to develop a fair pay formula by 
trying to clarify how exactly different ideas of worth could be commensurated in a 
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formula, the members of the CCC ended up in a situation of irreconcilable 
incommensurability. The failed attempt to find a compromise formula by explicitly 
asking for an evaluation of possible principles of equivalence is an accurate 
illustration of the problem of compromises that Boltanski and Thévenot discuss. 
Boltanski and Thévenot stress that a compromise can only be reached if 
‘participants do not clarify the principle of their agreement’ (2006: 277). 
The GTC case
GTC is a cooperative that builds digital applications and websites based in the 
United Kingdom. At the time of the research, GTC had been existing for 6 years. 
They use a sociocratic governance model, which means that their work is 
organised through six semi-autonomous working groups, called ‘circles’, which 
meet regularly and are responsible for certain key issues, like design or business 
development. When I studied this case in 2017, approximately 18 people were 
regularly working for the GTC. These people are distinguished into three different 
classes: Members, Collaborators and Contributors. Members are the formal 
members of the cooperative, they each hold one share of GTC and collectively 
own it. Collaborators are freelancers who are not members (yet), but they feel 
committed to GTC and work almost entirely for GTC. Collaborators are involved in 
the self-governance structures; they are automatically part of the ‘collaborators 
circle’ and should additionally be part of at least one other circle. Contributors are 
freelancers who work to a limited extent for the GTC. GTC started as a limited 
partnership, in their first year, there were only three partners who had together left 
a big media company in order to start their own business. The founding members 
knew each other well and regarded each other as equally skilled. Payment was 
settled by dividing the revenues by the hours that have been spent working on a 
project. Each partner then got paid based on the hours she or he had been 
working. In the beginning, there was thus an equal pay per hour policy, which was 
justified by the fact, that everyone was equally skilled.13 When a growing number 
of differently skilled and experienced people started working for GTC, they wanted 
13 This is similar to the reasons put forward for equal pay in Stark and Lukács intra-enterprise 
partnership.
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to continue basing wages on the original principle of equivalence of ‘payment 
corresponds with added monetary value of work’. For this, they had to change the 
system of pay determination. Nowadays, GTC have a differentiated pay scale, 
which is limited by a ratio of 3:1 and a fixed maximum and minimum salary. This 
constraint on payment differentials is already a deviation from the central principle 
of equivalence based on market worth. It shows that any kind of meritocracy can 
only to a limited extent be expressed in the payment. Salaries are calculated as 
day rates and they are determined for each person individually. Pay is always 
decided by a consensus of the members. 
The Competency Framework: A fragile compromise formula
GTC has the compromise formula ‘Competency Framework’ as a guideline to 
make an assessment for day-rates. The competency framework is an Excel sheet, 
which contains six competence areas and related competences in the rows, and a 
description of competences on five levels in the columns. The competence areas 
encompass all areas of work at GTC, for instance Coding, Design and Project-
Management. Each of the competence areas lists relevant competences. For 
example, the competence area ‘Coding’ lists the competences ‘Quality’, 
‘Innovation’, ‘Communication’, ‘Architecture’. These competences can be rated 
according to five levels. In order to clarify when, for instance, a coder can be rated 
as Level 5 in the competence area ‘Architecture’, the Excel sheet provides a 
verbal description in the respective column: 
‘Effectively plans, designs and creates effective server, application, and database 
architectures for large and complex projects.’
One of the founding members told me that wages at GTC should reflect the value 
added for the company by a person’s work. However, the competency framework 
cannot directly relate the level of skills to outcomes of a person’s work. For 
instance, the competence area ‘Support, training and culture’ lists the competence 
‘supporting other members’, where Level 1 is described as ‘Helps other members 
when asked, prioritising help as appropriate’ and Level 5 as ‘Spots when other 
members need help and offer their support’. While it is certainly valuable to have 
member-workers who are supportive of their colleagues, it is almost certainly 
impossible to evaluate the value of this support. The problem of linking 
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competences to monetary outcomes is apparent even for competences that are 
more closely related to direct work outcomes, like coding. How much will the 
competence of a coder to ‘effectively plan, design and create server, application 
and database architectures’ contribute to the successful execution of a project? 
The competency framework has to be understood as a compromise formula in the 
sense of Boltanski and Thévenot, it is a ‘compromise for the common good’ aimed 
at assessing the value of a person’s work in order to determine fair payment. 
Compromises are fragile, since the principles that they entail cannot be subsumed 
under one overarching principle of equivalence, therefore ‘a compromise will often 
be described as not entirely defensible in logical terms, even though it may be 
preferable to any other solution.’ (2006: 278). The competency framework clearly 
deviates from the idea of ‘equal pay for equal monetary outcome’, but at the same 
time, it is not arbitrary, a lot of collective effort has been made to define principles 
of difference –e.g., competence areas and principles of equivalence– and 
descriptions of different levels of competence. According to Boltanski and 
Thévenot, compromises can be worked out more easily if they accommodate 
qualities that depend on the way they are understood, and may be related, to more
than one principle of equivalence. This is true for the notion of ‘competence’, which
can be related to different dimensions. The central concept of competence 
suggests that an equivalence can be made between the work of a designer, or a 
coder, or a project leader. Furthermore, the idea of remuneration according to the 
‘value added for the company’ is an example of an ambiguous ‘figure of the 
common good’ since this idea can encompass ‘Cheery to have around the office’14 
as well as ‘Effectively wireframes a basic webpage showing key elements and a 
clear page hierarchy.’15 Another factor important to understand the role of the 
competency framework as a compromise formula is that it is not used for 
automated calculation, but rather through a sociocratic decision-making process 
by group consensus. Therefore, pay is not only legitimated by an assessment 
based on the competency framework, but in combination with a consensus 
resulting from a collective discussion. GTC provides total pay transparency, and 
14  Competence Area ‘Support, training and culture’, Competence ‘Promoting, living, developing 
the GTC culture’, Competence Level 1.
15 Competence Area ‘Design’, Competence ‘Information architecture’, Competence Level 1.
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there is a latent controversy over the differently perceived fairness of people’s pay.
While there is no unanimous opinion on how to evaluate salaries for individual 
people, and what role the competency framework should play in this, everyone I’ve
asked about the salary scheme thinks that it is not fair to everyone and should be 
updated.16 However, this shared understanding did not lead to a critical moment 
that would have demanded a quick solution. Still, GTC started to plan a survey 
inside the company to determine how people would calculate fair pay. In the 
following I will use information I’ve gathered from interviews and internal 
documents to explain the problems GTC faces when trying to find a fair way to 
calculate wages and the fragile, but not yet contested state of the competency 
framework in this regard. 
First stage of calculation: Principle of difference, or which members should be re-
evaluated?
At the GTC, the perceived unfairness of pay did not create a critical moment, 
spurred by a confident critique. One important factor to explain this seems to be 
that pay is negotiated and decided for each person individually. This means that 
asking for a pay rise can represent considerable risks. People might discover that 
their assessment of their own worth is not shared with the others. In a cooperative,
where the underlying idea is that all people are equal members, if differences in 
the assessment of competences and skills become visible, this is potentially more 
harmful to one’s feelings than in a conventional company. Furthermore, for the 
collective itself, conflicts in terms of evaluation of members by the collective are 
potentially harmful for shared solidarity and motivation. When I asked one of the 
members why he would not take up the offer by one of the other members who –
informally– offered to reduce his own day rate to substitute it for a pay rise for him 
and another member, he answered: 
‘I said to [X] that if he would make a proposal to reduce his day rate, with no other 
attachments, just, that he wants to reduce his pay rate, then that is ok. I would not 
mind that. And then, if people decide in another round, that the most important 
thing to do is think about pay rises, then that’s fine as well. But the idea of him 
16 During three months of ethnographic fieldwork, the author conducted in-depth interviews with 
10 members.
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taking a pay cut in order to subsidise my pay is, I don’t know. Does not sit right 
with me. I do understand, why he would want to do that. But I think that, if it was 
for everyone, that is very different.’
Even though pay is per se individualised at GTC, this member does not want to be
the beneficiary of an individual solution. The same member still thinks that he 
would deserve a pay rise, both due to his performance (merit) as well as due to his
increased costs of living (needs), but he is still hesitant to ask for a pay rise and 
would prefer a general solution: 
‘I think, even though I think that most people here think they deserve more money, 
it’s not at the top of my mind right now, I mean, given that I’ve got new costs and 
stuff that have recently developed because of my flat, it will be something that I 
need to look at at some point. But it is just not at the top of my list.’ 
Another member told me that: 
‘But I also think, I deserve a pay rise. But it is a little bit like a can of worms, so I 
am like, do I want to open this? Like, should I bother to open this? I think I should 
open it, yeah, and I will.’ And later adds: ‘And also, because [a member] was 
saying that, you know, lots of people told me that they think I should have a pay 
rise. Part of the problem is that, I need to own that. And I just don’t have time for 
this at the moment. I’m gonna let this as an aim for January. I was also hoping to 
sell a big project but it has not come around yet. […] And I was kind of using that 
to kind of justify me getting a pay rise and then I was like ‘wait a second, I deserve 
one, no matter if I sell the project or not’. 
Both of these members seem to have legitimate reasons to ask for a pay rise but 
are still hesitant to ask for it, one reason for that seems to be the risk they take by 
individually asking for a pay rise and potentially getting a rejection from their peers.
The first stage of calculation entails that relevant entities have to be singled out in 
order to be evaluated. In this case, while there is an understanding that pay overall
is not always fair, not even the people who think they deserve higher wages are 
sure if they are the (only) ones that should be singled out for a re-evaluation. 
Second stage of calculation: Conflicting principles of equivalence and limits to 
meritocracy
A common way to differentiate pay in conventional companies is to differentiate 
between different job roles. Interestingly, at GTC salaries are not coupled with the 
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job role, nor the member status. While titles such as project manager, developer or
designer are legitimate ways to differentiate between people, at GTC they are not 
legitimate principles of equivalence in the sense that they can be used to establish
a hierarchy of salaries. This is also true for the status of a member, collaborator or 
contributor. There are considerable differences in the pay rates of members, and 
furthermore, members don’t necessarily have higher day-rates than collaborators 
or contributors. Thus, day rates are not directly coupled to a status category inside 
GTC. While the competency framework lists legitimate principles of difference and 
equivalence, the overall relationship or proportion between these principles is not 
clear. Furthermore, members of GTC considered needs-based factors like age or 
having children as legitimate considerations for pay level as well, which are not 
considered in the competency framework. A preliminary document from the 
ongoing project of determining a more fair and coherent pay structure states that 
‘Pay should be based on experience and skill level but also based on life 
circumstances.’ The document also lists among potential additional benefits 
factors ‘pay for mortgage advice’ and ‘pay for babysitting’. While the competency 
framework thus offers several principles of equivalence, all based on some idea of 
merit that can be combined to determine pay, people are hesitant to only consider 
these. 
Third stage of calculation: Limits to measurement
The competency framework is a tool that should make it possible to come to a 
shared understanding about how to determine adequate pay for individual people. 
However, its categories and criteria are not clear enough and have in the past led 
to differing assessments of people’s ranking in this framework. While the 
competency areas and the description of the different levels certainly provide 
orientation for the assessment of people’s worth for the company, it leaves room 
for interpretation and different assessments. Another factor that seems important 
to GTC in terms of worth is their personal engagement with and for the GTC, a 
factor that can hardly be measured objectively, as stated by one of my 
interviewees:
‘And you know, I feel like I am always working, I feel like, on the weekend I am 
always thinking about GTC, I am always thinking about what we can do to improve
or you know, develop things that we’ve made mistakes on. But those kinds of 
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things are really hard to measure and I can’t say that no one else is doing it. I am 
sure there are other people that are doing it, and I am sure there are people that 
aren’t doing it, but I can’t know that for sure.’ 
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Discussion
Commensuration is a complex process, ridden with prerequisites. It is contingent 
upon the entanglement of measures and values in specific contexts. An analysis of
commensuration therefore needs to understand two different kinds of spaces: On 
one hand, the calculative space that has to be created –as illustrated in the first 
two stages of calculation– in order to allow calculation. On the other hand, the 
context in which the calculative space is created. Drawing on Brighenti’s article 
(2018) on the social life of measures, this context can be seen as a measure-value
environment, which is already populated with ‘actors, practices, formats, 
dynamics, transformations and resistance’. The possibility for creating calculative 
spaces is contingent on the specific nature of the measure-value environments in 
which they are located. Huault and Rainelli-Weiss (2011) emphasise that a crucial 
condition for a compromise to emerge from an attempt to commensuration is that 
the involved parties are united by a common interest. While this is the case with 
the members of the CCC and the GTC, who all agree on the importance of fair 
payment, both collectives run into severe obstacles when trying to determine what 
exactly fair payment means. Collective firms are a context in which pay 
determination is potentially more crucial and subject to criticism than in 
conventional firms. In conventional firms, even a very obvious mismatch between 
a person’s worth and their remuneration can remain uncontested. For instance, 
CEOs of multinational companies earn hundreds to thousand of what their 
employees earn, but power asymmetries prevent a potent critique of this. The 
relationship between pay and worth in conventional firms is thus quite often an 
example of a value-measurement link that Hesselmann and Schendzielorz (in this 
issue) call indeterminate, where the value that should correspond to a 
measurement remains unclear. Since in collective firms all members take equal 
part in decision-making, they are in a context in which it is very likely that a 
situation that represents a critical moment emerges. It is thus a context that is in 
some sense more open for radical critique and the potential presence of multiple 
principles of equivalence. Therefore, this is also a context in which 
incommensurability is more likely to emerge. These collectives are not only 
specific cases in the sense that their specific, egalitarian orientations prevent them
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from coming up with a wage formula. They are also specific cases because due to 
their specific governance structures they are more likely to create situations that 
are characterised by an imperative for public justification. They run into severe 
obstacles to commensuration, because they seriously consider the moral 
implications. In this sense, the article draws attention to the importance of 
understanding the specific context in which incommensurability, as a result of a 
social process, can actually become relevant. CCC starts from an equal pay 
system, which leads to tensions between the members. As a reaction, they 
engage in a commensuration process which is supported by a social scientist. An 
attempt is made to assess and legitimise the relative importance of a variety of 
principles of equivalence. This radically open testing movement, driven by all kinds
of possible critiques, leads to a situation in which incommensurability seems 
inextricable. A compromise, which is dependent on people tacitly agreeing on 
suspending, conflicts with the fact that different principles of equivalence cannot 
be reached in this situation. The CCC in the end settles with their original equal 
pay system, which does not need to establish and evaluate differences between 
the members. GTC already has a differentiated payment system and a 
compromise arrangement to determine wages that combines a compromise 
formula, a competency framework, with a consent-based decision-making 
process. However, the compromise is fragile, due to its ambiguity. This ambiguity 
stems not only from the combination of different principles of equivalence, but also
from the indeterminate hierarchy of worth between these principles. The 
compromise formula therefore does not guarantee the certainty that would allow 
people to point out which people have to be re-evaluated based on the formula. 
Thus, the compromise neither allows certainty in regard to its justification, nor 
certainty in regard to its critique. However, the competency framework is not 
arbitrary and established according to a research of a common good and in order 
to ‘find a formulation acceptable to all’ (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006: 278). The 
fragile, but not radically contested state of the competency framework leads to a 
slow process of trying to adjust the payment system, related questions had not 
been resolved at the time of research. 
In this paper I have focused on how and when moral considerations can hinder or 
support commensuration procedures. By tracing the involved requirements on 
each stage of calculation, I have identified four factors that make the achievement 
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of a stable compromise for pay determination unlikely: First, incommensurability 
can be the result of a radical refusal of setting up differences or equivalencies. 
Second, it can be the result of a disagreement over possible legitimate principles 
of equivalence, or their relative worth. Third, a disagreement over the limits of 
meritocracy, i.e. relative importance of merit-based measures vis-a-vis needs-
based measures further complicates commensuration. Fourth, certain 
characteristics are by nature hard to measure, or need an established 
infrastructure to be measured. 
Conclusion
This article highlights the importance of moral considerations in the process of 
commensuration even on practical economic matters such as determining wage. 
Looking at two different collective firms, I have reported from a failed attempt at 
finding a compromise formula for fair pay, and a fragile compromise formula for fair
pay. Wages are measures that establish a relationship between a person, their 
work, the firm and the society. Wages secure one’s livelihood, they motivate the 
workforce, they signal and remunerate worth. This multidimensionality and 
ambiguity are acknowledged in the context of the case studies in this paper. Pay is
then necessarily a composite measure, a combination of measures. It is the result 
of a process of commensuration in which different aspects have to be considered 
and brought into an adequate order. Which aspects have to be considered and 
according to which principles they can be ordered, are fundamentally moral 
questions. Attempts to determine (fair) pay thus illustrate that processes of 
measure making are processes of commensuration which have to consider moral 
principles. The paper extends extant literature on commensuration and 
compromises by taking into account obstacles to compromise that go beyond the 
need for a common interest (Huault & Rainelli-Weiss, 2011). To do so, I have 
employed a systematic approach for the analysis of commensuration which draws 
on the work of Callon and Muniesa, as well as Boltanski and Thévenot. This 
approach allows to treat commensuration as a process of situated, pragmatic 
action in which values and measures are entangled. In this sense, the article offers
a contribution to the field of valuation studies. 
118
One limitation of this article is that, by focusing on the importance of principles of 
difference and equivalence, it could not do full justice to the French pragmatists’ 
emphasis on the importance of material arrangements for the emergence of 
calculative agencies. One particular interesting aspect in this regard is that in the 
process of coming up with a formula for fair pay, considerations of the possibility of
measurement already play a role. Therefore, possible principles of equivalence 
can be criticised by pointing out that there are no appropriate indicators and 
therefore cannot be included in the formula. Future work could look more closely 
at the interrelationship between the legitimacy of principles of equivalence and the 
possibilities for measuring related characteristics.
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Appendix III: Evaluation and the tension between generalization and 
particularity: The negotiation of supplementary child allowance in a 
collective firm
abstract
This paper follows the negotiations for a model to calculate supplementary child
allowance inside a radical democratic organization based in Germany. This model
is conceptualized as an evaluation device: a device that standardizes how people
and things are evaluated. To understand the process in which the collective tries to
come to a shared understanding of fair supplementary child allowance, the paper
utilizes Boltanski  and Thévenot’s  notion of  the test.  The solution the collective
eventually settles on is a compromise between the need for a general solution and
the hesitation  to  use a  standardized format  to  evaluate  the  financial  needs of
different  parents  and  their  children.  By  highlighting  the  tension  between  the
general and the particular in evaluation practices, the paper contributes to studies
of evaluation in contexts of moral complexity.
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Introduction
This paper follows the negotiations of a model to calculate supplementary child
allowance inside a radical democratic organization – the Radical Cola Collective
(RCC) – that pays equal hourly wages to all. With equal wages, the RCC originally
refrains from evaluating differences of worth,  but also differences of need. The
inclusion  of  new members  with  children leads the  collective  to  reconsider  this
decision. The RCC embarks on a process of discovery and negotiation to find a
model for calculating fair supplementary child allowance.
Analyzing  this  intra-organizational  process  of  valuation  directs  attention  to  the
always already present ‘highly complex socio-technical orderings involving several
actors  and  instruments’  which  together  perform  valuation  (Helgession  and
Muniesa, 2013: 3). Brighenti (2017) has recently proposed to conceptualize these
socio-technical  orderings as ‘measure-value environments’,  which highlight  that
‘measure and value exist in an entangled relation’ (ibid.: 16f). Organizations are
one such ‘measure-value environment’ where evaluation devices have to conform
with existing values and norms. The organization this article is concerned with is
based on values of radical equality and inclusivity.  Theoretically,  everyone who
feels  affected  by  the  RCC  is  eligible  to  take  part  in  their  decision-making
processes. This creates a setting in which there is ample opportunity for competing
moral considerations and values to emerge. Negotiation processes in this context
are ‘hot situations’ in which everything can become controversial (Callon, 1998:
260).  This makes the study especially interesting to understand valuation as a
social practice (Doganova et al., 2018).
The  situation  in  which  the  collective  realizes  that  it  has  to  find  a  way to  pay
supplementary allowance constitutes a critical moment (Boltanski and Thévenot,
1999) in which there is radical uncertainty about how to move on. The collective
engages in  a  process in  which  it  tries to  move from a shared  appreciation of
children, to the appraisal of the share of the costs of raising children that should be
paid by it. The challenge is how to translate the appreciation of something into an
organizational, monetary valuation practice. This task is especially complex since
the  object  to  be  evaluated  is  ambiguous.  Zelizer  (1994),  in  her  work  on  the
changing social value of children in the U.S., traces how different conceptions of
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childhood influence the monetary evaluation of children. In particular, she shows
that,  when  children  became economically  ‘useless’ and  emotionally  ‘priceless’,
profound interpretative challenges emerged around children.17 There is a common
understanding at the RCC that children are valuable. However, this understanding
lacks any explicit formulation to clarify for whom exactly children are valuable, why
children are valuable, and who is responsible for ensuring the good life of children.
While children may be priceless, raising them is certainly not costless. But what
are legitimate costs of raising children? Can some children be more expensive
than others? 
The  task  of  finding  a  model  for  supplementary  child  allowance is  made  more
complex since a connection has to be made between the value of children and the
amount  of  costs  an  employer  should  take  care  of  in  addition  to  the  state.
Processes of evaluation are fundamentally processes in which relations and their
meaning are  negotiated  and defined (Espeland and Stevens,  1998;  Fourcade,
2011;  Zelizer,  1994).  By  negotiating  a  model  for  fair  supplementary  child
allowance, the collective is negotiating the employer-employee relationship. Are
employers responsible for the costs of employees children? The RCC, which is
concerned  with  being  a  social  collective,  has  to  come  up  with  a  shared
understanding of how much of the costs of raising children of employees a social
collective has to take care of. 
The language around valuation is not always clear, and meanings and definitions
are blurry in both ordinary language use and academic disciplines. To clarify the
different layers of valuation as a social  practice, the paper follows suggestions
from the field of Valuation Studies, where Beljean and Lamont have proposed to
differentiate between evaluation as the process of assessing worth and valuation
as the process of giving worth (Kjellberg et al., 2013: 20). Vatin (2013), meanwhile,
differentiates  between  evaluation  as  assessment  and  valorization  as  the
production  of  value.  The  paper  draws  on  three  meanings  that  are  often
17 While Zelizer’s study only looks at the US, similar processes related to a 
‘sacralization of children’ have been taken place in Europe as well, i.e. a ban on 
child labor, and universal compulsory education.
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encompassed by the term ‘valuation’ in ordinary language: (1) The RCC is valuing
children, in the sense of appreciating them; (2) As a consequence, the RCC is
looking for a way to  evaluate the costs of raising children and, furthermore, the
share  of  these  costs  a  good  employer  should  pay;  (3)  By  considering
implementing supplementary child allowance, they are valorizing children, as such
a practice ‘gives worth’ to children in the performative sense in which bonuses,
prizes or medals signify value. An evaluation device, then, structures a process of
assessment or calculation (Callon and Muniesa, 2005). It determines ex-ante how
people and objects have to be evaluated, and it treats all according to the same
rules,  regardless  of  their  specific  characteristics.  It  achieves  what  Callon  calls
‘framing’, establishing ‘a boundary within which interactions take place more or
less independently of their surrounding context’ (Callon, 1998: 248). Furthermore,
an  evaluation  device  is  used  to  standardize  evaluation,  to  repeat  the  same
process of assessment for different objects over time. Evaluation is a complex,
critical,  and highly moral task, especially when ambiguous objects and multiple
values are at stake. In evaluation processes, the moral sense of people cannot
always be satisfied with the application of universal principles, it might require to
consider what is ethical in context (Reinecke and Ansari,  2015).  An attempt at
standardized  evaluation  thus  entails  the  moral  tension  between  using  general
principles and considering what is just in a particular context.  
Standardized evaluation is linked to the core function of organizations: it ensures
ongoing  coordination  by  limiting  uncertainty  through  coordinating  forms  that
standardize and thus create calculability. Organizations are compromising devices:
by  combining  different  values  and  rationalities,  organizations  organize  (moral)
complexity  (Thévenot,  1984;  2001).  This  paper  deals  with  the  moral  tension
between generalized evaluation procedures and their implied sacrifices. This is the
tension  between  what  is  generalizable  and  can  be  measured  and  what  is
considered  incommensurable  and  immeasurable.  By  following  the  process  of
negotiating  supplementary  child  allowance,  the  paper  contributes  to  an
understanding of organizational practices and processes through which things get
constituted  as  valuable  (Kornberger,  2017),  highlighting  the  role  of  an
organization’s  self-image  in  valuation  practices,  as  well  as  how  the  tension
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between  generalization  and  particularity  can  lead  to  the  establishment  of
compromises.
To  understand  how  members  of  the  collective  negotiate  supplementary  child
allowance, Boltanski and Thévenot’s sociology of critical capacities (1999; 2006),
and specifically the notions of the test and compromise, will be used as heuristic
framework. These concepts have been developed in ‘On Justification’ (henceforth,
OJ) (2006), as well as in further work of Boltanski (2011) and Thévenot (2001). In
organization studies, the test and the compromise have been used to explain the
maintenance of legitimacy in public discourses (Patriotta, Gond and Schulz, 2011;
Taupin, 2012), as well as the compromising of conflicting values in the contexts of
public  management  (Oldenhof,  Postma  and  Putters,  2013),  entrepreneurs  in
biotechnology  and  sustainability  markets  (Kaplan  and  Murray,  2010;  Suckert,
2014) and knowledge commercialization (Mailhot and Langley, 2017). Of particular
interest  for  the  purposes  of  this  paper  are  studies  influenced  by  OJ  that  are
concerned  with  processes  of  commensuration  and  analyze  the  emergence,
critique and legitimization of calculative or evaluation devices (Annisette  et  al.,
2017; Fourcade, 2011; Huault and Rainelli-Weiss, 2011; Reinecke, 2010). Using
the notions of the test and compromise will illuminate the complex entanglements
between values and measures in organizational valuation practices. 
In the following sections, the paper will give an overview of the economies of worth
framework developed by Boltanski and Thévenot (2006), outline the concepts of
test  and  compromise,  and  discuss  studies  of  evaluation  devices  that  utilize
Boltanski and Thévenot’s framework, before turning to the case of the RCC.
The economies of worth framework: Tests and compromises
Boltanski and Thévenot‘s ‘On justification’ (2006) develops a framework to explain
the competences that enable actors to make critiques or to justify themselves in
the face of critique. In a dispute, actors use principles of equivalence that make it
possible  to  assess  the  relative  value  of  the  people  and  things  engaged  in  a
dispute, or their worth. OJ introduces six orders of worth that can serve as frame
of reference in a dispute, and each of these orders specifies a form of common
good. These orders of worth construct a model of a society that is just because it is
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a meritocratic  society  in  which  members are ordered according to  their  worth,
determined  by  their  contribution  to  the  common  good.  In  the  civic  polity,  for
instance, the worthiest people are the ones that are concerned with the interest of
all and can embody the general will. In the market polity, the worthiest people are
the wealthy, who maintain competition in a marketplace. Based on the polities, OJ
develops ‘common worlds’ (ibid.: 130ff), which are historically developed, socio-
material  instantiations  of  orders  of  worth,  inhabited  by  qualified  persons  and
objects. It is a necessary step for the framework to include the modeling of critical
competences since it allows us to pay attention to material devices and objects
that can be used to demonstrate, test, criticize or legitimize worth in a situation. In
the civic world, for instance, the highest states of worth are attributed to collective
persons  and  their  representations;  important  subjects  are  parties,  public
collectives  and elected officials;  important  objects  are  rights,  legislation,  order,
program; and the state of worth is tested through mobilization or democratic votes.
Cloutier  et  al.  (2017)  note  that  OJ  has  been  a  catalyst  for  sociological
developments  in  valuation studies and offers  a useful  conceptual  apparatus to
study valuation and evaluation both within and across organizations.18 In order to
understand  the  process  by  which  the  collective  tries  to  come  to  a  shared
understanding of a fair model to pay supplementary child allowance, this paper
uses Boltanski and Thévenot’s notions of the test and the compromise. 
Boltanski and Thévenot developed the notion of the test to explain how people can
move  from a  critical  moment  in  which  there  is  a  disagreement  regarding  the
appropriate order of beings in a situation to a moment in which the dispute has
been resolved. A central principle of equivalence, the higher common good of each
of the common worlds, determines how test formats can be established. Each
world thus entails its own standards for proving the value of any object or idea. In
each world, different objects and ideas are relevant for the testing of worth.
18 For a general overview of research inspired by OJ in Organization Studies, see the 
introduction to the Research in the Sociology of Organizations special issue on 
‘Justification, evaluation and critiques in the study of organizations’ (Cloutier et al., 
2017).
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OJ defines two different tests, as a result of two different critiques of a social order:
a ‘radical critique’ and a ‘reformative critique’. A radical critique leads to a ‘clash of
worlds’ in which the adequate way to evaluate a situation is not certain anymore.
For instance, if  payment in a firm is primarily based on formal qualification, an
exceptional  salesman without any higher education might criticize the way that
wages are  determined from the  point  of  view of  the  market  world,  in  which  a
university degree is not of relevance, unless it leads to more sales. In order to
come to an understanding regarding the adequate state of the world, the involved
participants will have to decide on one order of worth from which to evaluate the
situation at hand. Thus, they have to conduct a ‘test of order of worth’ (Dansou and
Langley, 2012: 511). A ‘reformative critique’, meanwhile, does not radically criticize
the order of worth that is underlying an situation, but rather criticizes the correct
execution of evaluation. For instance, a person with a PhD claims that he has
been falsely put into a category together with colleagues who only have a master’s
degree. A reformative critique may lead to a ‘test of state of worth’ ( ibid.) in which
people move from a dispute to a new agreement by bringing people and objects in
their  appropriate  order,  according  to  a  central  principle  of  equivalence  that  is
related to one world. 
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Dansou and Langley (2012) argue that the notion of the test allows us to examine
three key dimensions related  to  how actors question  or  reproduce constitutive
value frameworks: agency, relationality, and temporality. In order to mobilize the
test  for  empirical  studies,  and  to  make  use  of  the  potential  of  the  conceptual
apparatus of Boltanski and Thévenot’s pragmatic sociology of critique, tests should
not be seen as linear endpoints but as ‘temporary truces’ with varying degrees of
stability (Reinecke et al., 2017). 
In their study of the evolution of biotechnology, Kaplan and Murray (2008) argue
that the shape of this field, initially uncertain and equivocal, emerged through the
resolution of contests around multiple interpretations of the value of its technology.
The central task of entrepreneurs in biotechnology was to actively construct and
reconstruct justifications for the value of their firms by arguing for particular tests of
value and mobilizing evidence to satisfy those tests (ibid.: 12). Kaplan and Murray
describe a discovery process spanning three eras, in which the predominant test
formats and the respective interpretations of value and formats of evidence were
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Figure 1: Ideal-typical movement from critical moment to test of state of worth
contested and changed. Only after thirty years in which test arrangements were
contested, changed and adapted, a stable definition of the field of biotechnology
emerged.  The  stabilized  field  is  a  compromise  constituted  through  a  complex
network of  interactions between organizational  actors with  different  rationalities
(ibid.: 36).
Compromises between different rationalities are a central concept in Boltanski and
Thévenot‘s sociology of critical capacities. A compromise suspends a dispute that
involves more than one world without settling the dispute in only one of these
worlds. The resulting setup is a composite arrangement that involves persons and
things that can be identified in different worlds. A compromise is less stable than
an agreement based on a test in one world. Since in a compromise entities are not
unambiguously ordered according to one principle of  equivalence, it  is  easy to
point  out  inconsistencies  in  the  evaluation.  A compromise  needs  the  involved
participants to be ‘favorably disposed toward the notion of a common good’, while
at the same time they ‘do not attempt to clarify the principle of their agreement’
(ibid.:  326). Compromises can be made more stable by the creation of objects
composed of elements stemming from different worlds which are endowed with
their own identity ‘in such a way that their form will no longer be recognizable if
one of the disparate elements of which they are formed is removed’. An example,
here, is the compromise object of a ‘competitive public service’ that entails the
higher common principles of the civic world (public service) and the market world
(competition) (ibid.: 278). 
According  to  Thévenot  (2001),  all  organizations  are  fundamentally  arrays  of
compromises, ‘compromising devices’ between different repertoires of evaluation.
Organizations achieve a compromise and coupling between different practices and
their respective rationalities by combining devices (ibid.). With this, organizations
create structures that are able to deal with (evaluative) ambiguity (Knoll, 2014) and
allow  them  to  overcome  the  uncertainty  and  tension  that  emerges  from  the
simultaneous presence of different values.
Evaluation devices as compromises that achieve generalization over time
and space
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In this paper, a model for supplementary child allowance is conceptualized as an
evaluation device. An evaluation device standardizes how people and things are
evaluated. It  is  what Thévenot (1984) calls an investment in forms,  a rule that
supports  a  stable  connection  and  the  establishment  of  equivalency  and
calculability  between  different  entities.  Form  investments  generalize  relations
between actors and their environment over time and space, specifying what has to
be done in a given situation and thus making coordination less uncertain and less
costly.  Form investments  thus sacrifice  ‘particularization  or  characterizations  of
entities’  (Thévenot,  2011:  41)  in  order  to  facilitate  such  coordination.  A wage
payment scheme, for instance, can specify that workers will be remunerated by
hours worked, which means that their actual performance is not evaluated, or by
piece work, which means that their time spent working for the company is not
evaluated. Every evaluation device sustains a certain form of evaluation which is
based on specific principles of equivalence (time, piece) and, at the same time,
excludes other possible principles. In this sense, evaluation devices can be either
test  arrangements  based  on  one  order  of  worth  or,  conversely,  they  can  be
compromises based on different principles of equivalence.
In  most  empirical  situations,  evaluation  devices  have  to  achieve  a  complex
commensuration between different principles of equivalence in order to sustain
standardized  ways  of  evaluation.  The  compromise  is  a  useful  concept  to
understand  commensuration,  which  is  ‘the  expression  or  measurement  of
characteristics  normally  represented  by  different  units  according  to  a  common
metric’  (Espeland  and  Stevens,  1998:  315).  For  example  Reinecke  (2010)
analysesthe  determination  of  Fairtrade  minimum  prices  for  coffee  as  the
establishment  of  a  compromise  between  different  orders  of  worth  .  In  the
beginning, when Fairtrade products where not marketed to a mainstream audience
and significantly smaller, fair prices were established in face-to-face negotiations
between  producers  and  independent  fair  trading  organizations,  which  created
personal,  long-term relationships based on trust and mutual  recognition. These
personal negotiations were later substituted with a formalized price determination
based  on  the  Cost  of  Sustainable  Production  methodology  (CoSP),  which
calculates the cost of production. The CoSP methodology is an evaluation device,
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in  the sense that is sustains a standardized way of  evaluating the situation of
different coffee producers.
Since evaluation devices create  categories  and standards,  they are never  just
pragmatic, but also ethical and political choices since ‘each standard and each
category valorizes some point of view and silences another’ (Bowker and Star,
2000:  5).  An evaluation  device  renders  certain  characteristics  measurable  and
others immeasurable, or not worth measuring. An evaluation device thus entails
tradeoffs between different values, and between generalization and particularities
in  a  given  situation.  By  abstracting  from  particularities  and  creating  general
categories, evaluation ‘flattens’ the world (Kornberger, 2017: 19). Regardless of
the underlying principles of evaluation, all  evaluation devices express a specific
idea of justice based on the notion of equality, where all people/objects/situations
have to be treated equal if they share certain characteristics. To come to justifiable
agreements and orderings, people have to ‘divest themselves of their singularity
and  converge  towards  a  form  of  generality  transcending  persons  and  the
situations in which they interrelate’ (Boltanski and Thévenot, 1999: 363). However,
by considering only that what is or can be made general, people lose the ability to
consider  what  is  particular  and  might  be  incommensurable  or  immeasurable.
Considering particularities and context might be a part of an ordinary sense of
justice. From this viewpoint, it may seem unjust to abstract from the particularities
of something in order to measure only specific characteristics. Thus, the tension
between  two  different  moral  orientations  –  focused  on either  generalization  or
particularity  –  might  be  an obstacle  to  the  development  and application  of  an
evaluation device. 
In her study, Reinecke analyses tensions regarding the calculation of minimum
prices for coffee and the adequacy of CoSP as an evaluation method for a large
number of coffee farmers with differing production and cost structures:
What level  of  labor costs should be used? What was a decent  wage in
different local contexts? Whose labour should be taken into account? The
labour  of  the  farmer,  or  the  labour  of  his  entire  family?  What  did
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sustainability mean? And what was sustainable – compared to inefficient
production? (2010: 574)
The  resulting  compromise  combines  the  CoSP  methodology  with  democratic
decision  making  of  all  stakeholders.  Reinecke  interprets  the  result  as  a
compromise between the industrial world on the one hand, in which productivity
and efficiency are values measured by standardized criteria, and the civic world on
the other, where the collective interest expressed through formal and democratic
procedures is  valued.  Considering  the  inherent  tension  between generalization
and particularity  in  evaluation devices,  the result  can also be interpreted as a
compromise  between  generalization  and  leaving  space  for  the  negotiation  of
particularities.  It  therefore  combines  an  evaluation  device  that  is  based  on
generalization with a procedural rules for decision making, which integrates the
particular  voices  of  different  stakeholders  and  leaves  room  for  considering
particular circumstances in situ.
Annisette et al. (2017) describe the development of an evaluation device for large-
scale capital investment projects of a water utility in Western Australia as a ‘test of
worths  in  compromise’  that  calculates  the  financial,  social  and  environmental
impact of a project. This compromise device represents a site for ongoing critique,
targeted at the mechanics of calculation, i.e. the inclusion of appropriate objects
and measures. One of these critiques targets the fact that Aboriginal cultural and
heritage issues were not included in the valuation. In response, the developers of
the evaluation device argue that certain types of values ‘are not appropriate values
to  be  monetized’  (ibid.:  231).  Instead  of  trying  to  integrate  everything  that  is
deemed valuable in the evaluation device, the developers acknowledge that some
environmental  and  social  costs  and  benefits  cannot  be  monetized  or  may  be
inappropriate  to  monetize.  The  developers  therefore  argue  that  the  evaluation
device  itself  should  play  an  important,  but  not  exclusive,  role  in  the  decision
making process and should be supplemented by other tools, such as multi criteria
analysis (ibid.). This study is another example of the combination of an evaluation
device  with  a  less  standardized  method  that  is  better  able  to  include
incommensurable values in the evaluation. 
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Both studies by Reinecke (2010) and Annisette et al. (2017) analyze a context in
which there is a high potential  for contestation due to the need to come to an
agreement which is considered fair by a variety of different stakeholders. In both
cases, an evaluation device is contested and has to be supplemented by methods
that  allow  one  to  consider  particular  situations  and  characteristics  that  cannot
easily be generalized. In the following, this paper analyses a context that bears
similarities to Reinecke and Annisette et al.’s studies. The RCC is a collective that
has to  come up  with  an  evaluation  device  for  calculating  supplementary  child
allowance that is considered fair by a variety of people. The collective, however,
fails to develop such a generalizing device, and instead settles on a device that
signifies  worth  but  refrains  from  evaluation.  It  thus  achieves  a  compromise
between generalization and particularity.
Methods and case
The Radical Cola Collective (RCC) is a virtual organization that emerged out of a
collective of loosely coupled people, connected through the internet. These people
wanted to create an economic organization which satisfied their ideas of a just
economy. One of their central ideas is that the economy is a collective endeavor
and therefore  all  people  affected by a company should  have the possibility  to
directly influence production, including suppliers, subcontractors and wholesalers,
as well as end-consumers. At the center of the RCC is a compromise between the
civic,  the industrial,  and the market world.  On one hand, it  is  a cooperative in
which  equality  and  solidarity  are  important  (civic  worth),  but  it  is  also  an
organization that uses planning methods for coordination and efficiency (industrial
worth)  and  an  organization  that  cares  about  its  survival  on  the  market  and
considers prices and costs (market worth).
The RCC organizes the supply-chain for their signature product, a cola with less
sugar and more caffeine than usual, as well as beer and lemonade. It is based in
Germany but also sell their products in two neighboring countries. It has been very
slowly but steadily growing from selling a 1000 bottles to its members and friends
in 2001, to selling more than one million bottles in 2015. The RCC has a very
specific system of distribution that is based on so-called ‘ambassadors’. These are
people who want to be part of the RCC and act as semi-professional, semi-activist,
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local salesmen. In every city in which the RCC’s products are distributed, this is
due to an ambassador who started talking to small retailers, restaurants and bars
about the RCC project. Apart from the ambassadors, there are six people working
part-time for the RCC on day-to-day operations. All the other people involved in
the RCC network are business partners, like the bottler and the manufacturer, as
well  as  the  wholesalers  and  retailers.  In  keeping  with  its  conviction  that  the
economy is a collective endeavor, the RCC organizes itself in large part through
an online board where decisions are taken according to consensus. This means
that decisions are taken as long as there is no strong rejection in the form of a
veto. Theoretically, everyone who feels affected by the RCC can access the online
board and take part in the decision making process, although it is mostly people
who directly work with or for the RCC who take part in these online discussions. 
The RCC combines characteristics of a business with a social collective as well as
a social movement. While it has been selling cola, lemonade and beer for more
than  15  years  now,  throughout  these  years  the  RCC distinguishes  itself  from
conventional businesses. Membership is open, in principle, to anyone; community
members  are  geographically  dispersed;  and  decisions  are  taken  according  to
consensus  and  adhere  to  a  broad  agenda  of  anti-corporate  activism  and
sustainability. The RCC pays equal hourly wages to all, that is, the members of the
organization team and the members of the collective who do project-based work,
like updating their website.  The RCC decided that everyone is equally worthy, a
decision that is – although the word ‘equal’ suggests otherwise – not based on an
actual belief in equivalence, but a sensibility towards the particular, individual and
incommensurable contributions of everyone working for the RCC. According to
Espeland  and  Stevens,  ‘incommensurables  can  be  vital  expressions  of  core
values, signaling to people how they should act toward those things. Identities and
crucial  roles are often defined with incommensurable categories.  Believing that
something is incommensurable can qualify one for some kinds of relationships’
(1998:  327).  By  paying  equal  wages,  the  RCC signals  their  core  values  and
secures an identity that is based on collective solidarity.  With equal wages, the
RCC originally refrained from setting up differences of worth, but also of need,
between  them.  This  decision  was  questioned,  however,  when  a  father  and
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potential new ambassador for the RCC asked if he would get the same pay as
people without children.
Drawing on the analysis of online discussions, this paper will  illustrate how the
tension between generalization and considering particularities is negotiated during
a  ‘critical  moment’  in  which  there  is  uncertainty  over  an  adequate  evaluation
device for supplementary child allowance. The negotiation of supplementary child
allowance has two parts. The first part of the negotiation is an email conversation
with  30 emails  over  7  days with  9 participants.  During this  discussion,  people
decide  on  an  evaluation  device  to  calculate  supplementary  child  allowance,
although  no  one  ends  up  claiming  child  allowance.  The  second  part  of  the
negotiation happens a year later, when a freelancer who is supposed to do project-
based work for the RCC asks for child allowance. During this second part,  the
evaluation device is tested by calculating its concrete outcomes, which leads to a
radical  critique  and  eventually  a  new  proposal.  Since  the  RCC  has  in  the
meantime switched to using an online board, the second phase lasts for 41 days,
with 32 posts and 6 participants. Of this 6 participants 3 have been involved in the
first phase as well. 
The material of both discussions has been analyzed with MaxQDA using a coding
scheme that included codes for three categories: (1) codes that were related to
discursive  movements  and  inspired  by  conversation  analysis  (i.e.  explanatory
introduction,  apologizing),  (2)  codes that  were  related  to  justification  work  and
testing (i.e. critique, industrial worth, compromise), and (3) codes that were related
to content (i.e. payment, good collective member).
Testing for supplementary child allowance
The use of Boltanski and Thévenot’s framework for conducting the analysis of the
discussions  showed  that  people  did  not  follow  the  ideal-typical  route  from
uncertainty  to  deciding  on relevant  worlds  and eventually  to  a  test  of  state  of
worth. Instead, their negotiation resembles a discovery process: at stake was not
only who should be evaluated and how, but also it if it was possible to develop a
fair model for all situations in the first place. 
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Phase  One:  Questioning  the  justness  of  generalization,  but  still  adopting  an
evaluation device from family law
Shortly  before  this  discussion  happens,  it  was decided that  ambassadors who
work for the RCC should get their working hours paid in order for them to establish
a network of customers. A father of three children asks one of the core-members
(Udo) if he would get the same hourly wage as all  the others if he would start
working as ambassador.  Udo in turn asks the collective whether they ought to
think about adding supplementary child allowance to their salary scheme and how
much it should be: 
We decided that we will pay new ambassadors the hours they have to work
in the beginning to set up a network. So now we have the first ambassador
who asks (rightfully so) if he will get paid as much as everyone else, although
he has three children. Without really knowing what would be fair, I told him I
would say something like ‘additional five Euros per child‘, but this is just me
guessing. Should it be more, should it be less, should it decrease with every
additional  child?  And can  we  as  the  RCC afford  to  pay  this?  These are
complex  questions,  but  we  have  to  provide  an  answer  to  this  potential
ambassador.
This open question sets up a critical moment in which there is uncertainty over the
correct amount of supplementary child allowance. The question if the RCC should
pay extra to parents was already decided at an annual meeting a few months
before. Even though Udo does not question the necessity to pay, he seems to be
inclined to find a solution that weighs the survival of the company (‘can we afford
to pay this?’) with the importance of some idea, though not explicitly stated, of
justice (‘without really knowing what would be fair’).
The first response to Udo’s question comes from Theodore, who thinks that it is in
principle important to have a ‘social component’ in the payment scheme. However,
he highlights that the RCC will never be able to create a scheme that does justice
to every individual case, not least because there are also public child benefits: 
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On one hand, there is a system of public child benefits, but we also have
injustices in exactly this system (single parents have to pay more taxes than
couples, people who are in the highest income class receive child benefits as
well).  We  can‘t  account  for  all  of  these  differences  and  compensate  for
injustices. We would have to collect so much information for each individual
case to achieve justice for each individual case.
Thus,  the  tradeoff  between  treating  particular  cases  only  and  using  general
formulas is present already from the start of the discussion. Theodore continues
with a proposal for the amount of child allowance: 30 percent supplement for the
first child, 20 percent for the second child and 10 percent for the third child. Even
though Theodore thinks it is not fair to use a general solution for each particular
case, he weighs the coordination savings of an evaluation device against the costs
– in terms of time and resources – and introduces a compromise between his
awareness of particular circumstances and the concession that the RCC needs a
general solution.
Udo in turn asks if someone with children could confirm that more children are
related to decreasing marginal costs. The father of three answers that there is a
decrease of costs to some extent and that he would be OK with the 30%, 20%,
10% model. At this point. Karin adds that the father of three is not the only person
with children at the RCC, since she has been part-time-mother of her partner‘s
children  for  over  2  years  now  and  also  contributes  to  the  payment  for  these
children‘s expenses for vacation, education and hobbies. Next, Udo wants to draw
a line between one’s own children and children that someone feels responsible for.
This is countered by Anna, who criticizes Udo for sticking to an outdated idea of
family: 
I  think  it  would  be  extremely  unfair,  in  a  time  of  patchwork  families  and
alternative family concepts, to punish people who can’t have children of their
own,  or  fall  in  love  with  someone  who already has children,  or  who  are
homosexual and adopt children.
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This  exchange  between Karin,  Anne and Udo shows that  the  question  of  the
relevant beings that should be included in the test has not yet been exhausted.
While the idea seems to have been to pay child allowance for parents, it is not
clear who counts as a parent. Udo responds that he did not know that Karin is
actually  living  with  her  partner’s  children  part-time  and  adds  that  the
supplementary child allowance should of course apply to patchwork parents as
well. He says that he has learned that there is another member of the RCC with
four children, so when they decide on supplementary child allowance it will be very
expensive, but he still thinks it is important.
If we want to be a socially minded project, that is a part of it. In this
case, the ambassadors will just have to become even more reliable and
efficient.
Here we can see that it is not only the question of who parents are and how much
children cost that is put to a test in this discussion. The question of child allowance
is also a test of the nature of the employer. If the RCC wants to be a ‘socially
minded project’, it has to pay an adequate amount of child allowance. Next, Udo
actually calculates what the 30:20:10 model would mean in absolute terms and
does not think it would be a good model:
The 30:20:10 percent model was just an estimation that Theodore threw
in,  and it  seemed to make sense for the potential  new ambassador.
However, did any of you actually calculate what this means in absolute
numbers? For someone working full-time and calculated with 15 Euro
per hour,  30 percent means 720 per month and 10 percent 240 per
month. This is a complicated topic because there are also public child
benefits and reliefs and, therefore, children don’t have to be supported
by their parent‘s income alone. But still: To me, 720 per month seems
too much and 240 and not enough. What do you think?
Udo puts the proposed evaluation device to a new test by calculating what it would
actually mean. He doesn’t like the outcome and, though he can’t actually explain
why 720 is too much and 240 not enough, he tries to delegitimize the device by
139
pointing out that it was just something someone threw in. Again we can see that he
is worried about the status of the RCC as a good employer who, it seems, has to
make sure that their employees earn enough to cover the cost of their children.
Martin, not responding to Udo, but asking another fundamental question, wonders
why  there  should  be  a  specific  consideration  of  the  situation  of  people  with
children and not also other situations where people have more need. He thinks
that  parents  are  not  necessarily  more  entitled  to  additional  remuneration  than
people who are engaged in other activities that are for the common good, such as
voluntary work. Martin, like Karin before, criticizes the determination of relevant
beings for  the test.  To him,  it  is  not  only  parents  who deserve supplementary
allowance, but all people who contribute to the common good, which is framed
according to the civic order of worth.
Udo counters that voluntary work is voluntary and can be done flexibly and to
varying degrees, whereas people cannot decide how much care they want to give
to their  children, or whether they want  to  care for ill  relatives.  He asks if  they
should include care work for relatives in their deliberations. Beppo, a father of two
children, wants to clarify that not everyone has increased costs due to children
because, for him, the child benefits paid by the state are already sufficient. He
proposes  to  use  the  Düsseldorfer  Tabelle (Düsseldorfer  Table),  developed  by
judges  specialized  in  family  law  in  order  to  calculate  alimony  payments,  as
orientation  for  the  rates  of  supplementary  child  allowance  and  only  pay
supplementary  child  allowance  if  people  explicitly  ask  for  it.  But  Beppo’s
contribution also contains a critique of generalization: while he thinks he does not
need  supplementary  child  allowance,  he  does  not  want  to  speak  for  all  other
parents. His proposed compromise between generalization and particularity is to
pay child allowance only when people explicitly ask for it and to use an evaluation
device from family law, thus combining civic, domestic and market orders of worth.
Udo likes the proposal and formulates a possible resolution, namely, to use the
Düsseldorfer Tabelle only on the condition that people ask for child allowance. As
a  reaction,  three  people  raise  concerns  because  to  them it  would  be  fairer  if
people had to individually propose their own wages, since one solution for all is by
definition unfair to individual cases. For instance, Arno says:
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My ideal would be that everyone who works for the RCC and wants
money for their work can negotiate their wages freely with the collective
[…]  the  person  can  ask  for  what  they  actually  need,  not  some
approximate value derived from some table. I think it is kind of awkward
to say that we all get equal wages, but because we know this is not fair
under  this  or  that  circumstance we pay +X percent  and actually  we
know, that this is still not really fair.
Udo reacts by drawing a line between a decision for the same wages for everyone
and a decision for paying higher wages to people with children. Regarding the
same wages for everyone, he recalls the discussions they’ve already had where,
in  the  end,  they  decided  that  all  people  who  work  for  the  RCC  are  equally
valuable. In the end, there is no veto against Udo’s proposal for resolution. 
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Figure 2: Negotiation of Supplementary Child Allowance, Phase I
This first phase delivers three insights that are relevant for a sociology of critique
and valuation. First, inside a critical moment, there might be the need to negotiate
two  different  test  arrangements  at  the  same  time:  the  search  for  fair  child
allowance involves a test of the RCC as good employer, as well as the costs of
children.  Second,  while  trying  to  figure  out  a  test  arrangement,  people  might
realize  that  they have to  clarify  or  change the  relevant  beings that  should  be
tested. In the beginning it is neither clear if only parents deserve additional pay nor
what exactly qualifies one as a parent. Third, people might not always consider ‘a
rise towards generality’ as just. In this discussion, many people voice a critique of
generalization  as  unjust.  However,  most  are  also  willing  to  settle  with  a
compromise between generalization and particularity. These compromises involve
a standardized model which is supplemented with methods that open up a space
for considering particularities in the evaluation.
Phase Two: Fundamental critique of calculation device, questioning the justness of
generalization and resorting to a compromise
Phase 2 starts when Kate, the accountant, opens a discussion thread in the board 
in which she reminds everyone that the decision has been taken to pay 
supplementary child allowance. She then calculates what this would mean in 
absolute terms and asks if people are still OK with this. She adds that this has not 
been applied yet, but that a potential contractor has asked for child allowance. 
Frank, the freelancer with children who will be doing project work for the RCC in 
the future, then asks if everyone was aware of these sums when they decided on 
the Düsseldorfer Tabelle as a reference point for the supplementary child 
allowance. While the amounts seem reasonable to him (he would get approx. 
€8.50 per hour more than the others), they are also quite high. Kate responds that 
for someone working full time, the Düsseldorfer Tabelle would mean an additional 
income of €522 per month for a small child and she thinks this is too much. 
Instead, she proposes a pay raise for everyone to €20 per hour:
In general, I think we should pay everyone €20 per hour, regardless if
they have children or  not.  This  will  save us individual  administration
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efforts and freelancers don’t  have to tell  us how many children they
have. :-)
Here, we can see something that already happened before: an evaluation device
is tested by looking at its actual outcomes and then criticized, not for the principles
of  methods  of  calculation,  but  because  the  outcome  does  not  ‘feel’  right.
Furthermore, Kate proposes a new evaluation formula that would mean higher, but
equal,  pay  for  everyone,  a  proposal  that  is  accompanied  by  a  reference  to
efficiency and transparency.  Next,  Theodore  criticizes  the  Düsseldorfer  Tabelle
because it is not intended to calculate supplementary child allowance:
I’m asking myself if the  Düsseldorfer Tabelle is the right measure. To
remind you: the function of the table is to secure the livelihood of a child
through payments by the separated parent. The table is originally NOT
intended to calculate supplementary child allowances by the employer.
He also adds that in order to find a fair solution, the RCC would have to deal with
every  case  individually  which  it  cannot  do  due  to  data  protection  rights  and
administrative overhead. Theodore would like to make the supplementary child
allowance lower  than the  amounts  calculated  by  the  Düsseldorfer  Tabelle and
instead increase the hourly wage for everyone. Furthermore, while he is for paying
supplementary child allowance, it is normal that expenses for children are paid for
by  the  wages  of  the  parents,  as  well  as  the  public  child  benefits.   Theodore
provides  a  new,  radical  critique  of  the  evaluation  device:  The  Düsseldorfer
Tabelle’s intention is not to calculate supplementary child allowance in the first
place.  This  critique is  radical  in  the sense of  Boltanski  and Thévenot,  since it
argues, that the formula at hand is employing an inappropriate evaluative frame,
one that belongs to a different ‘world’. Furthermore, by stating that it is ‘normal’
that parents pay for their children with their wages, he ‘relativizes’ (Boltanski and
Thévenot, 2006: 336f) the character of supplementary child allowance: It is not a
right of parents and not an obligation for a good employer, it is just a nice gift, a
private arrangement between the RCC and its members that does not refer to a
general  good.   Frank  and  Theodore  then  both  discuss  if  children  are  more
expensive  when the  parents  are  separated,  due to  higher  rent  and child  care
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costs. Frank also notes that they will probably not find a ready-made solution out
there and asks what exactly the supplementary child allowance should achieve: a
gradual  improvement  of  the  financial  situation  of  people  with  children,  or  a
coverage of the costs of children, minus public child benefits? Theodore responds
by once more stating that what the  Düsseldorfer Tabelle wants to achieve is not
what the RCC wants to do with supplementary child allowance. Then he proposes
to  think  again  what  exactly  they  want  to  achieve  with  supplementary  child
allowance and if maybe they could just agree on an additional  €2 or  €2.50 per
child and hour. With this, Theodore is the first person that proposes to discuss
what exactly the purpose of paying child allowance should be. However, instead of
providing  possible  answers  for  his  question  Theodore  immediately  proposes a
relatively simple solution, which is not further legitimized. Frank agrees with the
proposal :
So I’ve thought about this again and I’ve realized that my more complex
considerations on the calculation might drive me to insanity so I’ve just
calculated  my  income  if  I  would  work  for  40  hours,  and  would  get
additional €2 or €2.50 and this would be fine for me. Therefore, I have
no objection against the proposal.
Frank’s argument that “complex considerations might lead to insanity” suggests
the relevance of using a kind of ‘satisficing’ logic (Simon, 1956) for legitimization:
although there is a desire to achieve true justice here, it seems that, as people
realize  how  complex  the  question  is,  at  some  point  finding  a  totally  fair  and
adequate evaluation device does not seem important anymore. Instead, a simple
solution, with no complex calculations attached, is deemed to be legitimate. Anton
joins the discussion to add that people should just say how much additional pay
they need. He adds that this makes more sense since people could have higher
financial  needs  due  to  various  reasons  –  not  only  children.  He  proposes  a
compromise between generalization and particularity:
We will never be able to discuss and consider all potential situations!
But  we  can  develop  a  system  which  will  allow  us  in  the  future,  if
needed, to incorporate different situations. I am thinking of a system in
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which  higher  financial  needs  of  people  could  be  described  as
prototypical cases in order to allow orientation. These prototypical cases
could be extended whenever needed.
We have seen this before, Anton both criticizes attempts to find general solutions
for particular cases and the beings chosen for this evaluation test. To him, it is not
only the situations of parents that should be considered. Frank responds to this
and says that a solution like this would end in overly complex calculations and he
thinks the +€2 proposal makes sense. Several people agree with Frank. In the
end, there are no critical  concerns and they decide on  €2 per  child and hour,
provided that people ask for it.
In the second phase of the discussion there are three insights for a sociology of
critique and evaluation. First, a calculation device is criticized due to its outcome,
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Figure 3: Negotiation of Supplementary Child Allowance, Phase II
not the principles that are used for calculation. Second, the complexity of trying to
find a general solution that can do justice to plenty of different and particular cases
can lead to a point where the objective of finding a just model does not seem
enough to justify complexity. On the contrary, it can ‘lead to insanity’! Third, the
compromise that the collective eventually agrees on can be understood as the
outcome  of  a  discussion  in  which  the  tension  between  generalization  and
particularity has been discussed exhaustively to the point where people agreed on
a ‘satisficing’ solution.
Discussion
The process by which the RCC tries to collectively find a model for paying fair
supplementary  child  allowance  has  been  analyzed  by  utilizing  Boltanski  and
Thévenot’s notion of the test as a heuristic framework. By following the justification
work of members of the collective, the analysis showed that actors in a situation of
radical uncertainty do not necessarily follow a linear path from giving worth to its
assessment.  Rather,  actors  conduct  a  collective  negotiation  process  by  which
values  and  their  appropriate  translation  into  measures  are  simultaneously
discovered and created. In a testing situation like this, together with the prevalent
ideas of justice, the aims, subjects and objects of a test may change. The test is
more a discovery process than an implementation of established ideas or values; it
is more exploration than exploitation. In this process, people discover what they
actually mean when they value something and the possibilities of assessing worth
influence the ways of  valuing. When the RCC starts discussing supplementary
child allowance, there is initially no certainty about which beings are put to a test. It
appears that it  is  not only parents that are (financially)  responsible for the up-
bringing of children. Problematizing the concept of parents in turn brings up the
consideration of other relations of care, posing the question of whether indeed
every kind of responsibility for people in need of care should be considered for
supplementary allowances. Even when these questions are answered, the RCC
has to develop an evaluation device that can simultaneously assess the costs of
raising children and what it means to be a good employer with regard to these
costs. The paper further illustrates that in order to mobilize the test for empirical
studies and to make use of the potential of the conceptual apparatus of Boltanski
and Thévenot’s pragmatic sociology of critique, tests should not be seen as linear
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endpoints,  but  rather  as  ‘temporary  truces’  with  varying  degrees  of  stability
(Reinecke et al., 2017). While, in a first phase, the RCC agrees on an evaluation
device  for  calculating  supplementary  child  allowance,  this  is  criticized  and
subsequently replaced in the second phase.
Supplementary child allowance is conceptualized as an evaluation device.  The
concept of  the evaluation device captures the double moral  complexity of both
developing a formula for assessing worth and using this formula to standardize
evaluation  over  time and space.  In  both  Reinecke’s  (2010)  study on Fairtrade
minimum prices for coffee, as well as Annisette et al.’s (2017) study on evaluating
large-scale capital investment projects of a water utility in Western Australia, an
evaluation device is contested on the grounds that it does not allow to consider
particular situations and characteristics that cannot easily be  generalized. While
Reinecke and Annisette  et  al.  discuss their  findings as  compromises between
different  worlds,  this  paper  contributes  a  different  possibility  for  interpretation:
compromises  between  generalization  and  particularity.  The  tension  between
generalization and particularity in evaluation and, especially, evaluation devices is
illustrated and further elaborated by the analysis of the (failed) development of an
evaluation  device  in  the  RCC.  In  the  end,  the  RCC settles  for  a  compromise
between the need to find a generalizable agreement and the hesitation to use a
standardized  format  to  evaluate  the  situation  of  particular  parents  and  their
children. The final solution is a compromise, since +€2 model answers to the need
of  making  a  generalized  difference  between  people  with  children  and  people
without children. It is also a formula that offers a clear answer to the question of
how much supplementary child allowance a person with one, two or three children
should get.  In that  sense,  the formula can be seen as a form investment that
stabilizes relations. However,  it  is  a very specific device in that the +€2 model
lacks any concrete foundation of legitimization. No one actually knows how these
+€2 are supposed to be related to the situation of parents with children; it is not
clear what this €2 should achieve and why it has to be exactly this amount. It is an
arrangement that allows to calculate the future, but in itself does not calculate, i.e.
it  does not specify a principle of equivalence that could explain itself.  The +€2
model is a valuation and valorizing device that signifies and remunerates value,
but abstains from evaluation.
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There are, then, at least two coordinating forms that accomplish a compromise
between  the  general  and  the  particular.  On  one  hand,  the  combination  of
evaluation devices with methods that can consider particularities and, on the other
hand,  valorizing  devices  that  signify  and  remunerate  value,  but  are  void  of
concrete evaluation based on principles of equivalence.19 
Boltanski  and  Thévenot’s  economies  of  worth  framework  allows  us  to  view
organizations as structures that compromise multiple orders of worth. In this paper,
the framework has been successfully applied to deal with normative tensions in
organizations. However,  the tensions that the framework is able to capture are
limited to those that can be related to competing higher common goods. In the
economies of worth framework, legitimacy is always related to a ‘rise to generality’.
Considering  particularity,  in  contrast,  problematizes  all  attempts  to  establish
equivalency  between  different  particularities,  which  is  the  basis  for  any
generalization. By analyzing the justification work accompanying the failed attempt
to  develop  an  evaluation  device,  this  paper  points  to  a  different  tension  that
organizations have to deal with, as well as a different compromise. The tension
between the general  and the particular is especially relevant to consider when
studying  valuation  in  organizations,  since  organizations  have  to  create
generalization and standardization in order to guarantee certainty and stability for
coordination (Thévenot, 2001). This need for generalization can come into tension
with considerations of particularity, as has been demonstrated in the case of the
RCC negotiating supplementary child allowance.
19  Practices that merely signify and remunerate value, without actually evaluating 
value, are probably most often non-monetary, like honorary titles or ceremonial 
rituals But one could think of certain bonuses or concessions as valorizing devices, 




Evaluation can be a highly uncertain process where not only is the final outcome
unclear, but also what exactly might constitute worth. Evaluation can be made less
uncertain and less costly if established evaluation devices are used. This paper
analyzed the attempt to develop an evaluation device that was used to calculate
fair supplementary child allowance in a collective based on radical democracy. To
understand  the  process  by  which  the  collective  tries  to  come  to  a  shared
understanding of a fair model to pay supplementary child allowance, the paper
utilized  Boltanski  and  Thévenot’s  notion  of  the  test.  By  applying  the  test  as
heuristic framework, the analysis offers two insights relevant for the literature on
test. First, the analysis shows that actors in situations of radical uncertainty do not
necessarily follow a linear path from giving worth to its assessment. It is rather a
discovery process in which people learn what their values imply and how they can
be realized in practice. Second, in following the justification work to develop a fair
model to pay supplementary child allowance, the analysis furthermore shows that
even in a situation that is characterized by an imperative to justification, people
might settle for solutions that are good enough, or ‘satisficing’.  By bringing in a
consideration of the tension between the general and the particular in evaluation
practices, the paper thus contributes to studies of evaluation in contexts of moral
complexity.
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Appendix IV: Composite Relations: Organizations between 
collective and company
Abstract
This paper analyses how collective firms deal with the challenge of being a 
company and a collective at the same time. Based on a comparative study of two 
collective firms, the paper shows how their member-relations are configured in 
such a way that they allow to balance and mediate different modes of 
coordination. The paper distinguishes two different kinds of logics that these firms 
use to coordinate work: First, coordination based on generalization, that is, the use
of standards, roles and rules. Second, coordination based on familiarity, which 
rests on intimacy and detailed, often tacit knowledge and understanding. 
Drawing on ideas from Viviana Zelizer‘s relational work approach and Laurent 
Thévenot‘s sociology of engagements, it is argued that the mediation between 
general and particular can be governed through defining the mutual rights and 
responsibilities between an organization and its members. Collective firms need to
create relations that are able to acknowledge and value particularities, but they 
also have to consider collective goals. They achieve this balance through 
‘composite relations’, which mediate between familiarity and generalization.




This paper analyses the relationship between coordination, evaluation and 
morality in two small, democratically governed collective firms. The cases were 
selected based on the firms using collective, democratic governance structures, 
not on the legal form of the cooperative. This understanding of collective firm 
mirrors Rothschild and Whitt’s definition of a collective or a cooperative as “any 
enterprise in which control rests ultimately and overwhelmingly with the member-
employees-owners, regardless of the particular legal framework through which this
is achieved” (1989: 2).
A central question in the literature on cooperatives is if and how they can escape 
‚degeneration‘ towards a conventional managerial hierarchy (Cornforth, 1995). 
There is ample theoretical and empirical work on cooperatives that lays out 
conditions, possibilities and facilitating factors that make democracy in economic 
organizations possible (Cheney et al., 2014; Johnson, 2006; Kokkinidis, 2015; 
Rothschild-Whitt, 1976; Sauser, 2009; Spear, 2004;). Jaumier (2017: 219) 
summarizes the factors the literature describes that facilitate ongoing democracy 
and equality as (1) relating to environment and size – for instance small-size and 
niche-markets, and (2) rules and procedures that support democratic practices – 
among the most common democratic decision-making. 
Since most of this research tends to focus on governance issues, a perspective on
everyday experiences and relational dynamics is often missing in studies of 
democratic firms (Jaumier, 2017; Resch and Steyaert, 2020). If we consider that 
cooperatives are “run and shaped by what its members do in the course of their 
daily interactions with their organization as much as by what they say at formal 
assemblies” (Stryjan, 1994: 66), it is striking that only a limited number of empirical
studies concentrates on relational practices in cooperatives, beyond governance 
and decision making procedures. Studies that analyze relational practices highlight
their importance for understanding the complex balances alternative firms have to 
achieve. For instance Jaumier (2017) discusses how  informal relationship-
management practices of workers via their formal superiors “prevents chiefs from 
being chiefs”. Langmead (2016) describes how ongoing ‘individual-collective 
alignment’ facilitates organizational change within organizational democracy. 
154
Resch and Steyaert (2020) describe relational activities that foster intimacy and 
affective connection between members of a radical democratic network of 
freelancers and start ups.
The paper argues, that to understand what it means to be a company and 
collective at the same time, it is necessary to go beyond questions of democratic 
governance and include the challenge to combine different logics of coordination. 
The paper focuses on how coordination is supported by relational dynamics, 
drawing on two conceptual approaches that deal with the entanglement of 
coordination and morality in the economy: Viviana Zelizer's notion of ‘differentiated
ties’ and Laurent Thévenot’s ‘regimes of engagement’.
Zelizer’s work highlights how interpersonal relations, and the meaning that people 
give to them, shape the accomplishment of economic activities. This paper 
particularly draws on „The Purchase of Intimacy“ (2005) in which Zelizer analyses 
how people manage to sustain intimate relationships that entail economic 
activities, despite the common believe that intimacy and economics will corrupt 
each other. Up to now, Zelizer‘ s framework has been primarily used to study the 
interweaving of intimacy and economics in families and markets for intimate or 
taboo goods.20 This paper is interested in the interplay between intimacy and 
economics in collective firms, starting from the question of how they can sustain a 
mediation between being a community of like-minded people and an economic 
organization. 
In Zelizer’s work, morality enters into the analysis of economic processes via their 
entanglement with intimate relations. However, morality in the economy is broader 
than the question of intimacy. For French pragmatic sociology (Eymard-Duvernay 
et al., 2005; Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006) all economic processes have a moral 
component, insofar as they rely on conventions that are related to specific ideas of
what is good. To broaden the analysis of morality in the economy, this paper 
combines and complements central ideas of Zelizer’s work with central ideas of 
20  For a review article on „Research on the interplay between intimacy and economy“ see Bandelj
et al. 2015.
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French pragmatic sociology, in particular, Thévenot’s sociology of engagements 
(2001, 2011, 2019), which distinguishes different levels of generalization in 
coordination. This framework has been used in a variety of social sciences 
research (Blok and Meilvang, 2015; Centemeri, 2015; Goulet, 2013; Howard-
Grenville and Carlile, 2006; Meriluoto, 2018; Meilvang et al., 2018, Ponte and 
Cheyns, 2013; Truninger, 2011). In organization studies, the regimes of 
engagement have been used to theorize everyday practices in organizations 
(Bullinger, 2014) and organizational bricolage (Duymedjian and Rüling, 2010). 
Based on Thévenot’s notion of coordination, this paper distinguishes two different 
logics that firms use to coordinate work: First, coordination based on 
generalization, that is, the use of standards, roles and rules. Second, coordination 
based on familiarity, which rests on intimacy and detailed, often tacit, knowledge 
and understanding. The paper argues that it is important to consider both modes 
as they both provide sources of stability and certainty that sustain coordination. 
The co-existence of these two modes of coordination, however, leads to normative
tensions. Collective firms can compose relationships that combine elements 
related to different modes of coordination and related moral orientations, thus 
mediating their tension. These 'differentiated ties' (Zelizer, 2000) are distinguished 
from each other through symbols and rituals, as well as evaluative practices. The 
main conceptual contribution of this paper is the notion of the ‘composite relation’, 
a heuristic concept that enables to analyze how organizations balance both modes
of coordination through differentiating and designing the relationship to their 
members. This concept has been developed out of the analytical needs of a 
qualitative comparative case study of three collective firms which, aimed at 
understanding the relationship between coordination and morality. A central finding
of this study was that many of the coordinative and normative tensions, as well as 
solutions, were linked to the specific way that belonging or relating to the 
organization was understood.
Due to space constraints, only two of the three collective firms will be discussed in 
this paper. Their analysis shows how collectives use composite relations to deal 
with tensions between familiar and general coordination, between being a 
collective and a company. 
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Differentiated ties and the interplay between intimacy and economy
Viviana Zelizer’s work highlights how interpersonal relations, and the meaning that
people give to them, shape the accomplishment and nature of economic activities. 
Zelizer argues, that Economic Sociology should analyze ‘relational work’ in order 
to understand how people establish, maintain, negotiate, transform and terminate 
interpersonal relations by creating viable matches between meaningful relations, 
transactions and media, such as money, food stamps or favors (2012, 2013). Due 
to her focus on the intermingling of different logics in social relations, Zelizer’s 
work offers important insights for a sociology of (economic) organizations. In “The 
purchase of intimacy” (2005) she explores the intersection between intimate 
relationships and monetary transfers. She discusses that most scholars regard the
relationship between intimacy and economics as either one of ‘hostile worlds’, 
where contact between these two will lead to moral contamination and 
degradation, or else a ‘nothing but’ relationship, which assumes that intimate 
relations involving money are either nothing but economic exchange, or nothing 
but coercion. In contrast to this, Zelizer posits her own account as one of 
‘differentiated ties’: In their social relations, people are able to mediate between 
the intimate and the economic, they routinely differentiate social relations. This is 
what Zelizer describes as ‘relational work’: “For each distinct category of social 
relations, people erect a boundary, mark the boundary by means of names and 
practices, establish a set of distinctive understandings that operate within that 
boundary, designate certain sorts of economic transactions as appropriate for the 
relation, bar other transactions as inappropriate, and adopt certain media for 
reckoning and facilitating economic transactions within the relation.” (Zelizer, 2012:
145). 
Zelizer analyses how people use different payment systems to distinguish social 
relations from each other, among them intimate relations (Zelizer, 2000: 818f; 
2005: 20ff). This form of relational work has been further developed into the 
concept of ‘monetary earmarking’ (Zelizer, 2012), by which people signal the 
proper use and destination of money. By earmarking money people construct and 
distinguish social relations, each differentiated currency is suitable for only some 
social relations and transactions. Earmarking is used in firms as well, where 
modes of payment – for instance hourly wages or annual salaries – create and 
signify different relationships between employer and employee. Zelizer uses the 
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idea of 'differentiated ties' to highlight, that people are able to use complex evaluative
practices to differentiate relationships. In her work, the intimate sphere presents the 
particular, the idiosyncratic, which can not be formulated for a general audience.
Zelizer suggests that her relational work approach would be suitable to study 
organizations (2005: 308), and has herself engaged with the significance of certain
intimate relations for organizations (2009). This paper applies the idea of 
differentiated ties to explain coordination in collective firms. Since in organizations 
relations between members have to balance several logics and conflicting goods 
that go beyond the tension between intimacy and economic gains, the paper next 
introduces Laurent Thévenot’s notion of organizations as ‘compromising devices’ 
between different rationalities.
Organizations as Compromise Devices between different modes of 
coordination 
For Thévenot organizations are able to deal with of two different obstacles to 
coordination: Contingency and uncertainty, as well as the presence of multiple and
conflicting legitimate principles of evaluation. They can deal with these obstacles 
to coordination because, first, they establish certainty over time and space by the 
generalization of relations. Second, they establish relatively stable compromises 
between multiple, conflicting values by designing ‘composite arrangements’. The 
notion of the composite arrangement is  based on Thévenot’s work with Boltanski 
(2006). “On Justification” develops a model of the structure of the six most 
legitimate coordination logics, ‘orders of worth’, which are based on different ideas 
of a common good. These orders of worth are extended towards ‘common worlds’,
which house specific objects and subjects that have meaning and worth. All of 
these worlds can be the basis of coordination based on generalization. If for 
instance, the market world is of high importance in an organization, coordination 
will tend to rationalize in regards to market expansion and good salesmen will 
have a high status. If the industrial world is of high importance, coordination will 
tend to optimize product quality and consequently, technical expertise will have a 
high status. With the idea of different possible common goods and related ideas of
what is rational and just, “On Justfication” allows to analyze moral conflicts that 
emerge when different coordination logics, based on different orders of worth, 
clash. To deal with the empirical reality of situations in which conflicting orders of 
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worth co-exist, Boltanski and Thévenot introduce the idea of composite 
arrangements. These are composed of elements of different worlds, which endow 
the arrangement with their own substance and identity.  According to Thévenot, 
„The firm should be treated as a compromising device between several modes of 
coordination, involving at least the market and the industrial modes. This definition 
emphasizes the plurality of the worlds entangled in the making of the firm. By 
contrast, settings that mainly involve one order of worth do not need the kind of 
composite arrangements which give substance to the firm.“ (2001: 411). 
In Laurent Thévenot‘s conception of organizations, generalization or the 
stabilization of relations is discussed as a solution to coordination problems. But it 
is not only the compromising of different higher order values that makes up the 
‘organized complexity’ of organizations, it is also the compromise between 
formalizing relationships and allowing for informal relationships and considerations
of particular goods. In his work after “On Justification”, Thévenot conceptualized a 
type of coordination in which certainty is not rooted in conventional categories, but 
familiar knowledge. 
Coordination based generalization and coordination based on familiarity
Thévenot's sociology of engagements has been developed to expand the analysis 
of coordination beyond, respectively, below, situations in which there is a need for 
public justification. The distinction between different ‘regimes of engagement’ 
allows to understand “agency of the most personal or intimate kind and agency 
that is collective, public or institutional” (Thévenot, 2001: 57). The main idea is that
people can be engaged in their material and social environment in different ways. 
Every form of engagement is therefore connected to a specific type of sense-
making, which is always tied to evaluation. “Engagement with the world is first a 
reality test that depends on the way the agent captures the world within a certain 
type of format (publicly conventionalized, functional, familiar, etc.). But this 
formatting of reality depends on a form of evaluation that singles out what is 
relevant.”(Thévenot, 2002: 54) .
Thévenot differentiates four main ways people can be engaged with their socio-
material environment: The regime of public justification, in which people coordinate
their actions according to a common good; the regime of planned action, in which 
people coordinate their actions in order to achieve a plan; the regime of 
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engagement in familiarity, in which people protect personal and local convenience;
and the regime of engaging in exploration in which excitement and novelty is 
pursued (Thévenot, 2014)21. Both the regime of engagement in public justification 
and the regime of planned engagement support standardized action, where 
coordination is based on on generalizing categories and conventions. In contrast 
to these regimes, the regime of engagement in familiarity succeeds without relying
on conventions. Here, coordination and evaluation are carried out at the level of 
local adjustment. Familiar engagement is concerned with allowing the (re-)creation
of the relationship between a person and her familiar environment. 
Thévenot's regimes of engagement allow to view the challenge between particular 
and collective goods not as one between the interests of utility-maximizing agents 
and a collective, but as the need to compose a balance between familiar 
attachments and more generalized modes of coordination. This article contrasts 
two basic modes of coordination in organizations: Coordination based on 
generalization and coordination based on familiarity. Coordination based on 
generalization subsumes the characteristics of engagement in a plan and 
engagement in public justification. This is done in order to capture the dialectical 
tension the paper is interested in: The tension between what can be generalized, 
and what can not. 
Coordination based on generalization uses formal hierarchy, institutions and rules 
to create relatively stable relations between people and their socio-material 
environment. People, objects and situations are not treated in their particularity, 
but based on common properties that can be abstracted from them, according to 
general rules. Coordination based on generalization is based on the type of 
rationality that is depicted in theories of scientific management and Weber‘s theory
of bureaucracy. It rests on substantial investments in standards and rules and, 
carried to its logical conclusion, it makes sure that everyone and everything is 
shaped and distilled into their most functional form. While the initial investment to 
achieve this is quite costly, once rules and forms are established, the predictability 
and certainty they generate yield decreasing marginal costs of coordination. 
21  Due to limited space, this paper can not provide a detailed discussion of the sociology of 
engagements, and particularly engaging in exploration will not be further elaborated on in this 
paper.
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Coordination based on familiarity rests on intimacy and detailed, often tacit, 
knowledge about one‘s environment. The rationality here is quite different from 
generalization. With coordination based on generalization, certainty rests on 
knowing how to act according to general rules, in a situation which is shaped and 
prepared functionally. With coordination based on familiarity, certainty rests on an 
intimate knowledge of the elements of a specific situation, stemming from direct, 
repeated experience: “This engagement supports the ease guaranteed by 
surroundings that are grasped by idiosyncratic indices and conveniently 
accommodated through a former habituation.” (Thévenot, 2019:7). People are able
to treat each other and their environment more 'thoroughly' or 'adequately', when 
they know each other. Coordination based on familiarity is based on particular 
knowledge, which is gained by investing one‘s personal time. It allows to 
coordinate with more flexibility, taking into considerations particularities. 
Thévenot links the different kinds of coordinative powers of regimes to related 
kinds of goods. Coordination based on generalization is related to conceptions of a
common or general good, while coordination based on familiarity is related to 
moral considerations of particular needs. In coordination based on generalizing 
relations, the underlying idea of justice is one in which it is just to treat all 
people/objects/situation the same, if they share certain characteristics. Which 
characteristics have to be taken into account is determined by a central principle of
equivalence. For instance, if an employee arrives late and obviously sleep-
deprived to an important meeting, delivers a confusing presentation and does not 
seem to engage properly in the resulting discussion, from a standpoint of justice, it
seems fair and right to subsequently deny him promotion. This idea of justice is 
also the base of Boltanski and Thévenot's framework in “On Justification”. To come
to justifiable agreements and orderings, people have to “divest themselves of their 
singularity and converge towards a form of generality transcending persons and 
the situations in which they interrelate” (Boltanski and Thévenot, 1999: 363). 
To provide an alternative ending to the story of the under-performing employee: If 
his manager knows that he usually performs very well, but is currently caring for 
his sick elderly father, she might find it legitimate to treat this employee differently 
than she would normally do. This idea of morality has been most elaborately 
articulated in the ethics of care approach (Held, 2006). The ethics of care 
emphasizes that we can think and act as if we were independent is only possible 
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because we are embedded in a network of social relations that sustain and protect
us. It rejects the idea, that reasoning about moral problems is the better the more 
abstract. The ethics of care “respects rather than removes itself from the claims of 
particular others with whom we share actual relationships” (Held, 2006: 11). The 
central focus is thus on the moral salience of attending to and meeting the needs 
of particular others for whom we take responsibility. 
Both approaches can foster and protect important goods in organizations, and 
both are related to different modes of coordination: Coordination based on 
generalization aligns with an ethics of justice, while coordination based on 
familiarity aligns with an ethics of care.
Composite Relations and the Moral Sense of 'Not going too far'
While Thévenot’s notion of organizations as compromise devices is interested in 
the intermingling of different logics of coordination in organizations, Zelizer is 
interested in the intermingling between different logics in social relationships. Both 
approaches are inherently interested in how conflicting logics and moral ideas can 
be resolved in social interaction and coordination. With the notion of ‘composite 
relation’, this paper includes crucial points of both Zelizer’s and Thévenot’s work 
into a concept that helps to explain the mediation between coordination based on 
generalization and coordination based on familiarity in collective firms.
Moral ideas can come into conflict on two different levels. First, different ideas of 
common goods can clash. Second, a common good and a particular good can 
come into conflict.  Thévenot’s notion of composite organizations is concerned with
the former, since it offers a framework to analyze how organizations can create 
certainty and order in the presence of multiple, conflicting common goods. 
Zelizer’s work focuses on situations in which particular and common goods are 
intermingled and come into conflict. Her concept of differentiated ties highlights, 
that people regularly combine the intimate and the economic in their relationships, 
and that  they carefully deploy different ways of signifying the specific meanings of 
these ‘differentiated’ relationships. While Zelizer does not differentiate different 
levels of coordination, in her usage of the difference between the economic and 
the intimate, she usually points towards mediation between the general and the 
particular. By using the word composite rather than differentiated in this paper, the 
emphasis is not on the fact, that people distinguish differentiated relations, but 
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rather on the fact, that organizations compose relations that mediate between 
different modes of coordination. The composite relations this paper is interested in 
achieve a compromise between generality and particularity. They connect an 
ethics of justice with an ethics of care.
Composite relationships allow a further qualification of the moral sense of people 
engaged in such relationships: The protection of relations that are “neither/nor” 
can only be achieved by never completely oppressing one of the embedded 
goods. This suggests a specific depiction of the everyday moral sense of people: 
The desire to 'not go too far': in their relationship to other people and their 
environment, people might feel the wish to pursue both general, as well as 
particular goods. They are often acting according to both an ethics of justice and 
an ethics of care, moving on a continuum between both orientations. A sense of 
injustice is then experienced, if a situation is evaluated according to only one of 
these moral orientations. In collective organizations, this means, that people try to 
pursue both the well-being of their members and that of the organization itself. It 
would be going too far, for instance, if people are put into existential risks to secure
the ongoing of their cooperative. 'Going too far' can also be understood in a 
related sense where it concerns the appropriate definition of a relationship. For 
instance, if people refuse to be considered or treated as “just” colleagues, or “just” 
friends, a judgment which seems to distant from what the relationship “actually” is.
Composite Relations in two collective firms
In the following, the paper will describe how two collective firms deal with the 
challenge of being a company and a collective, by composing relationships that 
allow to mediate between generalized and familiar coordination.
„Call a Bike“ (CAB) is a bike courier collective based in Germany. At the time of the
research it had been existing for 9 years, with 26 people working for the firm. 
Everyone working for CAB gets paid equal wages per hour. The analysis of CAB 
draws on the observation of regular working days in the office (6), general 
assemblies (4), and one annual plenary lasting a day. Observations took place 
over a time-frame of 20 months. The analysis additionally draws on 7 semi-
structured interviews, as well as minutes of plenary meetings over three years and
the internal wiki.
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The “Good Tech Collective” (GTC) is a worker cooperative that builds digital 
applications and websites, based in the UK. At the time of the research, GTC had 
been existing for 6 years. Over this six years, GTC transitioned from a two person 
LLP to a co-op with eight members, six regular and several occasional freelancers.
GTC started with an equal pay per hour policy, but when a growing number of 
differently skilled and experienced people started working for GTC, they changed 
to a differentiated pay scale, which is limited by a ratio of 3:1 and a fixed maximum
and minimum salary. The author conducted an ethnographic study of the GTC 
over a period of three months, which included observation of internal meetings, 
meetings with clients and social activities. The analysis additionally draws on 13 
semi-structured interviews, as well as documents such as minutes of meetings 
and the internal wiki.
Collective Governance and the significance of consent 
Both CAB and GTC have been founded with the explicit goal to provide a working 
environment based on equality and solidarity. Intimate relationships between 
members had been important from the start. But the complexity of their 
organization requires both collectives to use coordination forms that allow to 
generalize and standardize. Both collectives use a participative, democratic 
governance structure which is based on semi-autonomous working groups and a 
group assembly which has ultimate authority. CAB have five different working 
groups which meet regularly and are responsible for certain issues like finances or
sales. Additionally, they hold a plenary assembly once a month. In the plenary 
assembly, working groups, but also individuals can bring in proposals for 
decisions. Decisions are taken according to consent. GTC use a Sociocratic 
governance model, which means that their work is organized and governed by six 
semi-autonomous working groups, so called ‘circles’, which meet regularly and are
responsible for certain key issues, like design or business development. These 
working groups practice consent-based decision making. Ultimate authority is with 
the member’s circle, which consists of all formal members of the cooperative. 
Like in many other collectives, in the working groups and plenaries of both CAB 
and GTC decisions are based on consent. Consent, in contrast to consensus 
means that there is no significant objection or veto to a decision. This difference is 
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important, since a consent does not mean, that everyone in the assembly is happy
with a decision, it just means that everyone can live with the decision. Taking 
decisions by consent means, that a singular, particular concern can stop a 
proposal that everyone else agrees on. There is no general rule that would 
prescribe, under which conditions a veto is legitimate, there is no attempt at 
comparing and ranking concerns of different people, a veto is a veto and can only 
be legitimized by a particular person with particular concerns. While vetos are rare 
in the practice of both collectives, structuring the main governance structure in a 
way that renders particular concerns as theoretically more important than 
collective interests is a foundational rationality that influences organizational 
practices and decision-making. 
The relationship between these collectives and their members cannot be 
described as either employer/employee or community/community-members, it 
involves economic as well as social considerations. Remarkably, the relationship 
also considers and protects particularity. Particularity is, however, bound to 
designated areas: People may take their own decisions if it doesn’t affect other’s 
or is to the benefit of all. People may veto a decision in the formal, controlled 
setting of an assembly. If there is a shared understanding that specific 
particularities are endangered by decisions or practices, both collectives try to 
prevent ‘going too far’. For collectives it is important, that the relationship between 
members is one, that can accept both, particular needs and the common good. 
Depending on situational considerations, they have to be able to either balance 
between both, or chose one of them. It would be a problem, if it was only ever one 
of these ‘winning’. 
Not a member, but not “just” a freelancer either: Status differentiation
When it comes to the relationship between a cooperative and people who work for 
it, conventionally, there is an either/or choice: People can be co-owners and 
members of the cooperative, which means there is a relationship that is long term, 
in which interpersonal trust can be established. Or people can be freelancers, a 
market relation, which does not need any kind of trust or intimate knowledge, a 
relationship between independent, utility-maximizing individuals. While people 
working for CAB and GTC can formally be distinguished between members and 
“non-members”, both collectives have established more complex, differentiated 
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relations for “non-members” which are marked through specific language and 
evaluative practices.
CAB is legally a company with limited liability owned by a registered association. 
Internally, however, CAB is organized like a cooperative. People can become 
members of the collective – „kollektivista“ – after three months of regularly working
for CAB. Kollektivista are engaged in at least one of the working groups and have 
veto-rights at the assembly. However, not every courier working for CAB is 
interested in taking part in the governance structures.22 Therefore, there can be 
stark differences in terms of commitment for the collective. But apart from the veto-
right at the assembly the non-kollektivistas enjoy the same rights as kollektivista: 
They get equal pay and are paid to take part in the assembly. This is interesting, 
since CAB needs a lot of personal investment by its members to make the 
company sustainable. But the people who are involved in the collective still share 
the advantages that they have worked for with people that are not taking on the 
same amount of responsibilities. There was, however, a critical moment in the 
history of CAB, when this composition of different ways of relating to the collective 
was seriously challenged.
Four years after CAB started, four members of the collective surprised the others 
at an annual extended plenary with the demand to radically restructure the 
collective.23 While the majority of the other members were either still studying or 
had additional sources of income and worked only part-time, the four people who 
attempted this coup worked full- or almost fulltime for CAB, which was their main 
source of income. They were also doing the major bulk of the strategic and 
administrative work. While there was effectively an elite of four people in the 
collective, who were responsible for critical tasks and usually worked more then 
they were paid, these very same people had neither entitlements to higher salaries
nor exclusive decision-power. Their proposal at the plenary assembly was to 
drastically reduce the number of people working for CAB. Only the best and 
22 The fact that not everyone wants to take over the added responsibility of membership in a 
collective and that some people prefer to work part-time or project-based has been reported in 
other studies on collective firms as well (see for instance Cornforth 1995).
23 The analysis of this event is based on the minutes of the meetings, as well as interviews with 
members of CAB.
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fastest couriers should be allowed in the collective, and only if they were working 
full-time. Their proposition was not to formalize and henceforth remunerate the 
existing hierarchy. Instead, they were striving for a solution that would equalize 
members, by demanding that everyone should work approximately the same 
amount of hours and by reducing the collective of its less worthy members. They 
were striving for a collective of equally capable and motivated people. Even within 
“the elite”, there was an unease with allowing evaluative differences between 
members of CAB. As a reaction to this proposal, everyone in the meeting was 
asked to describe their personal ideas and wishes for the future of CAB. One 
member stated that she was very proud to be a part of the collective and hoped, 
that in the future, it would still be possible to contribute to the collective in smaller 
ways. Another member supported this, by saying that it would be important for him
that they would continue to value the contribution of everyone, regardless of how 
much time people can spend. A third member stated, that to him the social 
collective was so important, that he was willing to keep accepting relatively low 
pay for his work. In these statements we can see the importance of belonging to a 
collective where everyone is valued in their particularity. In contrast to this, for the 
people who proposed the restructuring, the best version of a collective was one 
where people belong to the same general category. Two of these people explicitly 
stated, that they wanted to work in a collective, where other people are working as 
much as they were, and shared the same sense of commitment and quality 
standards. Another one of the elite four stated that she liked her job even when 
she was doing the demanding work of coordinating deliveries among the couriers 
“as long as the couriers on the street are doing a good job”. 
After a second emergency assembly, the proposal for restructuring was rejected. 
After this incident the idea was established, that CAB is only a real collective, if it 
can value the contributions of different people with different skills and time-
resources. In an interview, a member  told me that:
I believe, one decision that has been taken after this was that CAB decided,
that we can’t use rigid patterns for how we see ourselves. We accepted, 
that CAB will always be a matter of interpretation and we will always have 
to be flexible with rules or ignore them, while at the same time stay 
consequent if it is important. First and foremost, we all have to realize, that 
we will always have to find compromises. And we will always find 
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compromises, and strict and rigid criteria for being part of the collective, like
the ones they wanted to introduce, just don’t make sense for our collective.
Remaining CAB members appreciate that subjective, particular circumstances can
be legitimate reasons why people are either not able to participate in the 
governance structures or are not as skilled as other couriers. Still, veto-rights are 
granted only to the sub-group of members who take part in the collective 
governance. Giving people, who are “just” couriers and not involved in the 
governance structures the same authority as kollektivista would be going too far. 
But from their perspective, refusing non-kollektivista equal pay would just as well 
be going too far.
GTC is legally a cooperative, they differentiate between members and non-
members, and have an additional transitional state. In the year when the author 
conducted research on the GTC, approx. 17 people were regularly working for the 
GTC. These people are distinguished into three different categories: Members (9), 
Collaborators (4) and Freelancers (4). Members are the formal members of the 
cooperative, they collectively own it and are legally responsible for it. Collaborators
are people who are not members yet, but they feel committed to GTC and work 
almost entirely for GTC. The members are employed by GTC, everyone else is 
self-employed. If people who work at GTC are asked to draw a conceptual map of 
their cooperative, they quite often draw three concentric circles, with members 
located in the most inner circle and freelancers in the most outer circle. 
Being a collaborator is a transition phase between being a freelancer and being a 
member. There is a formal process of becoming a collaborator: Before people can 
apply to become collaborators they have to define objectives and measurable key 
results that they want to achieve for GTC, as well as a personal development plan.
Collaborators are involved in the self-governance structures, they are 
automatically part of the 'collaborators circle' and should additionally be part of at 
least one other circle. Usually, people are part of the circle that is closest to their 
function at GTC, so developers are in the tech-circle and people responsible for 
sales and marketing in the sales and marketing circle. Independent of their specific
function at GTC, all collaborators have to take up some PR and communication 
work. Collaborators are also expected to take part in the “social life” of GTC, and 
attend group lunches, visits to the pub or weekend trips. In return, GTC offers 
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collaborators paid time to attend the circle meetings, and, after members, 
collaborators are given priority to work opportunities. There is also a clear 
dismissal procedure from the side of GTC, collaborators are given two formal 
warnings and an in-depth review before dismissal. 
GTC’s coordination logics, which involve self-governance and coordination based 
on intimate relationships make it impossible to treat everyone who is not (yet) a 
member as “just” a freelancer. At the same time, GTC has had bad experiences of 
giving people shared responsibility for the whole enterprise without getting to know
them first. The status of a collaborator is thus a relationship that combines 
characteristics of members and freelancers. In some formal aspects, this 
relationship resembles the status of quasi-self-employment, an illegal, exploitative 
relationship. However, the collaborator is not “just” quasi-self-employment, since it 
is a well-delimited status with clear rules for transitioning from freelancing to 
becoming a member. Furthermore, collaborators have decision making and veto-
rights insofar in their respective circles. The collaborator is thus an institutionalized
compromise between being a member and a freelancer.
Both CAB and GTC avoid treating non-members as just freelancers, and have 
created composite relationships that combine characteristics of members and 
freelancers, with the aim to achieve a balance between both. These compositions 
emerged out of the necessities of a collective firm that combines coordination 
based on generalization and coordination based on familiarity.
Colleagues and friends: Balancing particular and general in the division of 
labour
To understand how collective firms balance coordination based on familiarity and 
coordination based on generalization, it is not enough to look at their formal 
governance structures. Rather, one has to understand their relational work in their 
day-to-day activities. Due to the differences in the type of work they perform, CAB 
and GTC have to accomplish very different coordination processes on a regular 
basis. While in both firms the governance structures allow democratic participation
of everyone, in their day-to-day activities, there is a division of labour and a 
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related, though functionally and temporally constrained, hierarchy.24 However, 
people in authority always have to make sure to consider their colleagues not just 
as workers, but as particular people as well. 
In conventional bike courier companies, bike couriers are effectively forced in the 
position of being competitors vis-a-vis their colleagues. In order to change this 
relation of competition to one of solidarity, CAB had to fundamentally innovate and 
change the way bike courier work is coordinated. In Germany, couriers are usually 
independent contractors and pay a commission to the courier company, which acts
as a broker between customers and couriers. While courier companies try to have 
as many people on the street as possible, they don’t feel responsible if not all 
people on the street get enough orders. This means that especially less 
experienced couriers are available constantly, while not getting enough orders to 
earn enough money. Mainstream courier companies profit from the appeal of 
being a bike courier, which is highly precarious, but still attractive to a lot of young 
people. Since they do not have to pay the costs, courier companies can be quite 
inefficient in their coordination of couriers and deliveries, they can have more 
couriers on the street than necessary, as they always have “surplus couriers”. This
is the type of exploitation that the founding members of CAB wanted to stop. At 
CAB every courier on the street is paid equally per hour, not per delivery. In order 
to afford this, CAB has a highly efficient system for coordinating couriers and 
deliveries. Every shift, there are two people at the office dedicated only to 
coordination. CAB calls this role “doing dispo”, as in disposition. One person is 
mainly responsible for taking on orders via telephone, e-Mail and their website. 
The second person, the main “dispo-person” is responsible for calculating routes 
as well as committals between the couriers on the street.  In order to to optimize 
the matching between orders with different deadlines and available couriers in 
different distances to the delivery points, “dispo-people” have to have an overview 
of all current orders and couriers on the street. This job is only done by 
experienced couriers who know the city and possible routes quite well and who 
24  In the literature on worker cooperatives, formalization, specialization and division of labour is 
often seen as incompatible with sustaining democracy and equality. Consequently, job rotation 
is seen as an anti-dote to degeneration (Kokkinidis 2015; Rothschild-Whitt 1976; Sobering 
2019). In the collective firms I‘ve studied, specialized knowledge and skills of members are both
necessary and not viewed as a danger to collective governance per se. 
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furthermore know how to handle their different colleagues on the street. Dispo-
people have to be aware that the couriers on the street have different experience, 
fitness and psychological states. They stay in constant contact with the couriers 
during the shift. The communication between the office and the couriers is via 
radio. Every courier has a number which is used instead of names over radio-
communication, to prevent mishearing. To deal with minor disruptions, unexpected
incidents and negotiating best routes with couriers, dispo-people employ humor, 
insider language and their intimate knowledge of the trade. The nuance in 
language that they use is impossible to translate in English, as they make heavy 
use of jargon and puns.
Dispo-person to a courier on the radio: 54! Alright then, please jump over to 
X-street, colleague 50 will be there and he has a delivery for you which will 
bring you to Y-street.
Dispo-person to a courier on the radio: Take care 47! And by the way it is 
great how you are totally rocking this just right now. Oh and can you tell me,
do you have an estimate for when you will be at X-street?
(Fieldnotes, paraphrase, translated by the author)
Although they are in a position of ultimate authority,  dispo-people use a lot of 
conversational ‘repair work’ when giving “orders” to couriers, always adjusting their
communication as well as their demands in order to not ‘go too far’. Observing a 
skilled dispo-person is akin to watching a masterful performance in composition. 
Couriers are treated as bike couriers that have to fulfill a certain role, but the 
dispo-person always makes sure to treat them as particular people as well. And at 
times, the person can be more important than the courier. 
Courier passing by in the office: I you don’t have anything for me at the 
moment, I’ll get something to eat now.
Dispo-Person: (laughs) I have a lot for you, but go on, eat something first. 
(points at screen) See, we already have 57 tours. Today we are really 
rocking it!
(Fieldnotes, paraphrase, translated by the author)
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The sophisticated process of disposition CAB uses can be seen as a strategy of 
equalizing members instead of remunerating differences: Instead of individual 
couriers being responsible for their own success, via the dispo-work the 
accomplishment of delivering all orders in time becomes a collective success. On 
good days, they are all rocking it together. Dispo-work, which is based on 
compromises between the particular and the general, fosters solidarity in the 
collective.
The daily work at GTC is structured by client projects. They can therefore use a 
coordination approach that is more conventional in their sector:  agile project 
management techniques. Project managers, not unlike dispo-people at CAB, have
to achieve a balance between treating team members according to their role in the
project, as well as particular people. The balance between acting as a functional 
leader in a project and the overall equality at GTC led to a conflict with a colleague
while I was doing fieldwork. When this colleague, Marcus, started working for 
GTC, he had been very close to the company, but due to private reasons, he had 
had to move cities and started working mostly remote. GTC had been trying to 
accommodate this new situation and had even financed additional working 
equipment that Marcus new remote work necessitated. Marcus, however started to
become quite unreliable, ignoring deadlines set by the project manager, and not 
being available per e-Mail or phone. 
The project manager told me about this conflict:
He's caused some serious like, some real real problems to me and projects 
because he just disappears. I can't get hold of him. I don't know where he 
is, I don't know what country he's in. I've had clients calling me saying 
where is our website. He was supposed to play a website once and he went
missing. And he didn't respond so he can really really leave you hanging. 
And when I said to him like Marcus you can't do that. He was like ‘Listen 
you're not my boss.’ And I was like I'm not talking to you as your boss I'm 
talking to you as the project manager who is getting an angry phone call 
from the client. 
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The conflict quickly got a personal note, when Marcus accused the project 
manager of “being after power”. With this, Marcus effectively ‘went too far’, by 
framing his relationship with the project manager as one of illegitimate domination,
instead of a composition between familiarity and a functional division of labor. The 
conflict was subsequently discussed in the member’s assembly. One member said
that “We have to explain him the expectations we have from our colleagues are 
not top-down, everyone has to be available in certain times.” While Marcus’ need 
to work remotely had been accepted, his new unreliability was clearly on the verge
of ‘going too far’. Still the member’s decided that one of them would go out for a 
drink with Marcus, to discuss the situation in a more intimate context. Eventually 
though, the relationship could not be repaired.
The complex relationship between members and the question of accountability is 
often a topic of discussions at the GTC. Zelizer notes that ‘When relations 
resemble others that have significantly different consequences for the parties, 
people put extra effort into distinguishing the relations, marking their boundaries, 
and negotiating agreements on their definition’ (2005: 34). The importance, as well
as difficulty to demarcate particular composite relations and their meaning is 
illustrated in this quote of an interview I conducted with Alex, one of the members:
So for example, on the weekend, I saw a few friends and I was telling them 
about GTC, my friend John, and stuff like this. And they said: Who is John? 
And I said, he is my colleague, but he is also my friend. And I was like, we 
don‘t have any bosses. And they were like, but who hired you. And I was 
like, well, John was the one who brought me in. And they were like, does he
earn more than you? And I said, yeah. And then they said: So he is your 
boss. You know, immediately, when you say stuff like this, people will say 
that he must be, or she must be, your boss.
We can see here, that Alex’s friends are looking for markers and symbols that 
enable them to characterize the relationship between John and Alex as an 
employer-employee relationship, since to them a higher-status, higher-earning 
colleague is a boss. They apply both the ‘nothing but’ and the ‘hostile worlds’ 
fallacy. For Alex, it is not immediately possible to describe his relationship to John 
to people unfamiliar to the GTC, who have never experienced the intermingling of 
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different coordination logics in the firm.25 Nevertheless, for Alex it is important, that 
their relationship to John is understood in the correct, suitable way, and calling 
John a boss would be wrong. And just as well, calling him just a colleague, or just 
a friend, would be ‘going too far’, because John is both.
Both CAB and GTC need a division of labour, which results in temporally and 
functionally constrained hierarchies. As the role of the dispo-person at CAB and 
the ways GTC handles conflicts with colleagues show, both collectives still have to
balance particular and general modes of coordination, even when they use formal 
hierarchy, 
Discussion
This paper started from the question of how collective firms deal with the paradox 
of being a community and a company at the same time. This question necessitates
to include questions of morality in the analysis of economic and organizational 
processes. To do so, two theoretical approaches were utilized and combined in the
notion of the composite relation: Laurent Thévenot’s notion of coordination based 
on evaluation, as well as Zelizer‘s notion of relational work, through which people 
interweave intimacy and economics in their relationship. This draws attention to 
the use of differentiated ways of relating to and coordinating within an 
organization. By constructing composite relationships which are marked through 
emic language, rituals and evaluative practices, organizations can endow 
members with varying degrees of discretion, autonomy and responsibility. The way
that relationships between members and the organization are defined determines 
the extent of coordination based on generalization and the extend of coordination 
based on familiarity.
The case studies in this paper illustrate that small organizations with democratic 
governance develop composite relations that are more open to the particular, 
since they rely on coordination based on engagement in familiarity, which fosters 
shared understandings and trust. For both CAB and GTC coordination based on 
25  While they trusted, that I, as someone who had spent a considerable amount of time with 
them, would understand.
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generalization and coordination based on familiarity are equally important. The 
mediation between the general and the particular is achieved on three levels that 
condition the relationship between the collectives and their members:
(1) Their governance structures, while built on generalizable relations, formalized 
rules and procedures, leave space for particularity. This can be seen by their 
approach towards decision-making, as well as their sensibility towards sustaining 
trusting personal relationships between all members.
(2) Both CAB and GTC allow “non-members” to relate to the organization that can 
not be reduced to “just” a market relationship. “Partial members” are allowed quite 
substantial participation in the governance, as well as the same rights as “full-
members” in regards to pay and other perks.
(3) While both collectives have a division of labour and related formal hierarchies 
in their day-to-day work, they make sure to balance particular needs of members 
with the functional needs of the work process.
Collective firms are more exposed to the tension between the general and the 
particular than conventional firms, but nevertheless, all organizations have to 
manage this tension. The more firms are dependent on valorizing the subjectivity 
of their employees, the more they have to deal with the integration of individual 
and particular orientations and demands in their coordination mechanisms (Lohr, 
2003). While this study can not say anything definite about how the relationship 
between collective goods and particular goods differs in collective firms vis-a-vis 
conventional firms, one tentative suggestion is that the boundaries that discern 
what ‘going too far’ means are differently positioned and unequally distributed: 
Familiar engagement exists in every conventional firm, and in some, it is central 
for successful coordination. However, in conventional firms, the extent to which 
particularity is valued is constrained by how much it contributes to profit 
generation. Valuing particular goods as not just a means, but an end in itself, 
would be going too far. Furthermore, in conventional firms, there is a formal 
hierarchy, which allows to treat some particularities as more important than others,
sometimes even as “general”. With composite relations, organizations accomplish 
an engagement with and between their members that is not reduced to a strictly 
quid-pro-quo relationship. The accomplishment of this compromise is a vital 
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condition that allows companies to function.26 Therefore, the concept of the 
composite relation can offer a productive lens to understand how conventional 
firms manage to mediate between the general and the particular.
Conclusion
This article originated from the question of how collective firms manage to sustain 
organizations that are leaderless and value both the individual members, as well 
as the collective. While there is already ample scholarly work on the (non-) 
achievement of democracy in worker cooperatives, this paper brings a new 
perspective to the topic. Based on central notions of French pragmatic sociology, 
the problem is analyzed not as one of democracy, but as the need to balance 
different rationalities of coordination. 
To explain how collective firms mediate between collective and company, this 
paper distinguishes two different logics of coordination, based on Thévenot’s 
sociology of engagements: Coordination based on generalization and coordination
based on familiarity. In contrast to coordination based on generalization, 
coordination based on familiarity can rely less on formalized relations because the 
sources of certainty are in particular relations and dependencies. The format of 
information is not standardized and ties can transfer more nuanced, detailed and 
idiosyncratic information. The article highlights the moral dimension of 
coordination: While coordination based on familiarity aligns with an ethics of care, 
coordination based on generalization aligns with an ethics of justice. 
Based on Zelizer’s work on differentiated ties, Thévenot’s composite organizations
as compromising devices, and his sociology of engagements, this paper develops 
the heuristic concept of composite relations. The composite relation is a 
conceptual tool that helps to uncover how organizations mediate between 
coordination based on generalization and coordination based on familiarity. By 
creating composite relations collective firms are able to reconcile and balance 
26 Notwithstanding that external factors, especially the distribution of power between those people
buying the labour of others and those people selling their labour power, crucially determines the
importance, as well as the structuring of this compromise.
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different coordination logics as well as related moral considerations. Through this 
composition they achieve to be neither “just” a collective, nor “just” a company. 
This article thus contributes to literature on coordination in organizations and 
particularly extends Thévenot’s work on organizations as compromise devices, by 
adding the consideration of coordination based on familiarity.
The article also contributes to literature dealing with moral issues in economic 
processes: It introduces a description of a moral sense that is suitable for 
composite relations, the aspiration to ‘not go too far’. Not going too far addresses 
the attempt to not totally sacrifice the particular for the general and vice versa. It 
also points toward the feeling of injustice that is experienced when relationships 
are characterized as either/or, although they are neither/nor.
Using the case study of two collective firms, the paper shows how alternative 
organizations try to value different ideas of justice by composing member-relations
that mediate between the particular and the general. For future research, it would 
be interesting to use the analytical lens of the  composite relation to understand 
how conventional organizations compose member-relations that integrate the 
need for formalization and standardization as well as making space for subjectivity
and autonomy of the workforce.
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Appendix V: Duality, uncertainty and management consultancy as practice: 
navigating conflicting regimes of engagement
Abstract:
The literature describes management consultants as both insiders and outsiders; 
personal and professional; experts and pragmatists. Transgressive, dual practices 
do not obviously fit the certainty-seeking mould of the corporations paying 
consultants‘ wages; yet straddling dualities is a repeated motif in consultants‘ 
work. We pursue this puzzle, wondering why this pattern of dualities arises. To do 
so, we draw on Thevenot’s ‚regimes of engagement‘. Its distinction between 
rationalistic, hierarchical ‚planning‘ and more locally rooted, interpersonal ‚familiar‘ 
coordination helps cohesively theorise these formerly disparate dualities. This 
facilitates a comparative case study of consultancy engagements in a large 
hospital and small tech-cooperative. Through this, we identify consultants as 
attempting to hold together familiarity and planning to mitigate uncertainty between
the two. This uncertainty, highly prominent in their client organizations, 
characterises the post-Fordist capitalism during which contemporary consultancy 
has thrived. Contemporary consultancy practices balance dualities to mitigate their
clients‘ uncertainty between familiarity and planning.




Advice; evaluations; coaching; education; filling temporary vacancies; planning 
and implementing changes (Furusten, 2009; Johansson, 2004; Salaman, 2002; 
Waisberg and Nelson, 2018; Wright, 2000): today’s management consultants play 
a staggering range of roles. Where once consultants were demanded for 
specialised skills, today they seem to fill whatever gaps organisations face 
(McKenna, 2006). If the traditional firm remains the muscle and bone of 
contemporary capitalism, consultancy has become its connective tissue.
While observing consultancy work’s rapid rise is simple, understanding it is less 
so. Early writing problematised consultants’ success (Ernst and Kieser, 2002), 
explaining it in terms of their rhetorical skill (Alvesson, 1993), institutional positions
(Saint-Martin, 1998) and histories (Kipping, 1999). More recent studies have 
approached grounded analyses of consultants’ interactions within client 
organisations (Faust, 2012; Heusinkveld and Visscher, 2012). This literature on 
consultants’ grounded practices is vital to understanding how consultants shape 
client relationships and win the repeat business on which they rely (Wright, 2000). 
However, focusing on consultants’ practices also raises fresh questions. Across 
studies, consultants emerge as embedded within dualities. They lie both within 
and without organisational boundaries (Sturdy et al., 2009); blur personal-
professional boundaries (Sturdy et al., 2006); and move between grounded 
pragmatism and technical expertise (Berglund and Werr, 2000). Highlighting 
different types of duality, such studies share an image of consultants as dual and 
conflicted (Czarniawska and Mazza, 2003). This leads us to wonder given firms 
characteristically seek certainty and consultants pursue their custom, why have 
such uncertain, conflicted practices become so widespread in contemporary 
consultancy? 
This paper addresses this question through two detailed case studies of 
consultancy work. These it theorises through Thévenot’s (2001b) regimes of 
engagement framework. Through Thévenot’s concepts of ‘planned action’ and 
‘familiar engagement’ it theorises consultants’ multiple dualities in terms of different
modes of agency associated with different normative orientations. This reveals 
consultants’ struggles to hold together these different types of agency in 
organisations facing uncertainty between them. Thus this paper offers an 
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integrative theorisation of consultants’ several dualities which helps explain their 
importance to consultants’ practice.
Consultants’ dual practices
The consultancy literature attempts to understand consultants’ work and explain 
their rapid rise. Key strands focus on consultants’ positions of knowledge, 
institutional influence, and persuasive capabilities (Ernst and Kieser, 2002). These 
insights into consultants’ informational, discursive and institutional advantages tell 
us something about consultants’ work and demonstrate how well-positioned 
consultants are to sell their services (Alvesson, 1993; Engwall, 2012). 
Yet we must complement them with more grounded understandings of how 
consultants enact such advantages in practice (Heusinkveld and Visscher, 2012). 
With consultants relying on repeat business (Wright, 2000), we cannot understand 
their continued popularity without explaining their work during client engagements. 
Nor can we understand consultants’ work itself, and how it shapes organisational 
life.
Consequently, a literature on consultants’ practices has developed. While such 
studies tend to focus on diverse specific elements of consultants’ work (Sturdy et 
al., 2006), we can discern a pattern across them. In three ways, this literature 
describes consultants and their practices in terms of dualities. They are both 
insiders and outsiders; personal and professional; experts and pragmatists: neither
one thing nor the other.
First, writers emphasise consultants’ position as neither within nor without 
organisational boundaries. Czarniawska and Mazza (2003) explore this liminal 
position from consultants’ own perspectives, emphasising its precarity. Sturdy et al
(2009) highlight the multiple types of boundaries within a client firm, and how 
consultants manage their positions relative to each. A picture emerges of 
cognisant actors straddling complex organisational boundaries.
Second, consultants inhabit both professional and personal realms. Historical and 
institutional writers frequently consider consultants’ rapid professionalisation and 
performance of expertise (McKenna, 2006; Saint-Martin, 1998) alongside their 
ability to form personal relationships with long-term clients (Wright, 2000). Sturdy 
et al (2006) highlight exactly this ability to straddle the personal and the 
professional. 
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Third, consultants are characterised as combining abstract expertise and local 
pragmatism. Accounts of them as knowledge actors frequently emphasise the 
former (Alvesson, 1993), while others emphasise their local, improvised work 
(Furusten, 2009). Others specifically highlight how consultants balance abstract 
expertise and standardised solutions with local knowledge and innovation 
(Fincham et al., 2008; Waisberg and Nelson, 2018; Wright et al., 2012). 
We suggest that these three dualities are consonant with one another. We can 
imagine a professional, external expert offering theoretically informed insights; or a
more situated, pragmatic consultant thrashing out local solutions over a drink. This
diptych piqued our curiosity: these transgressive, dual practices do not obviously 
fit the certainty-seeking corporate mould (Alvesson and Spicer, 2012). So why do 
consultants seeking corporate customers thus position themselves?
Writers have attempted to address this question with regard to the individual 
dualities consultants display. They characteristically cast consultants as engaging 
in uncertain, dual practices because organizations face uncertainties of their own 
(Berglund and Werr, 2000; Clark and Salaman, 1998; Schuyt and Schuijt, 1998; 
Sturdy, 1997). In this view, consultants must inhabit ambiguous, liminal spaces to 
resolve the problems residing there (Alvesson, 1993; Czarniawska and Mazza, 
2003). 
We think that such claims are true, but insufficiently specific. Certainly, consultants
address uncertainty, but, bluntly, who doesn’t? A substantive explanation must 
narrow down what type of uncertainty they address. Equally, contemporary 
consultancy is a recent phenomenon. Explaining its explosion as a practice means
explaining what changed to prompt this development. Given organizational 
uncertainty is perennial (Thévenot, 2001a), uncertainty itself cannot explain 
contemporary consultancy’s spread (Fincham, 2002).
Consequently, some writers attempt to specify the type of uncertainty consultants 
engage with. They highlighting globalisation’s turbulence (Fincham, 1999); or a 
predicted dynamic, fast-moving future (Bloomfield and Vurdubakis, 1994). Others 
suggest internal factors: increasingly differentiated departments whose lateral 
dependencies undercut traditional hierarchies (Ernst and Kieser, 2002); or 
decreasing internal ‘slack’ necessitating external resources for ‘flexibility’ 
(Furusten, 2009). 
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Each of these factors might create uncertainty, which consultants might help with. 
But not all consultancy problems are problems of globalisation, or departmental 
differentiation. These individual accounts cannot explain consultancy as a broad 
practice.
Yet together, these plural uncertainties hint at a broader explanation. They share a 
family resemblance, all arising as organizations work less through traditional 
Fordist hierarchies, and more through flexible networks, interorganisational 
dependencies and diversified organisational forms. Changes like these emerged in
the Mid-Twentieth Century, underpinned by a ‘new spirit of capitalism’ which 
prioritised flexible dynamism over hierarchical stability (Boltanski and Chiapello, 
2005). Challenges become decreasingly about optimising production chains, and 
increasingly about negotiating ever-more turbulent external environments 
alongside conflicting internal priorities.
We therefore suggest an explanation of consultants’ dual practices in terms of the 
uncertainty arising from this particular historical transformation. Encouragingly, it 
corresponds with the period during which contemporary consultancy rose as a 
practice. Pursuing this thought, we next review the rise of contemporary 
consultancy and this new logic of capitalist accumulation.
Consultancy and new capitalism
People have long charged for management advice. By the early Twentieth 
Century, companies provided such advice internationally (Kipping, 1999). 
However, these were different practitioners to today’s consultants. With roots in 
engineering and cost-accountancy (McKenna, 2006), they focused on ‘shop floor’ 
improvement through technical expertise (Kipping, 1999, p.215) in fields like 
‘scientific management’.
Consultants we would recognise today grew prominent from the Mid-Twentieth 
Century. These consultants augmented scientific management expertise with 
organizational development and human relations techniques. Characteristically, 
they migrated from America to Europe through multinational clients (Kipping, 
1999). They worked across a breadth of engagements comparable to today’s 
consultants, including strategy, human resources and management development 
(Wright, 2000). This contemporary consultancy grew prominent around the 1960s.
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This coincided with major changes in the conditions and organization of capitalist 
production and profit accumulation. This precipitated the so-called ‘post-Fordist 
economy’ (Jessop, 1993) or ‘knowledge economy’ (Powell and Snellman, 2004). 
With it came changes in organizational structures, and new ideas of good 
governance, rationality and efficiency. 
The Fordist-Taylorist ideal had been replaced by a new image of a flexible, lean, 
learning organization (Womack et al., 1990). Managerial discourse critiqued 
bureaucracy’s rigidity and lauded organic, flexible forms and processes (Du Gay, 
1994). ‘New management’ saw organizational boundaries become more porous as
firms emphasised their globalized ‘networks’; and decreasingly secure employees 
considered their contacts, ‘personal capital’ and consequent future employment 
prospects (Garsten, 1999; Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005).
These changes reshaped organization-employee relationships. ‘New’, post-
bureaucratic management techniques (Heckscher and Donnellon, 1994) shifted 
governance and coordination burdens from external controls and structures 
towards responsible, flexible, self-motivated employees. New management aimed 
to utilise employees’ ‘subjective potentials’: capacities not amenable to hierarchic 
control, like personal aspirations and views. Workers thus aqcuired greater scope, 
but also new pressures and insecurities (Lohr, 2003). 
This was not only a transformation of organizational practices, but of ideas about 
what good organization was. Where clear boundaries were once valued, they were
increasingly seen as impediments to the good organization’s flexible dynamism. 
Behaviour once viewed as appropriately professional became seen as stuffy and 
traditional. Such observed changes in management practice reflected a shift in 
ideals of what ‘good organizing’ involved.
Yet none of these movements was total. Even as spaces for the particular and 
subjective opened up, efforts to standardise and control continued (Hodgson, 
2004). Management based on solid, permanent contracts was not replaced, but 
complicated, by personal relationships’ growing importance (Thévenot, 2007). 
Shifts in ideals of the good organization were not total and unambiguous but 
partial and contextually dependent.
Consultants flourished under new management. While still selling technical 
expertise in fields like process optimization, they also offered to help managers 
‘engage’ with ‘empowered’, ‘enterprising’ and ‘innovative’ employees (Fernandez 
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and Moldogaziev, 2013; Garsten, 1999; Wright, 2000). They increasingly promoted
themselves as generalist professionals (McKenna, 2006): not mere carriers of 
professional knowledge, but high-capacity individuals. This generalism, combined 
with a newfound focus on strategy, enabled repeat engagements and extensive 
senior contact. Personal relationships with, and recommendations by, clients thus 
became increasingly important in selling consultants’ wares (Sturdy et al., 2006; 
Wright, 2000). Consultants thrived in, and through, new management.
New management’s uncertainties echo the dualities attributed to consultants. Both
relate ambivalently to organizational boundaries, ideals of professionalism and 
knowledge. Indeed, the narrative above suggests consultants’ observed dualities 
partly responded to ‘new’ organizations’ increasingly ambiguous practices and 
ideals. Under new management’s conflicting ideals, consultants had to be both 
professional experts and locally competent practitioners. This uncertainty grew 
during contemporary consultants’ popularisation in the 1960s, and remains 
profound today.
Consequently, this study explores the possibility that consultants’ dualities respond
to uncertainty between these different ideals and practices of organizing. This 
could explain contemporary consultancy’s dualities in a manner coherent with our 
understanding of the historic forces surrounding its popularisation. This will require
a pragmatist theorisation sensitive to this socio-economic change and the 
difference between styles of coordination and evaluation that followed it.
Regimes of engagement
Laurent Thévenot’s (2001b) ‘regimes of engagement’ fits this bill. ‘Regimes’ are 
different ways of engaging with the world: different modes of agency exhibited at 
different times. But they are not only ways of acting. Thévenot associates different 
modes of action with the pursuit of different types of goal (‘good’) and consequent 
different ways of seeing the world and receiving information. The regimes bring 
together accounts of people’s coordinative and evaluative practices.
The different regimes through which we act emerge from the different types of 
good we seek. For Thévenot, every action seeks some ‘good’ or other. Even if 
action is not instrumentally rational, it cannot be reduced to unconscious habit, 
since every engagement aims for a ‘good’, even if that ‘good’ is as simple as 
personal convenience. Nevertheless, one’s chosen good affects how one 
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approaches one’s environment: the ‘formatting of reality depends on a form of 
evaluation that singles out what is relevant’. Engagement with the world ‘depends 
on the way the agent captures the world within [that] format’ (Thévenot, 2002, 
p.54).
This ‘formatting’ is more than a question of perception and can entail materially 
adapting one’s environment. Aligned with broader development in French 
pragmatism (Brandl et al., 2014; Hennion and Muecke, 2016), ‘regimes of 
engagement’ describe a distributed, embedded, emergent agency reliant on both 
people and their socio-material environment being appropriately ‘prepared’. 
Regimes of engagement are thus more than forms of agency, but entail ‘properly 
disposed environment[s]’ (Thévenot, 2011, p.48).
These engagements thus intertwine the good someone seeks, the actions they 
undertake, and the response received from their environment. They therefore 
entail, but cannot be reduced to, the forms of knowledge (Waisberg and Nelson, 
2018), rhetoric (Berglund and Werr, 2000) and institutional contexts (Saint-Martin, 
1998) the literature highlights as important to consultants’ work.
The regimes help theorise the dualities the literature attributes to consultants. Two 
‘regimes of engagement’ are ‘planning’ and ‘familiarity’. They distinguish between 
rational-purposive plans based on conventional or standardized knowledge and 
‘agency of the most personal or intimate kind’ (Thévenot, 2001b, p.57). The 
distinction between planning and familiarity encompasses the distinctions between
our two pictures of the consultant: pragmatist and theoretician; local insider and 
outside expert; professional and confidant. 
Thévenot (2007, pp.418–419) also uses the distinction between planning and 
familiarity to theorise the rise of ‘new capitalism’. Fordist capitalism was 
characterised by strong reliance on planning, with its production-line logic, 
rationalist coordination and scientific-rational values. Post-Fordist accumulation 
introduced a focus on subjectivity, personal connections and interpersonal 
coordination: all elements of the familiar. New management thus saw new 
uncertainty between the two regimes.This uncertainty incorporates, but remains 
irreducible to, the uncertainties others suggest consultants address: the shift from 
hierarchy to lateral ties (Ernst and Kieser, 2002), or the tension between long-term 
plans and flexible arrangements built on personal ties (Furusten, 2009). 
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Thévenot’s ‘regimes of engagement’ theorise both consultants’ dualities and the 
‘new’ capitalism apparently associated with their rise.
We thus utilise the concepts of planning and familiarity in analysing our cases. 
Combined with two other regimes – ‘exploration’ (Auray, 2007) and ‘public 
justification’ (Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006), they provide a detailed repertoire of 
potential action, which has been useful to social researchers exploring relations 
between knowledge and practices (Howard-Grenville and Carlile, 2006), between 
information, practice and morality (Blok and Meilvang, 2015), between subject-
positions and participatory formats (Meriluoto, 2018) and standard-setting and 
testing (Ponte and Cheyns, 2013). Organisational scholars have used the 
framework to theorize bricolage (Duymedjian and Rüling, 2010). Because they 
capture the tensions the consultancy literature describes, this study focuses on 
planning and familiarity. Consequently, we now elaborate these regimes.
Planning
Consultants engage extensively in planning (Table 1). This regime approaches 
what is usually seen as standard intentional action: here, people are concerned 
with achieving a plan. A plan need not be elaborate: simply writing an e-mail can 
be a plan. To act according to intentional planning, one needs an environment 
equipped with functionally usable objects. They guarantee stability for planning 
and help me control, measure and assess my actions. In planning, ‘the 
environment is seized in a format of functional capacity’. Action depends on 
‘intentional-planning agency and instrumental-functional capacity’ (Thévenot, 
2001b). 
It is not only the material environment that must be functionally usable. ‘Planned’ 
coordination assumes that others are ‘also’ rational actors pursuing plans. 
Planning thus supports coordination with unknown others following the same rules 
and conventions (Thévenot, 1984), but not adjustment based on personal 
knowledge or intimacy. In organizations, plans often get ‘standardized’: converted 
into recurrent formats applicable across contexts. Standards can thus reduce 
phenomena to properties, oppressing other regimes of engagement (Thévenot, 
2009). (Standardized) planning affiliates with the strong, hierarchical structures 
and standard operating procedures of the classical Weberian bureaucracy or 
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Taylorist firm. Consultants adeptly navigate this regime when deploying standard 
management models or formal ‘transformation’ plans.
Table 1 - regimes of familiarity and planning (adapted from Thévenot, 2001b, p.15)
Familiarity Planning





Form of reality 
engaged
Usual and used surroundings 






Local, idiosyncratic perceptual clue Ordinary 
semantics of 
action
Form of agency 
construed




Familiarity is not based on the kind of intentionality characterising planned 
engagement. Nevertheless, it has its own reflexivity, which concepts like routine, 
habit or habitus neglect. The ‘good’ participants seek is ‘the kind of confidence that
lies in a familiarly accommodated environment’ (Thévenot, 2019, p.7). This they 
achieve through dynamic, non-teleological relationships with the human and non-
human entities of their familiar surroundings. In familiarity, my relationship with my 
surroundings relies on local, personal clues. What I am doing, how and why 
cannot easily be communicated to those not familiar with me. 
Familiarity matters not only to our most intimate relationships, but also in the 
workplace. This is particularly true in the flexible, project-based, ‘empowered’ 
organizations ‘new management’ promoted. Where coordination occurs less 
through standardization and formality, interpersonal familiarity and ‘networks’ 
become more important. Activities the literature attributes to consultants – like 
becoming embedded in a department, innovating and forming close, trusting client 
relationships – entail working adeptly through familiarity. 
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Consultants and the regimes of engagement
Thévenot thus resists reducing actors to one model of agency, like rational choice 
or habitus, instead analytically distinguishing conventional and standardized 
(planned) agency from more personal (familiar) forms. As argued above, this 
distinction helps conceptualise consultants’ multiple dualities alongside the 
uncertainties organizations experienced following ‘new management’. 
Consequently, this study investigates consultants’ practices and dualities through 
Thévenot’s framework. It asks, ‘how and why do management consultants 
navigate the coordinative and evaluative uncertainty between familiarity and 
planning?’.
Research design
We operationalised the regimes of engagement within a comparative case study 
on consultants’ grounded practices. Given our theoretical focus, we sought sites in
which any tensions between familiarity and planning would be highly ‘observable’ 
(Pettigrew, 1990): a UK web-development start-up called the ‘Good Tech 
Collective’ (‘GTC’) and a large hospital in England’s National Health Service. 
These had the added advantages of contrasting sizes, structures and sectors. Full 
accounts of the sites are provided below.
Each researcher gathered extensive observational, interview and documentary 
data from one site. Semi-structured interviews with consultants and others covered
a diversity of topics including organisations’ problems and consultants’ responses. 
Meeting observations aimed to capture not only discussions’ content, but also how
those discussions occurred, and the tools (e.g. documents) used. GTC’s 
comparatively more flexible governance arrangements also enabled a more 
flexible ethnographic approach including a workshop with participants discussing 
their organisations’ relationship to Thévenot’s model. This provided a rich data-set 
for our analyses (Table 2).
Table 2 - Data sources










Our overall analytic aim was to identify consultants’ working practices in relation to 
Thévenot’s model. However, it is difficult to simply directly observe practices. They 
entail diverse constituent elements (like actions, objects, situations, discourses) 
and interconnections therebetween (Reckwitz, 2002). Not all of this can be directly
observed, so attempts to directly induce practices risk jumping to conclusions. 
Accordingly, we followed a three-phase coding process designed to lead 
progressively from empirical observations to consultants’ practices.
After sifting data to exclude material unrelated to consultants, we began by 
zooming in on a quarter of the data from one site. This we coded inductively under
headings drawn from Thévenot’s framework: situations, objects, actions, 
discourses and ‘goods’. This provided us with a theoretically relevant account of 
our data’s content.
Second, we asked how these diverse elements combined into practices. Because 
the headings under which we had coded described distinct but related 
phenomena, passages were frequently coded under multiple codes. This 
simultaneous coding was used to indicate, for example, that a given ‘object’ was 
being used in a given ‘situation’. In this analytic phase, we interrogated these 
overlaps, seeking patterns in the combinations of codes used to describe the 
same passages. We zoomed in on the most common such overlaps to develop 
hypotheses about the practices in which the coded items were involved. We tested
these hypotheses against further data, affirming, adapting or discarding them as 
appropriate. Through this process, we developed a second-round coding structure 
describing practices themselves.
Finally, we coded the remaining data using the practice codes identified through 
our first and second phases. Where an extract corresponded to an existing code, 
we simply coded it therein. Where it did not, we coded it in the same inductive 
detail as the first tranche of data. This enabled the equally robust identification of 
new practices unidentified in our first and second phases. We thus retained our 
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detailed gaze upon our data while avoiding excessive detail during routine coding.
Figure 1 illustrates this analysis process.
Figure 1 - Analysis process
Findings
We present our findings through four narratives: describing consultants’ work at 
first the GTC, then second the hospital; then third and fourth detailing the 
problems they faced at each site. From each, we then abstract the practices we 
coded. These accounts develop a common theme across sites: notwithstanding 
differences in exactly what consultants did, their work involved alleviating 
coordinative and normative tensions by navigating between familiarity and 
planning.
Combining familiarity and planning 
Good Tech Collective 
GTC began when two friends formed a Limited Liability Partnership. During the 
first year, they recruited three new partners from their extended friendship circles. 
The organisation’s size and the familiarity between members enabled coordination
based on friendship, respect, and trust, with few formal structures and no formal 
hierarchies. Their ‘office’ was one partner’s kitchen. The founding partners 
considered each other comparably competent and with equal responsibility. 
Decisions were informal and ideally consensual. 
GTC’s aversion to traditional bureaucracy was partly fuelled by members’ prior 
experiences. Three founding partners used to work in a large corporate 
bureaucracy. Others also described feeling alienated and depressed in prior jobs 
in more conventional organisations:
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There was no chance you could get involved in anything 
else. It was like: ‘This is your role. This is what you're here to 
do. Come here. Go home. That's it.’ (Member 1)
I found myself walking into a future that was being 
determined because I wasn't making decisions for myself. 
(Member 2)
Both accounts express unease about working environments without space for 
self-expression and autonomy. There, planning seems to shape working life so 
thoroughly that the future seems emptied of meaning, and bureaucratic structures
crowd out personal connections with colleagues. Conversely, one GTC member 
valued their relationship to another member and GTC itself:
C had started like two weeks before I did. And it was really, 
really good because like we work in very similar ways and we
both love GTC in equal measure, C and I, I think. So we 
have this like camaraderie from the start I had it with 
everyone but I had the camaraderie with C, which I still have.
And we were kind of just going on this crazy like adventure 
together. Because it was crazy and it was an adventure. It 
still is and then I kind of I just managed to pick stuff up quite 
quickly as well because I was just so into it. I've been so sad 
in my previous job. And then this was just a complete 
escape.
As a collective based on intimate, personal relations, caring for one another and 
preferring consensus to hierarchy was central to GTC’s operations. However, as 
GTC grew and hired staff of increasingly varied experience, making everyone a 
partner became no longer viable. With a larger organisation, more predictability 
was desired. One member described ‘trying to move towards a more systematized
company; there shouldn't be any decisions, because there are already rules in 
place for anything’. As GTC grew, its members increasingly desired not only its 
basis on intimate, personal relations, but the stability of ‘systematized’ 
organisation.
GTC thus faced a tension between developing structures that provided clarity and 
predictability and avoiding the overstructured, alienating bureaucratic workplaces 
characterising members’ prior experiences. Consequently, GTC sought structures 
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which could enable growth while preserving its familiar, non-hierarchical logic. This
was deeply challenging. One member described feeling ‘exhausted by constantly 
trying to invent this new honest, just company thing’. ‘Rather than running a 
business it had felt like inventing the concept of a business’, they explained. 
Significant uncertainty remained about how – and whether – one could construct 
formal structures while protecting the familiar relations underpinning GTC’s 
coordination and governance.
When research began, they had  transitioned into being a co-op working through 
‘Sociocratic’ practices. This entailed devolving decisions to themed, semi-
autonomous working groups (‘circles’), which emphasised hearing all voices 
before consent-based decisions. To support this transition, GTC had hired a 
consultant. Though not a member, they worked regularly with GTC, chaired the HR
circle and organized business, organizational and personal development training. 
While GTC had been working with the ‘circles’ structure for almost two years, a 
lingering uncertainty remained about the type of organization they should be: how 
should the less formal, sometimes intimate coordination on which they were 
founded combine with the planning that could offer a growing organisation clarity 
and predictability? It was this uncertainty the consultant was to address.
Conventional organisations use hierarchical management to direct people’s 
activities. Thus a core challenge for the consultant was how to provide 
coordination while helping GTC remain ‘without bosses’. The consultant 
addressed this through ‘the leader’, a cognitive-normative figure that narrates how 
people can competently plan, while empathizing with others’ particular situations 
and adjusting plans to unpredictable idiosyncrasies. The consultant discursively 
created and shaped this version of leadership through training and documentation.
GTC Wiki’s ‘Leading and Managing’ entry reads:
Everybody at GTC leads and manages. That means 
everyone takes responsibility for making sure they 
understand – and help generate – the direction in which we 
are heading. Everyone also helps to create that future by 
proactively taking action that they believe will move 
themselves and the cooperative forward positively.
Leading, the entry continues, is about ‘being yourself’; ‘there’s no right way to be’. 
It is not about ‘delegation, controlling or dominating other people’ but ‘engaging 
195
with and supporting other people as they grow and develop, when they want to, 
and at their own pace’. The leader understands how to further the organization in 
the direction of their plans, while simultaneously aware of and able to utilize her 
and her colleagues’ particular weaknesses and strengths. They are always 
ultimately responsible towards the collective. Through this ‘leader’ identity, the 
consultant narrows regime differences between planning and familiarity, holding 
them together within individual ‘leaders’.
Another element of familiar organisation that GTC wanted to preserve was the 
informal support provided through mentor-like relationships. This was particularly 
important for those entering the organisation. In their beginnings, when recruitment
was based on  members’ friendship circles, these relationships arose 
spontaneously. As it grew, GTC could no longer rely on this. Yet they eschewed 
the superior-subordinate relations traditional firms used to provide support.
Consequently, the Consultant and HR Circle institutionalised ‘mentoring’, making 
‘mentor’ a specified role ‘supporting someone else who is going through a 
particular transition’ (Wiki) and billable as work time. This helped value and 
guaranteed supportive relationships between experienced members and 
newcomers, without necessitating overarching hierarchies. It did so by balancing 
familiarity and planning, introducing selected elements of planning to a context 
from which it was more-or-less absent. But it did so to preserve elements of its 
erstwhile familiarity.
GTC wanted to preserve this familiarity as it grew. Some efforts to balance 
familiarity and planning thus focused on making styles of coordination enduring 
through mediating forms: objects that preserved compromises between the two. 
These partially standardised coordination while maintaining space for 
particularities, thus projecting elements of familiar coordination into the future and 
across GTC’s growing scale. For instance, the consultant introduced a template for
‘circle’ meetings. This same template governed every circle, structurally 
standardising their functions. All meetings lasted an hour, including a check-in, 
review of the last meeting’s actions, points from the standing agenda and other 
items. Decisions and actions were recorded separately against each discussion 
point, and any omitted items ‘parked’ for the next meeting. The template and 
limited timeframe partially standardized meetings. Simultaneously, it entrenched 
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elements of familiar engagement, from the ‘check-in’ to circles’ autonomy over 
topics discussed.
Hospital
We found similar patterns at our second site. Like many care organisations, the 
Hospital was both a complex of plans and hierarchies, and a site of familiar care 
(Thévenot, 2009, pp.807-08). Like many English hospitals, it faced significant 
resource shortages, which it attempted to address through formal savings plans. 
Senior managers had called in consultants in response to difficulties making these 
plans realities. 
The underlying reasons for this first became clear when we observed a series of 
similarly formatted meetings to review each division’s spending.
Managers were discussing a division’s spending, using 
standard budgetary information. A central manager asked 
why certain wards had recently begun to overspend their 
budgets. It ‘could just be some individual patient we’ve done 
something weird with’ replied a divisional manager. The 
discussion moved on. (Fieldnotes paraphrase)
Central managers saw the budgetary plans asked about above as vital to the 
hospital: their fulfilment was what made next year ‘do-able’. Yet this standardized 
planning injunction meets a response based on a particular patient’s esoteric 
requirements. Their care required ‘something weird’ which formal budgets could 
not foresee. The divisional manager’s language reinforces this deviation from the 
conventional. ‘Something weird’ is nonspecific, indexically denoting unknown steps
to satisfy unconventional needs. Thévenot (2009) characterises caregiving as 
entailing familiar concern for patients’ ease. Here, appealing to familiar concerns 
for particularity sidesteps injunctions to follow budgetary plans.
This duality typified a common tension in the hospital: between highly 
standardised financial planning, and more clinical coordination which combined 
this familiarity with less standardised plans. The former was particularly prominent 
at the hospital’s corporate centre, where managers experienced regulatory 
pressure to guarantee financial performance. The latter became more evident the 
closer one got to service delivery. Staff in a clinical service ‘division’ displayed 
concern for a waiting room becoming ‘jumpy’ or about the ‘spate of quite nasty 
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incidents that are scaring our staff to the point they don’t want to come to work’. 
Such concerns for staff ease or a space’s ‘feel’ exemplifies this familiarity.
This did not mean that divisions neglected central savings requirements. But their 
approach to them combined (unstandardized) plans with familiar concerns, jarring 
with the centre’s standardized planning. One divisional manager cast savings not 
as goods to pursue, but unavoidable boundary conditions within which to pursue 
one’s true goals.
So, none of the efficiencies – none of the schemes to 
generate efficiencies, I would say, were brilliant. They’re just 
some – we get down to what is palatable and what’s not. 
(Interview, divisional manager)
This account certainly evidences (unstandardised) planning. ‘Schemes…to 
generate efficiencies’ describes efforts to fulfil financial plans. Yet these are not 
pursued as goods in themselves, but acknowledged as obligations to be selected 
based on which is ‘palatable’, or least discomfiting. Even as divisions respond to 
central savings plans, decisions based on familiar ease are not far away. This 
difference in how work was coordinated and evaluated precipitated the planned-
familiar uncertainty exemplified at the start of this subsection.
Consequently, central managers had commissioned external consultants to 
address this tension, and ensure financial plans were realised. A group of external 
and internal consultants created and staffed the ‘Projects Office’. It sat outside the 
divisions, structuring their work and providing related advice to the centre. From 
this office, consultants worked to balance divisions’ various modes of coordination 
to better fit central planning. They problematised the organisation’s diversity of 
ways of ‘doing change’ as a chaotic set of particular endeavours:
So there’s lots of people fixing lots of things all at the same 
time, but the impact of the fix, or their change, isn’t felt 
outside their team because you’re just absorbed within the 
walls of their own team…So if we can have a standard way 
of, of managing, delivering, reporting and then realising 
benefit from change, then all those small changes ought to 
start reflecting in a much bigger improvement package. 
(Interview, consultant)
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For this consultant, the problem with local ‘fix[es]’ was that they were unassociated
with wider planning. Only alignment with ‘a standard way’ of working can ‘realis[e]’ 
them as something transcending their team’s ‘walls’. Unstandardised particular 
efforts cannot aggregate to a general benefit.
Consultants thus deployed a complex documentary infrastructure to integrate 
divisional efforts into a standardised framework. This enabled upwards reporting 
on aggregates of schemes categorised by – say – division or ‘risk’ level. The right-
hand half of Figure 3 represents these data and reporting processes. A Cost 
Improvement Plan (‘CIP’) Tracker database included one row per ‘saving’, 
recording standardised information about each, enabling aggregation and 
reporting. This integrated divisional activity into a standardised planning structure. 
As consultants saw it, they were balancing familiarity and planning by harmonising
divisional coordinative styles with the centre’s standardised plans. 
Figure 2 - Hospital documentary infrastructure
Consultants could have constructed these data simply by demanding those 
managing savings schemes populate their CIP Tracker row. Instead, they asked 
each scheme to fill out largely free-text ‘Outline Change Plans’ (OCPs). These 
were more standardised than characteristic of divisional work, but less than central
reporting. From these, consultants abstracted the CIP Tracker’s standardised 
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information. This created a gentler, stepwise movement from divisions’ familiarity 
and unstandardised plans to the centre’s standardised planning. This gentler 
movement helped narrow apparent gaps between regimes.
Consultants not only monitored savings schemes but also helped evaluate 
potential projects. Potential schemes were supposed to offer a four-to-one ‘return 
on investment’ (RoI): an evaluative criterion tailored to ensure financial plan 
fulfilment. Initiatives aiming to simply improve bedside quality struggled to meet 
this standard, so consultants could have rejected them out-of-hand. They did not:
There are real examples of [such initiatives] and quite often, 
it’s because you can’t realise the money. So – a lot of Quality
Programmes that improve quality at the bedside and hence 
release clinical time to go and do more stuff or go and do 
other stuff; so you almost end up with a notional four-to-one 
argument. (Interview, consultant)
 ‘Programmes’ to ‘improve quality at the bedside’ deploy elements of planning 
(‘programmes’) to pursue patient ease in a domain (‘the bedside’) which is both 
intimate and public. Initiatives based there may poorly comply with a standardised 
four-to-one RoI criterion. Yet consultants reframed this criterion to suit such 
schemes through ‘a notional four-to-one argument’. This arrangement is 
precarious: ‘notional’ RoI no longer measures real money; surrounding language is
hedged (‘almost’) and indexical (‘more stuff…other stuff’) emphasising both this 
composition’s uncertainty and familiar ingredients. But it limits the disputes 
consultants could have caused by rejecting quality improvement initiatives 
germane to a hospital. The consultant thus narrows regime differences, using this 
adapted, ‘notional’ 4:1 criterion to minimise the tension between familiarity and 
planning. Like the structure of documents through which divisional familiarity 
becomes central planning, this modified criterion becomes a coordinative device 
legible in terms of either planning or familiarity: it becomes a mediating form.
While their work differed, both sites’ consultants strived to hold together planning 
and familiarity in three ways. They balanced regimes: where they felt either 
planning or familiarity contextually overabundant, they introduced more of the 
other. They narrowed regime differences, minimising the tension between them. 
And they supported these efforts by creating and deploying mediating forms: 
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objects legible in terms of both planning and familiarity. Seen through Thévenot’s 
lens, these practices attempt to hold together these two regimes of engagement.
Resistance
Yet Thévenot (2001b) highlights also that our engagements face a ‘resistant…
world’. As observed above, adapting the modes of coordination and evaluation 
used in environments meant introducing new mediating forms to them. As objects 
managing the uncertainty between regimes of engagement, they were ripe for 
critique.
Good Tech Collective
Among the GTC consultant’s core functions was chairing the HR Circle. Through 
the Circle’s training, policies, guidelines, mediation and conflict resolution, this role 
spanned the consultant’s efforts to navigate familiarity and planning. Circle 
members understood the importance of familiar coordination. They emphasised 
the importance of direct personal interaction, and would seek one-to-one 
conversations to address emergent conflicts.
Not wholly part of the collective, the consultant was poorly suited to address 
(inter)personal problems whose resolution required existing intimate relationships. 
Other Circle members worked at the office daily, naturally developing closer 
relationships with co-workers. They could thus address the ‘people’ problems the 
Circle focused on without its official involvement. This imbalance in capacities 
between the consultant and other members precipitated a critical moment. In the 
consultant’s absence, Anna, a circle member, voiced discomfort with their 
approach: 
We do things, but I don’t think they have priority. We create a
lot of policies and I am not sure if this should be our job, to 
create a policy on how to create a proposal. And maybe it’s 
just because that does not interest me or because I have too 
much on, but I think the HR Circle should be about ensuring 
people feel happy.  (Fieldnotes, paraphrase.)
This statement casts planning (‘policies’) and familiarity (‘ensuring people feel 
happy’) into conflict. Anna devalues policymaking in favour of personal 
engagement directed towards members’ ease. She then discussed the specific 
nature of the Circle’s problems with another member. The problems the HR Circle 
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addressed requires a more practical and active approach, they suggested; 
whereas the consultant currently emphasized policies and documentation. 
Consequently, Circle minutes recorded the following proposal: 
We should only have HR Circle meetings when a people 
issue arises and we need to discuss/sort it out. The HR 
Circle will continue, taking on a more active role rather than 
focusing on documentation. Clarifying Questions: This will 
make us a more reactive body rather than a proactive body. 
Is this right? Shall we try it and see what happens?. 
The clarifying question concluding the proposal highlights a trade-off  between 
longer-term planning and more ‘reactive’, contingent familiarity. While the 
consultant worked to link planning and familiarity, others surfaced the tension 
between them.
Simultaneously, they criticised a perceived overabundance of new policies and 
procedures. Precisely because GTC was largely characterised by familiarity, the 
consultant was rapidly introducing new policies. These mediating forms were 
intended to clarify how work was to be coordinated. Yet even HR Circle members 
– involved in introducing these forms – found their proliferation overwhelming. 
While standards and mediating forms are intended to clarify and solidify how 
coordination should proceed, introducing many at once left each one little time to 
become established. This introduced a new quality of uncertainty: it was hard to 
know to which standard to turn, or why so many had to be devised. This 
contributed to Circle members’ critique of the consultants’ work and worry that 
coordination had turned too much towards the planned.
Hospital
GTC’s consultant was not alone in facing criticism. As noted above, Hospital 
consultants attempted to monitor and standardise initiatives previously pursued 
within divisions. Unsurprisingly, some saw this as intrusive or unhelpful. 
Consequently, consultants found gathering timely, accurate information 
challenging. The undertaking’s mammoth scale did not help: they attempted to 
aggregate and standardise some 150 individual initiatives. 
These dangers were demonstrated when consultants discovered a major ‘gap’ in 
their plans. Around a third of the value of one division’s CIPs were found not to be 
backed by robust plans. This left a gap in the Hospital’s budget, based on which 
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divisions had thus far coordinated their work. Consultants faced an imperative to 
help construct a new budgetary compromise so coordination could continue. They 
presented their proposal to central managers:
A consultant projected onto a screen proposed revised CIP 
targets. They uneasily explained that this was an unpolished 
Excel sheet designed to engage central managers in 
planning. While unaccompanied by Finance staff, they 
repeatedly emphasised the figures had been devised with 
Finance. Extensive questions followed. One manager asked 
the scale of the savings they were seeking. The consultant 
pointed to a figure, emphasising that the spreadsheet was a 
working document.
Eventually, a manager said they did not recognise the figures
provided for their division: it looked like the ‘process had 
gone wrong’. They described the best-case scenario which 
would not happen ‘in anyone’s dreams’. Another manager 
said that the comment about ‘in anyone’s dreams’ was 
important: they needed realism, not ‘paper’ exercises. 
Another described themselves as ‘immensely irritated’: why 
were Finance absent? They were not even getting to reality 
when discussing a division whose meeting ‘you sat in on, 
[consultant]’. If they ‘can’t do that correctly’, the manager 
continued, they had ‘no faith’ in the other figures. They ended
the meeting early.
For consultants, this should have been a moment where new targets were agreed 
to monitor and evaluate divisional work. Instead, they found their ability to reflect 
divisional reality critiqued and their figures labelled ‘paper’ exercises: mere plans. 
They could not become real ‘in anyone’s dreams’ – a phrase invoking intimate, gut
judgements about plausibility. Consultants’ planning and divisional intuitions were 
at odds, as managers surfaced the tension between familiarity and planning. 
Central managers lost ‘faith’ in consultants’ ability to hold these regimes of 
engagement together. That this precipitated the meeting’s early close emphasises 
its importance to coordination.
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Such critiques were exacerbated by the relatively unestablished nature of the 
mediating forms they targeted. Here, pressure is placed on a budgetary object 
formatted as a ‘working’ Excel sheet. Unlike more polished documents, such 
devices seem open to continual changes. This is emphasised by the consultant’s 
apologetic emphasis that this was a working document and their apparent 
uneasiness about it. Particularly without finance managers’ authorising presence, 
this leaves this object unestablished as a form.
The forms consultants introduced faced frequent criticism and difficulties capturing 
the reality they attempted to reflect. Characteristically, consultants responded to 
this by tweaking those objects. While designed to ensure they were better 
accepted, this in fact had the consequence of never allowing any one version of a 
form to become established. Each new document added to an already complex 
documentary landscape: consultants internally voiced concerns this was 
overwhelming for staff.
For instance, as external financial circumstances changed, central managers 
decided that consultants’ use of CIPs to measure financial progress was no longer 
sufficient. Consultants responded with several new objects designed to measure, 
report and evaluate divisions’ financial success, focusing on performance relative 
to budget. But these found mixed success:
At a meeting held to review one division’s financial 
performance against these new measures, the conversation 
turned to one service they highlighted as overspending. 
Central managers were pessimistic, noting that if it couldn’t 
cover its costs, they would have to serve notice on it. ‘Hard 
choices’ would have to be made. But a divisional manager 
objected: the service did cover its costs. It was simply that 
they didn’t reach their target profit. Central managers 
indicated concern for next year, but the conversation moved 
on. (Fieldnotes, paraphrase)
Two things happen here. First, central managers appear to misunderstand what 
the new measures indicate, assuming that negative figures suggested a service 
did not cover its costs. Second, a divisional manager juxtaposes this new measure
(performance relative to budget) with another criterion (profit/loss), successfully 
avoiding negative evaluation. Normally, when a measure is established within an 
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organisation, this would not be so effective: the measure would still seem like the 
‘right’ way to evaluate progress. But here, the new measures seemed insufficiently
established to be thus taken-for-granted. The Hospital’s regular promulgation and 
amendment of measurement objects created an ever-more densely populated 
documentary landscape in which there was little time for new objects to be 
understood or established as measures.
Discussion
The foregoing sections describe consultants’ work in our two sites. In so doing, 
they highlight the five practices we coded within this study. We found three 
practices core to consultants’ daily work: balancing regimes of engagement; 
narrowing the differences therebetween; and creating mediating forms to manage 
those differences. These met with two forms of resistance: first, as named in the 
foregoing text, opponents sometimes surfaced planned-familiar tensions once 
again. Second, consultants in both sites saw their rapid promulgation of mediating 
forms lead to those objects appearing not as static, stable forms, but as a moving, 
unstable sequence. By analogy to the device designed to produce such illusions, 
we call this final practice zoetroping. Table 3 catalogues these practices.
Table 3 - Practices
Description GTC example Hospital example
Balancing planning 
and familiarity
Introducing more of one 
regime of engagement, 
when perceiving the 









Mitigating the distance 
and tension between 
planning and familiarity
‘The leader’ Gradual, stepwise 
movement from 






Constructing and using 
objects that mediate 
‘Circle‘ meetings ‘Notional’ four-to-one 
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Denying the link 
between familiar and 
planned engagement in 
consultants’ practices
‘We create a lot of 
policies […] but I think 
the HR circle should be 














It was striking to find similar practices in such ostensibly different organizations. 
GTC was a young, flexible cooperative employing under twenty people; the 
hospital a long-established bureaucracy employing thousands. Yet combining 
traditional bureaucratic organisation with a Post-Fordist interpersonal style, both 
were seized by planned-familiar uncertainty. Not only were they uncertain how to 
arrange their affairs in practice, they were also uncertain about what being a good 
organisation entailed. This difficulty – characteristic of modern organisations – 
explained consultants’ presence and practices.
It also explained the relationships we found between these practices (see Figure 
3). In both sites, consultants began by attempting to reduce this tension between 
planning and familiarity (balancing, narrowing). Mediating forms were important to 
achieving this because they made sense in terms of both familiarity and planning. 
Our organisations experienced tension between these two regimes of 
engagement, leaving staff unsure what type of environment they were 
encountering – how to ‘grasp reality’. Legible in terms of both familiarity and 
planning, mediating forms seemed to grasp reality in a way which brought these 
regimes of engagement together.
However, mediating forms could also become focuses of resistance to consultants’
practices. This could come from other actors, in the form of surfacing, which 
deployed mediating forms to highlight consultants’ better correspondence to one 
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regime of engagement than the other. Equally, consultants’ reliance on these 
forms could produce a resistance of its own, when zoetroping made their grip on 
reality seem transient. Thus consultants’ efforts to mediate between regimes of 
engagement created (only) temporary respite from the uncertainty these sites 
experienced.
Figure 3 - Consultancy practices
The differences between the sites also had their roots in the types of uncertainty 
they faced. While both faced uncertainty between regimes of engagement, this 
was differently articulated in each site. Wishing to deploy planning to protect its 
familiar core, GTC was uncertain how to do so. The Hospital’s uncertainty sprang 
instead from the tension between central plans and divisional particularity. 
Consequently, these common practices were differently articulated in each 
organization. For instance, GTC’s balancing aimed at introducing new elements of 
planning across the organization; the hospital’s version focused on extending 
existing planning into new domains. Thus the hospital’s mediating forms took the 
shape of chains of documents reaching from central planning to divisional 
particularity; while GTC applied single forms throughout organizational domains. It 
was GTC’s efforts to rapidly spread these forms across a relatively unplanned 
organization that precipitated zoetroping and surfacing: in the hospital, the routine 
disputation and replacement of these forms had a comparable effect. 
Thévenot’s approach is central to enabling these insights. His emphasis on 
uncertainty between regimes of engagement is core to our reading of consultants’ 
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practices. Our identification of the role of mediating forms owes much to his 
highlighting of measurement devices. Without his emphasis on the ‘resistant…
world’ our interventions encounter (Thévenot, 2001b), we might have restricted our
gaze to consultants’ own actions, missing the roles of surfacing and zoetroping. 
Wide-ranging as Thévenot’s role in this reading is, we now wish to emphasise 
three features thereof, and how they relate to the consultancy literature.
(1) Duality, uncertainty and contemporary consultancy practice
This paper began in response to our puzzlement at the literature’s representation 
of consultants’ practices. We read repeatedly that consultants were bound up in 
one or other duality. They were both theorizing expert and pragmatist (Berglund 
and Werr, 2000; Wright et al., 2012); bearer of outside expertise, and inside 
knowledge (Sturdy et al., 2009); professional and confidant (Sturdy et al., 2006). 
We were left wondering: particularly given they seek employment from ostensibly 
certainty-seeking firms, why do consultants engage in such practices? 
We began our answer by refining this somewhat fragmented account of 
consultants’ dualities. We found in Thévenot’s differentiation between planning and
familiarity a distinction which encompassed the dualities noted elsewhere without 
being reducible to them. This proved both a parsimonious and powerful 
theorisation of these dualities. It helped identify the five practices described here, 
and how consultants navigate their multiple dualities.
Yet the question remained: why do consultants seeking corporate custom position 
themselves this way? The answer here lay in the uncertainties from which those 
customers suffered. Uncertainty has long been suggested as a reason companies 
hire consultants. But the types of uncertainty identified elsewhere – like 
globalization and increasing departmental independence – each explain only a 
subset of consultancy engagements (Fincham, 1999). The distinction between 
familiarity and planning integrates these diverse uncertainties into a single 
framework irreducible to any one of them. The difference between familiarity and 
planning entails the difference between command-and-control structures and 
lateral coordination (Ernst and Kieser, 2002), and between stability and turbulence 
(Fincham, 1999). But it is more than either of those: it is the tension between 
multiple modes of coordination, and multiple ways of evaluating organisations. 
Practices of balancing, narrowing and deploying mediating forms are oriented 
towards alleviating this tension. It is thus that these dual, transgressive practices 
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enable consultants to position themselves as saleable to firms suffering from such 
uncertainty. Of course, this implies nothing about whether they actually benefit 
those firms. Indeed, surfacing and zoetroping provide reasons to suspect that any 
relief from planned-familiar tensions is probably temporary. But it does answer the 
question with which we began: it is to engage with firms’ uncertainties between 
familiarity and planning that consultants engage in such dual practices.
This answer relies on a recognition that consultants’ duality is not simply a 
question of their position relative to organisational boundaries; personal-
professional divides; or forms of knowledge. It extends to the nature of their 
agency. They operate both as the situated ‘improviser’ (Furusten, 2009) and the 
removed, rational planner. Some note similar dualities, but brand them 
‘paradoxical’ (e.g. Berglund and Werr, 2000; Whittle, 2006). Others have avoided 
such ‘paradox’ by attributing planned and improvisatory forms of agency to 
different grades, divisions, or individuals (Canato and Giangreco, 2011; Waisberg 
and Nelson, 2018). But there is nothing ‘contradictory’ or problematic about one 
individual engaging different types of agency (Thévenot, 2007). Only by allowing 
for this can this study identify the tensions and resistance consultants experience, 
and the uncertainties they negotiate.
(2) A historically cogent account
Contemporary consultancy, with its emphasis on corporate strategy and change 
management, is a historically specific phenomenon. Yet many accounts of 
consultants’ practices are oddly ahistorical. The factors to which they attribute the 
spread of contemporary consultancy practices – like their clients’ susceptibility to 
discursive persuasion – were just as present long before its rise (Alvesson, 1993; 
Berglund and Werr, 2000). In answering the question ‘why is this style of 
consultancy now so widespread?’, they only raise the question ‘why was it not so 
widespread then?’. This limitation pertains also to those who highlight an 
undifferentiated concept of ‘uncertainty’ to explain the organisational problems 
consultants address (Berglund and Werr, 2000; Clark and Salaman, 1998; Schuyt 
and Schuijt, 1998; Sturdy, 1997): given uncertainty is ubiquitous in organisations, 
why are contemporary consultants a relatively recent phenomenon (Thévenot, 
2001a)?
It is therefore important that our account of consultants’ practices not only explains
consultants’ engagement in them, but does so in a historically cogent way. If these 
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practices are popular because they address planned-familiar uncertainty, their 
spread should coincide with that uncertainty’s development. Sure enough, we see 
contemporary consultancy rise around the 1960s (Kipping, 1999; Wright, 2000), 
when ‘new management’ became prominent (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005; 
Jessop, 1993). As Fordist hierarchies (planning) were complemented by more 
interpersonal ways of organising (familiarity), organisations faced increasing 
uncertainty about what constituted ‘good organising’. Consultancy rose alongside 
the uncertainty between familiarity and planning (Thévenot, 2007).
This spread was not uniform. While consultancy became prominent in private 
sector bodies during the 1960s, the public sector did not immediately follow suit. 
Instead, it was during the new public management reforms of the 1980s that 
Governments increasingly drew on consultancy (Saint-Martin, 1998). These were 
the very reforms which brought ‘new management’ into the public sector. In private
and public sectors alike, consultancy rose alongside new management – and 
planned-familiar uncertainty. Thus our account of consultants as addressing this 
uncertainty is not only validated by observed practices, it is also historically 
cogent.
(3) Identifying consultants’ practices, and the resistance they face
Others have previously highlighted practices in which consultants are involved. 
These can be revealing to those interested in how consultants operationalise 
knowledge, or persuasively ‘perform’ as skilled professionals. Yet they tend to 
emphasise one or other particular element of consultants’ work (e.g. Sturdy et al., 
2006; Whittle, 2006), rather than attempting a broad account of the practices of 
consultants and those around them. Consequently, they provide limited pictures of 
consultancy engagements, which do not capture the tensions so palpable in this 
study’s empirical material. The practices and interrelations illustrated in Figure 3 
capture this dynamic.
This study thus complements existing insights into specific areas of consultancy 
work with a broader model of their practice. Most importantly, this model 
incorporates an understanding of the resistance consultants’ activities receive. In 
particular, it highlights the mediating forms consultants deploy as likely sites of this
resistance. It thus offers predictive power not offered elsewhere in the literature on 
consultants’ practices: with a knowledge of a consultancy engagement and the 
210
mediating forms deployed therein, we can identify the likely nature and sites of this
resistance.
Among such phenomena, we highlight zoetroping, a form of resistance not 
previously remarked upon. It involves a rapid proliferation of forms precipitating 
awareness of those forms’ transience and artifice: people see both a static, taken-
for-granted form and an unstable succession of ways people choose to measure 
success. Thévenot theorises these different orientations to forms as having one’s 
eyes respectively ‘closed’ and ‘open’ to their arbitrariness. 
Thévenot describes ‘blinking’, a state in which cognisant actors – particularly those
involved in constructing forms – adopt both perspectives at once. But in 
zoetroping, the effect is not one of simultaneously, crisply viewing both sides of a 
form. In zoetroping, one blurrily apprehends objects one treats as real rushing 
past, creating the impression of instability. This phenomenon is not observed 
elsewhere in the regimes of engagement literature, but relates closely to its 
preoccupation with forms and their associated social dynamics.
Conclusions
This paper was motivated by an attempt to explain consultants’ engagement in a 
variety of dual, uncertain practices (Czarniawska and Mazza, 2003). Given their 
reliance on repeat business from certainty-seeking firms, their positioning 
themselves in this uncertain manner was not immediately intuitive. Theorising 
organisations’ uncertainties and consultants’ dualities through Thévenot’s regimes 
of engagement revealed both to relate to the tension between familiarity and 
planning. Analysing consultants’ practices from this perspective highlights their 
dual practices as means of engaging with organisations’ uncertainties by holding 
together these regimes of engagement.
This answer progresses research on consultancy practices in three ways. First, it 
theorises how these practices’ duality relates to the organisational problems 
consultants engage with. Second, it links observational evidence of these 
practices to an historically cogent explanation of their popularity. Third, it models 
these practices and the resistance they face, helping us anticipate the likely site 
and nature of this resistance in consultancy engagements. 
Each of these advances is made possible by an underlying contribution: the use of
Thévenot to more parsimoniously and integratively account for consultants’ various
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dualities and organisations’ historically developing uncertainties. This parsimony 
and integration enables studies like this one to bring together phenomena 
previously considered distinctly. Through Thévenot’s framework, we can relate 
consultants’ various dualities to organisations’ uncertainties between planning and 
familiarity. Most importantly, Thévenot marks this uncertainty as historically 
specific, enabling us also to draw together the otherwise distinct literatures on 
consultants’ practices and their historical rise. This takes us a small step closer to 
an integrative theory of management consultancy as a phenomenon.
This paper uses Thévenot’s theory to advance consultancy research. But 
zoetroping is a phenomenon of wider interest to regimes of engagement scholars. 
It identifies a superfluity of new forms as a possible reason why actors may find 
their eyes at once open and closed to forms’ arbitrariness. In a world increasingly 
replete with new forms (Breviglieri, 2018), this phenomenon seems unlikely to be 
limited to consultancy engagements.
These developments suggest further research. First, we note that consultants 
seem to have a talent for moving between regimes. Yet we do not yet know why, or
what other occupational groups may be similar. Further research could replicate 
our use of Thévenot’s lens to consider other professions and roles, particularly 
those characteristic of Post-Fordist capitalism, like freelancers and management 
gurus. Second, this paper does not attempt to comprehensively analyse 
consultancy’s history. Therefore, while our account is compatible with this history, it
can only point to one potential reason for consultants’ rise. Further work could 
consider consultants’ practices alongside other identified reasons for their 
popularity, like their ability to plan, organize and legitimize the outsourcing of 
labour (Hyman, 2018). Finally, while we identify zoetroping, we know neither the 
breadth of environments in which it arises, nor its wider consequences. Studies of 
environments in which many new forms are often created, like standards 
agencies, or regulatory bodies, could interrogate this further.
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Appendix VI: Collective firms between collective and company - Summary
This thesis wants to understand how alternative firms deal with the complexity of 
balancing different rationalities in their intraorganizational coordination, in the 
absence of formal hierarchies. In a comparative case study of three small, 
democratically governed collective firms, the relationship between coordination 
and morality is analyzed. The majority of research on collective firms focuses on 
democratic governance structures, which risks to underestimate the importance of 
coordination that is based on intimate knowledge and personal relations. This is 
especially important to understand collective firms, which are dependent on lateral 
accountability and cooperation between their members. Consequently, this work is 
informed by the work of Laurent Thévenot which allows to understand coordination
based on different levels of generalization. 
The results of this thesis contribute to three different areas of research:
First, contributions are made to the field of valuation studies, by further developing 
insights on the notion of the test. The thesis also points out the central role of 
legitimate principles of difference and equivalence for successful commensuration,
and the tension between particularity and generalization in standardizing 
evaluation devices.
Second, the study contributes insights for scholarship on coordination and morality
in organizations. It demonstrates that considering coordination based on different 
degrees of generality yields important insights on intraorganizational coordination.
Finally, this study contributes to scholarship on cooperatives and collectivist 
organizations. The often noted duality of collective firms is reframed as the need to
balance and mediate different modes of coordination. The study develops a 
heuristic concept, the composite relation, which explains how collectives are held 
together despite their central tension between particular and collective goods.
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Appendix VII: Kollektivbetriebe zwischen Gemeinschaft und Unternehmen - 
Zusammenfassung
Das zentrale Forschungsinteresse dieser Arbeit ist zu verstehen, was es bedeutet gleichzeitig 
eine Gemeinschaft und ein Unternehmen zu sein, und welche Herausforderungen dadurch für 
die intraorganisationale Koordination entstehen. Die Arbeit interessiert sich dafür, wie 
alternative Betriebe unterschiedliche Menschen und Rationalitäten miteinander vereinbaren, 
ohne auf formale Hierarchien zurückzugreifen. In einer vergleichende Fallstudie von drei 
kleinen, direkt-demokratisch organisierten Kollektivbetrieben wird der Beziehung zwischen 
Koordination, Bewertung und Moralvorstellungen nachgegangen.
Die Mehrheit der Forschungsarbeiten, die sich mit Kollektivbetrieben beschäftigen, fokussiert 
auf das Design und die Aufrechterhaltung von demokratischen Governance-Strukturen. Ein 
solcher Fokus läuft Gefahr, die Bedeutung von intimen Wissen und persönlichen Beziehungen
für Koordination zu unterschätzen. Dies ist besonders wichtig, um Kollektivbetriebe zu 
verstehen, die auf gegenseitige Verantwortlichkeit und Kooperation zwischen ihren Mitgliedern
angewiesen sind. Dementsprechend basiert diese Arbeit auf Laurent Thévenots 
pragmatischer Soziologie des Engagements. Diese ermöglicht es Koordination zu analysieren,
die auf unterschiedlichen Graden von Generalisierung basiert.
Die Ergebnisse der Arbeit liefern einen Beitrag zu drei Forschungsbereichen:
Die Arbeit liefert einen Beitrag zum Feld der „valuation studies“. Es wird gezeigt, dass die mit 
Bewertung verbundene Unsicherheit zu Prozessen führen kann, die mehr einer kollektiven 
Entdeckung, als einem Konflikt zwischen unterschiedlichen Werten entsprechen. Darüber 
hinaus wird die zentrale Rolle von legitimen Differenzierungs- und Äquivalenzprinzipien für 
Kommensuration aufgezeigt, sowie die Spannung zwischen Partikularität und Generalisierung 
in standardisierten Bewertungsinstrumenten.
Die Arbeit liefert einen Beitrag zur Forschung zum Verhältnis von Koordination, Bewertung und
Moralvorstellungen in Organisationen. Sie zeigt, dass ein theoretischer Rahmen, der 
unterschiedliche Grade der Generalisierung von Koordination beachtet, wichtige Erkenntnisse 
für das Verständnis intraorganisationaler Koordination liefert.
Die Arbeit liefert einen Beitrag zur Forschung über Kollektivbetriebe und Genossenschaften. 
Indem die eingenommene Perspektive über die Analyse von Governance-Strukturen 
hinausgeht, wird die Dualität von Kollektivbetrieben als ein Problem der Balance zwischen 
unterschiedlichen Koordinationsmodi gerahmt. Aus dieser Perspektive ist die zentrale 
Spannung, die Kollektivbetriebe ausbalancieren müssen, eine zwischen auf Vertrautheit 
basierender Koordination und Koordination, die auf Generalisierung von Beziehungen beruht. 
Die Arbeit entwickelt das heuristisches Konzept der Kompositions-Beziehung, die erklärt, wie 
Kollektivbetriebe zwischen partikulären und kollektiven Gütern vermitteln.
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